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Abstract 
The macroeconomy of Saudi Arabia has been dominated by oil exports which 
between 1970 and 1995 accounted for more than 85% of total export earnings. 
Due to the fact that oil is an exhaustible resource, the price of which fluctuates 
considerably, and is produced in an enclave economy, the Saudi Arabian 
government had recognised the needs to diversify their economy away from oil as 
the main source of income. Since the oil price crashed in 1986, the Saudi Arabian 
government has adopted a new policy to develop non-oil sectors, such as 
manufacturing, agriculture and more recently, non-oil minerals. The main 
objective of this study is to evaluate the contribution of the non-oil minerals sector 
to the economic growth of Saudi Arabia during the period 1970-1995, using three 
different approaches. These approaches are the export portfolio approach, the 
input-output approach and the Dutch disease approach. The empirical findings of 
this study show the following: 
1. A non-oil export portfolio analysis provided guidance to the Saudi Arabian 
planners who seek simultaneously to reduce export earnings instability and 
achieve economic growth. An increase in the volume of machinery and transport 
equipment commodities could produce an optimum portfolio due to both price 
trends and stability of price over time. Other exports, including non-oil mineral 
commodities, are unstable and have relatively negative price trends. 
2. Even though preliminary results indicate that the non-oil minerals sector has a 
relatively low integration with other sectors, when the impact of inducing final 
demand is taken into account, this sector shows the highest income and the second 
highest employment multipliers. These results indicate that if this sector were to 
be stimulated by increasing final demand, it may well generate more income and 
employment than other sectors. Therefore, the application of an input-output 
approach was extended further to estimate the impact of three new promising non- 
oil mineral projects on the Saudi Arabian economy. Moreover, the construction 
and operation phase's multipliers reflect the potential of the non-oil minerals 
sector. 
iii 
3 -With regard to the effect of a boom in one sector of the economy on the rest of 
the sectors, the oil sector boom in the 1970s in the case of Saudi Arabia conforms 
very closely with the assumptions of the Dutch disease theory. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Saudi Arabia is well known as one of the major oil exporting countries in the 
world. Thus, oil exports and oil revenues play a major role in the Saudi Arabian 
economy. Oil exports account for an average of 85% of its total exports, while 
government revenues from oil vary between 70 to 90% on average between 1970- 
1995. However, oil is a finite resource and reserves will eventually be exhausted. 
Moreover, fluctuation in oil prices mean the economy has faced a series of 
external shocks during the last two decades. 
Throughout the Five-Year Development Plans (1970-1995), Saudi Arabian 
planners focused on economic diversification as a strategy to increase the 
production of the non-oil sector, such as manufacturing, agriculture and non-oil 
minerals, in order to reduce dependency on oil exports as a major source of 
government income and foreign exchange earnings. 
Manpower shortage and limitation of absorptive capacity were the main problems 
for the industrialisation strategy facing Saudi Arabian planners. Accordingly, they 
have chosen a tightly focused formula for growth. They have elected to invest 
large amounts of capital and small amounts of manpower in a few key industries. 
Using its advantage of having plentiful capital, a bounteous supply of energy and 
feedstock, Saudi Arabia has concentrated on two heavy process industries: baslc 
metals and petrochemicals. However, recent years have also shown an increasing 
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number of light industries as a result of government encouragement for an import 
substitution strategy. 
1.2 Importance of the Stud 
In its commitment to diversify the economic base away from the oil sector, the 
Saudi Arabian govenu-nent started to re-evaluate its policy with respect to 
diversification. In response to the fall of oil prices in 1982-83, Saudi Arabia 
realised the need to establish new industries that increase the role of the non-oil 
sector in the economy. The non-oil sectors, such as manufacturing and agriculture, 
were developed mainly through subsidies and the provision of incentives for 
private investment. Despite these efforts, the non-oil role in the economic growth 
is still relatively low, and its shares in both Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
exports are small. This failure of diversification could be attributed mainly to 
three reasons. 
(1) The oil sector has a weak linkage to the rest of the economy. Unlike other 
industries which draw their inputs of land, labour and capital from a wide 
variety of other smaller industries and, in turn, stimulate and invoke a 
wide range of productive activities, oil offers few such backward and 
forward linkages. 
(2) The oil industries' market is characterised by uncertainty (instability). 
Given Saudi Arabia's heavy dependence on oil and the fluctuation of oil 
prices, the ability of the govenunent to stabilise the total eamings is 
uncertain. Uncertainty about the availability of government revenues is 
3 
thought to complicate further the already difficult task of development 
planning. Moreover, uncertainty is taken to affect private investment. 
(3) Symptoms of the 'Dutch Disease' are present in the Saudi Arabian 
economy. It is believed that the oil boom was an obstacle to economic 
diversification in Saudi Arabia. The Dutch disease has induced structural 
changes on the Saudi Arabian economy. The oil boom induced structural 
changes through government spending effect that induced an appreciation 
in the real exchange rate following the acceleration of spending on the 
non-tradable sector e. g., goods and services. The excess demand for 
tradable goods induced by the boom is satisfied by imports at constant 
world price while the excess demand for the non-tradable goods will be 
offset by both their relative prices and their production. This implies an 
expansion in the non-tradable sector and a contraction in the tradable 
sector such as manufacturing and agriculture. 
However, the government's new trend was to develop and promote the non-oil 
minerals (mining and quarrying) sector in order to enhance its weak role in the 
Saudi Arabian economy. In fact, the government is providing substantial 
incentives to develop the sector. The reasons behind the new Saudi Arabian policy 
can be summarised as follows. Firstly, large reserves of both metallic and non- 
metallic minerals such as gold, iron, copper and clay have been found. Secondly, 
it is believed that the non-oil minerals industry has relatively strong linkages with 
other sectors inside the country. Finally, non-oil mineral exports, as well as other 
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non-oil commodities, could help in reducing the instability in exports and, in turn, 
reduce Saudi Arabia's total revenues fluctuation. 
1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Stud 
The aim of the study is therefore to test whether or not the new Saudi policy in 
developing the non-oil sector could successfully diversify the economy away from 
oil. The study, in particular, will evaluate the role of the non-oil minerals sector in 
the economic growth of Saudi Arabia during the period 1970-1995. Specifically, 
the study was intended to meet the following objectives: 
1. To highlight the main characteristics of the Saudi non-oil minerals sector. 
2. To evaluate and assess the Saudi diversification plans seeking to increase non- 
oil export earnings and reduce their instability. 
3. To examine and assess the linkages between the non-oil minerals sector and 
the other sectors of the economy, as well as the multiplier effects (output, income, 
employment, exports and import multipliers) of the sector on the rest of the 
sectors. 
4. To estimate the economic impacts of the new, promising, non-oil mineral 
proj ects. 
5. To investigate the effects of a boom in the oil sector on the non-oil sector in the 
economy and on the non-oil mineral sector in particular. 
1.4 Hypotheses of the Stud 
Four hypotheses are put forward, and these will be tested in the study. 
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1. Non-oil exports diversification is expected to reduce the Saudi earnings' 
instability and increase its growth. This hypothesis will be tested in Chapter 5. 
2. The inter-industry linkages of the non-oil mineral sector with the rest of the 
economy are predicted to be relatively strong, and its multiplier impacts 
especia y, the income and employment multipliers, are expected to be strong as 
well. These hypotheses will be tested in Chapter 6. 
3. The economic effects of the new non-oil mineral promising projects are 
expected to be strong. This hypothesis will be tested in Chapter 7. 
4. The booms in the oil sector are expected to result in an increase in relative 
prices of non-tradables to tradables, which would result in an expansion in the 
non-traded goods sector and contraction in that of traded goods. This hypothesis 
will be tested in Chapter 8. 
1.5 Methodology of the Study 
In order to test the hypotheses stated above, three main approaches are adopted. 
1. Portfolio Approac 
This approach is used in Chapter 5 in order to give guidance to Saudi planners 
who seek, simultaneously, to increase non-oil export earnings and reduce their 
instability. The objective of the export portfolio approach is to reduce fluctuations 
in total Saudi Arabian earnings below the level experienced by the individual 
commodities. Specifically, the purpose of the approach is to investigate 
operational guides to export diversification strategies to achieve greater stability 
in export earnings. 
2. Input-Output Approach 
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This approach is adopted in Chapter 6 in order to estimate and evaluate both the 
inter-in ustry linkages between the non-oil minerals sector and the other sectors 
of the economy, and the effects of a unit increase in the final demand of non-oil 
minerals on total output, income, employment, total exports and total imports (the 
multiplier effects). The aim of doing this is to see the extent to which the non-oil 
minerals sector is integrated with the rest of the sectors of the economy. The 
input-output approach is also applied in Chapter 7 in order to estimate the 
multiplier effects of some new mining projects. 
3. Dutch Disease Approach 
This approach is used in Chapter 8 to estimate the effects of a boom in the oil 
sector on relative prices of non-tradables to tradables, on the one hand, and on the 
structural composition of output in both sectors, on the other. The purpose of 
doing this is to investigate whether a boom in the Saudi oil sector leads to the 
results predicted by the Dutch disease theory or not, and how Saudi planners 
could respond to combat its symptoms in the tradables sector and in non-oil 
minerals in particular. 
In other chapters of the study, we use the descriptive approach to investigate the 
Saudi development strategy and highlight the main features and historical 
developments of the Saudi economy and non-oil minerals sector. 
1.6 Outline of the Stud 
The study is divided into nine chapters, the first of which is this introduction. The 
other chapters are organised as follows: 
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Chapter 2 characterises the features of the Saudi Arabian economy. Three phases 
of economic development are highlighted during the period under consideration 
(1970-1995). This chapter provides an extensive description of Saudi economic 
background, to give a broad idea of the Saudi economic structure. 
Chapter 3 begins with a critical survey of the main arguments for the policy of 
industrialisation. An overview of a variety of industrialisation theones and 
strategies is presented. The Saudi industrialisation policy is examined and 
discussed to see whether it complies with any of these strategies. Both oil and 
non-oil industries are introduced in order to see to what extent the Saudi 
industrialisation strategy succeeded in diversifying the economy away from crude 
oil as the main source of income. 
Chapter 4 touches upon the background of the Saudi non-oil minerals resources' 
sector. It highlights the existence of mining industries, and their characteristics in 
terms of reserves, productions, exports and imports. It also discusses the effects of 
the non-oil minerals sector on the Saudi economy by examining its direct 
contribution to the different macroeconomic components, such as GDP, balance 
of payments, employment, and foreign exchange savings. Furthermore, an 
analysis is made to pinpoint the main incentives introduced by the government to 
promote the sector. 
Chapter 5 sheds light on the tenus of trade between developing and less 
developed countries, and the variability in short-term commodity prices, in terms 
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of the causes and domestic consequences of export instability. The portfolio 
approach to export diversification, as proposed by Markowitz, is presented. The 
objective for applying the portfolio approach is to provide guidance to Saudi 
planners who seek simultaneously to increase non-oil export earnings and reduce 
their instability. 
Chapter 6 covers the input-output approach applied in order to estimate the inter- 
industry linkages between the non-oil minerals and other economy sectors in 
Saudi Arabia. One of the main aims of this chapter is to estimate the multiplier 
effects of the non-oil minerals sector on the Saudi economy, i. e., the estimation of 
its outputs, exports, imports, income, and employment multipliers. 
Chapter 7 shows how the input-output approach is applied again, given the result 
of the previous chapter, to trace the special incidence of impacts on the micro 
level to complement the macro picture. Bearing in mind the new promising non- 
oil mineral projects, it is possible to show the effects of an expansion within the 
non-oil mineral sector resulting from changes in the final demand for that sector's 
products. The aim is to draw on the economic impacts of each and the whole of 
the major extensions in the non-oil minerals industry employing an input-output 
approach. 
Chapter 8 investigates the change in exchange rate, the stunting of growth of 
manufacture (de-industrialisation), unemployment, the national income and real 
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GDP- The chapter focuses on how to combat the impact of the Dutch disease on 
the Saudi economy. 
Chapter 9 is a summary of the study findings, and provides some 
recommendations for promoting and diversifying the Saudi economy and 
developing the non-oil minerals sector, and suggestion for further research. 
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Chapter 2: Saudi Arabian Economic Development 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to providing a brief overview of the Saudi Arabian 
development process, as an aid to understanding of the Saudi economy as a 
whole. Furtherinore, examination of the economic policy would help in pointing 
out the limitations and the problems facing Saudi Arabia when it implements its 
economic policy. 
2.2 Saudi Arabian Development Strateg 
Saudi Arabia is roughly two-thirds the size of India or one-quarter that of the 
USA, with a relatively small population of 20 million in 2000. Before the 
discovery of oil in the Arabian Peninsula, it would be difficult to speak of a 
unified entity such as the Saudi Arabian economy. Before the 1930s, the region 
that would later come under the control of the Saudi state was composed of 
several regions that lived off specific resources and differentiated human 
activities. The Western Province (the Hijaz), for example, depended mainly on 
subsistence agriculture, some long-distance trade, and the provision of services to 
pilgrims travelling to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. A plantation economy 
that grew dates and other cash crops dominated the Eastern Province (Looney, 
1982). 
In the early stages of Saudi Arabia (1930-1945), the only non-traditional 
economic opportunities for Saudi citizens were linked to employment in the 
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military, provision of services for pilgrims, and some modest contracts and 
commissions. The little revenue was adequate to allow only minimal government 
functions, not to undertake economic and social projects. After the end of World 
War II, the development of the country's oil resources resulted in some wage 
payments to Saudis and local purchases of goods and services by foreign oil 
companies, but the impact on the Saudi economy was initially minor. Until 1970, 
oil income increased slowly, and the government usually operated under financial 
constraints. The government's economic decisions were largely those of 
determining priorities among alternative uses of limited resources (Findlay, 1994). 
The quantum jump in oil revenues in 1973-74 allowed the country to be the 
widespread agent of economic change, replacing the traditional economy with one 
that depended primarily on the state's outlays. The government has raised the 
average Saudi citizen's standard of living to one of the highest levels in the world, 
and established for most of its residents world class inErastructure and social 
services. But sustaining real income growth still depended primarily on 
government expenditure, which was largely facilitated by oil revenues. Therefore, 
the government could not afford to neglect the oil sector, the primary engine of 
economic growth. Despite attempts to diversify the economy, developing a self- 
perpetuating non-oil sector has proved more difficult than earlier Saudi planners 
had predicted (Vassiliev, 1998). 
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2.3 Development of Saudi Economic Polic 
Saudi Arabia first established a planning agency in 1958 in response to 
suggestions of International Monetary Fund (IMF) advisers. Planning was limited 
in the 1960s, partly because of Saudi financial limitations. The government 
concentrated its limited funds on developing human resources, the transportation 
system, and other infrastructure aspects. In 1965, planning was formalised in the 
Central Planning Organisation, and in the 1975 goverm-nent re-organisation, it 
became the Ministry of Planning. The Ministry of Finance and National Economy 
controlled funding and had considerable influence over the execution of the plan. 
Although the economic policies were formalised and adopted through each Five- 
Year Plan, three major events have reformed the Saudi economic policies. During 
the period studied (1970-1995), Saudi Arabia has experienced three phases of 
economic and political events. The first phase (1970-1985) was known as the oil 
boom period. This phase experienced an expansion in the industrial sector, 
construction, infrastructure and transport, and several pipeline projects grew 
rapidly to facilitate the sale of oil. The second phase (1986-1989) started after the 
crash of oil prices in 1986. The sharp downturns in world oil prices led to a 
decline in oil revenues and the draw-down of foreign investments to supplement 
the domestic expenditures. The third phase (1990-1995) was in the 1990s, 
specifically during and after the Gulf War in 1990-1991. The Gulf War had a 
harmful effect on the economy by forcing the government to borrow from 
international institutions. These three events have had an impact on the Saudi 
economic structure, and hence, on the Saudi policy makers' strategies. In the 
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remaining part of this chapter we are going to introduce and analyse these policies 
and the main economic characteristics for each period separately. 
2.3.1 Economic Policy During the Oil Boom (1970-1985) 
In the early 1970s, the economic situation changed dramatically. The quantity of 
oil exports expanded substantially, royalty payments and taxes on foreign oil 
companies increased sharply, and oil-exporting countries, including Saudi Arabia, 
began setting and raising oil export prices. Saudi revenues per barrel of oil, 
averaged from total production and oil revenues, increased from US$0.22 in 1948 
to US$1.8 in 1970. By 1973, the price had reached US$5.04, and higher in 1974 
following the Arab oil embargo. In 1982, the average export price per barrel of oil 
reached well above US$29. As a result, between 1973 and 1980, Saudi oil 
revenues jumped from Saudi Arabian Riyal (SR) 13.4 billion to SR 189.3 billion. 
At last, the higher oil revenues gave the Saudi government the means to make 
major structural changes in the economy. 
One choice facing Saudi planners in the early 1970s was whether to control oil 
production at a level that was adequate to finance limited economic and social 
development, or to allow production at a level that would meet world demand for 
crude oil. Choosing a relatively high production level would force a decision on 
whether to use resulting revenues for rapid domestic economic and social 
development or long-term investments abroad. Those planners who wanted to 
restrict oil production, except for that needed for limited development, argued 
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strongly that this policy would best preserve the country's resources for future 
generations. 
The choices emerged by 1974, and Saudi Arabia pledged to keep oil flowing at 
moderate prices, appropriate to world needs, arguing that the country was as 
dependent on the stability and prosperity of consuming countries as those 
countries were on Saudi oil. Saudi Arabia advocated a policy of moderate 
increases in oil prices that, in effect, would index the oil price to world inflation, 
and to economic growth in the major consumer countries (Rustow, 1983). 
Moreover, if Saudi Arabia wanted to ensure that oil would remain the energy 
source of choice, moderate prices were crucial. 
Despite these attempts to moderate oil prices, the supply and demand basics of the 
international oil market combined with the changes in ownership of downstream 
assets to raise international oil prices, creating huge pressures on the domestic 
front to invest rising oil revenues in developing the country's economic and social 
infrastructure. 
By the mid-1970s, the government had decided to use most of the growing oil 
revenues for a massive development effort. An important part of that effort was to 
industrialise, largely by investing in processing plants that used the country's vast 
hydrocarbon resources, Such strategy was laid down in the Council of Ministers' 
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Statement of National Industrial policy in 19741. This strategy meant at least a 
decade of very large investments to build the plants and the necessary 
infrastructure. It meant financing and building the gas-gathering system, the 
pipelines for gas and crude oil to bring the raw material to the two chosen main 
industrial sites, Al-Jubail and Yanbu, and building the industrial sites themselves. 
According to Turner and Bedore (1979), Saudi Arabia allocated SR 56.2 billion 
for hydrocarbon-based industries. The development effort also included many 
other projects, such as huge airports, hospitals, schools, industrial and plants, 
roads and ports. As illustrated in Table 2.4 (page 29), between 1970 and 1985, the 
massive government expenditures totalled more than SR 2 trillion. 
A large part of the funds spent on development programmes were intended to 
promote private sector investment and to support future objective. The pnvate 
sector was encouraged to "take the initiative, and mobilise its own resources" 
(Fourth Development Plan, p. 42). This encouragement took the fonn of tax 
concessions, trade protection and the provision of cheap finance and industrial 
sites. This government funding was estimated at nearly 50% of the capital 
invested by the private sector between 1974 and 1979, and about SR II billion 
during the Third Development Plan (1980-1985) alone (Soufi and Mayer, 1991). 
Furthermore, government expenditure was directed to more productive sectors in 
order to meet its future objective, the diversification. The emphasis was on import 
substitution instead of trade and construction only. The goverranent increased the 
1 Statement of National Industrial Policy in Saudi Arabia (Council of Minister's 
Resolution No. 15 dated 2.6.1974). 
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funding to manufacturing industry, and built the industrial complexes at AI-Jubail 
and Yanbu. 
Starting in the mid-1970s, the goverment decided that an adequate infrastructure 
was crucial to future development. Providing this infrastructure included 
refurbishing and building electricity, water, sewerage, desalination, and 
telecommunication systems. Moreover, it entailed creating airports and ports, and 
laying a vast network of roads. In terins of generating and distributing electric 
power, the government assisted private companies in building and operating its 
electricity network through concessionary capital loans and continuing operating 
subsidies. Apart from upgrading distribution facilities for water, the government 
built several desalination plants, and drilled wells, built dams, and installed 
pumps. Telecommunications were quickly brought to international standards, 
allowing Saudi Arabia to handle all its communication needs in local and 
international telephone, telegraph, maritime, and television distribution services, 
via cable, satellite, and terrestrial transmission systems. In the period 1973-1985, 
there was a massive increase in government spending on education, to an annual 
level of about 10% of the budget. 
The main problem in the period of rapid development of the mid-1970s to the 
early 1980s stemmed from the government's interest to subsidise production, 
consumption, and investment. The objectives of subsidies were threefold: 
encouraging non-oil economic activity, meeting social goals, and redistributing 
income. The subsidy programme may have created greater problems than were 
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earlier anticipated. Saudi planners never thought that oil revenues would constrain 
spending to the extent that they did in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Most Saudi 
production subsidies had been indirect subsidies, which reduced the cost to 
consumers of electricity and other industrial inputs, leading to unnecessary waste. 
The industrial sector thereby became a relatively inefficient producer and made 
little effort to wean itself from government assistance. For example, the slump in 
oil revenues in 1982-83 forced the Saudi govenunent to reconsider its subsidies to 
the industrial and agriculture sectors. As a result, the number of industrial licences 
issued in the first half of 1983 fell sharply by 50% compared to those issued in 
1982 (Vassillev, 1998). 
The pace of modernisation was also economically disruptive. The substantial 
development effort created many risks, especially in the structure of the Saudi 
labour market and in high inflation. The Saudi labour force has undergone 
tremendous change in the latter decades as a consequence of the modem 
economy. The size of the effort and the tecl-mology involved required the 
contribution of a huge number of foreign workers for a long period, with the 
potential of disrupting the society. With the domestic labour force growing at an 
average of 5% annually between 1975 and 1985, despite an annual population 
growth among the highest in the world at 3.5%, foreign labour was still necessary. 
According to the Ministry of Planning, the total work force in 1980 was around 3 
million, of which 0.8 million workers were in producing sectors and 2.3 million 
were in the services sectors. As shown in Table 2.1, labour was concentrated in 
four main sectors in 1980. Agriculture accounted for 17.8% of the total work 
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force, construction 20.9%, commerce 10.6%, and social services, including 
government service, 34.4%. By 1995, the total labour force had risen to close to 7 
million, with 1.06 million in production sectors and 5.9 million in service sectors. 
Agriculture's share had fallen to 5.5%, construction was down to 15.3%, whereas 
commerce's share of the labour force rose to 14.8%, and community and social 
services were up to 48.6%. 
Table 2.1: Development of Labour Force in Saudi Arabia by Sectors (1970-1995) 
(In thousands) 
Sector Year 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Agriculture 445.8 426.1 545.6 538 393.2 377.2 
Oil 20.2 21.3 36.0 65.1 53.6 60.4 
Non-Oil Mineral 25.7 45.6 47.0 62.9 52.3 59.1 
Manufacturing 36.1 46.5 170.4 424.1 494.7 566.9 
Utilities 12.2 18.3 67.0 112.2 66.5 79.7 
Construction 141.5 314.2 638.9 1470 916.7 1060.7 
Commerce 130.2 211.0 323.1 688.7 921.9 1026.7 
Transportation 62.1 103.2 180.0 316.5 274.9 319.9 
Service 250.2 357.2 654.6 1163.1 2218 2549.8 
Government 112.7 168.8 399.4 469.1 711.2 817.7 
Total 1236.7 1712.2 3062 5309.7 6103 6918.1 
Source: Ministry ot Flanning (1999). 
The domestic work force numbered 1 million people (58% of total employment) 
in 1975. By 1980, employment of foreigners had risen from 723 thousand in 1975 
to more than I million (or 46% of total employment). They were about 57% of the 
labour force in 1992, and about 90% of the labour force in the private sector in 
1995 (Sixth Development Plan, 1996-2000). There is no official figure on the 
Saudi unemployment; however, according to a new non-official estimate, Saudi 
unemployment has risen from 13.4% in 1992 to 20% in 2000 (Saudi American 
Bank, 2001). These figure led the Saudi government to implement a new policy 
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called 'Saudisation', in order to replace foreign workers by domestic workers. The 
Saudisation plan involved equality in the application of the labour regulations 
between Saudi and non-Saudi workers, and an increase in the number of technical 
and vocational education institutions. Some observers questioned whether Saudi 
refineries and petrochemical plants would be efficiently managed and prove 
competitive within a reasonable time. According to Johany et al. (1986), Saudi 
Arabia found itself in a position to build both its capital stock and its labour force 
and, at the same time, produce a balanced industrial development. As the 
Saudisation plan was implemented recently in the last Five Year plan, the 
outcome of this policy may take years to succeed. 
By the mid- I 970s, the country had also encountered high inflation. As a result of 
massive expenditure, as well as supply difficulties linked to the incomplete 
infrastructure,, a strong inflationary pressure was experienced in Saudi Arabia. 
Another reason was the heavy reliance on imports to meet the excess demand. 
Table 2.2: Inflation in Average Rates (%) 
Five-Year Development Plans 
First (1970- 
1975) 
Second (1976- 
1980) 
Third (1981- 
1985) 
Fourth (1986- 
1990) 
Fifth (1991- 
1995) 
16.29 9.5 -0.14 -0.16 2.12 
Source: SAMA Annual Report (1998). 
As illustrated in Table 2.2, the first and second development plans (specifically, 
the period 1973-77) experienced the highest rates of inflation. Since 1978, the rate 
of inflation has been significantly reduced as a result of the government's 
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adopting many fiscal and monetary measures, such as reducing government 
expenditure, appreciation of the Saudi currency, which had a positive effect on 
import prices, and control of the money supply. Thus, compared to the annual 
average rise of 16.3% in the general cost of living index during 1970-1975, the 
rate of inflation in Saudi Arabia during 1978-1985 averaged only 0.8% per year. 
Table 2.3 below, shows the growth rates of GDP during the first phase (1970- 
1985), in Saudi Arabia. GDP for the first Five-Year Development Plan (1970- 
1975) was to increase by 9.8% per year (in constant prices) and show the greatest 
increase in the non-oil sectors. The unanticipated great expansion of crude oil 
production, accompanied by large increases in revenues per barrel, contributed to 
an exceptionally high rate of economic growth, of 10.2%, while non-oil real GDP 
increased far beyond the Saudi planners' expectations by 11.1 % per year in the 
same period. 
In the second Development Plan (1976-80), GDP was to grow at an average rate 
of 10% per year. The non-oil sector's real planned rate of increase was 13.3% per 
year; the oil sector's projected rate of growth was 9.7%, although actual growth 
would depend on world markets. Despite the massive increase in government 
expenditures, overall real GDP growth at an average of 8.3% per year was below 
the planned 10% rate. This lower growth resulted from a slower than anticipated 
growth in oil production, a function of international market conditions factors. 
Non-oil GDP grew at an average annual rate of 11.6% per year compared with a 
planned rate of 13.3%. The producing components grew at 16.6% per year on 
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average (the real plan rate was 13%), with most components outpacing their 
targets. The following components all exceeded their targets: agriculture, 
manufacturing, utilities, and services (including commerce, transport, and 
finance). Construction paralleled the planned growth rate, and non-oil mineral and 
public sector projects did not meet targets. 
Table 2.3: Gross Domestic Products bv Oil and Non-Oil Sectors 
(Constant 1970 Prices, million SR) 
Five-Year Oil Sector Non-Oil Sector Total 
Development 
Plans 
Year 
GDP 
Value 
Annual 
Rate of 
Growth 
(%) 
Share 
in 
GDP 
(%) 
GDP 
Value 
Annual 
Rate of 
Growth 
(%) 
Share 
in 
GDP 
(%) 
Annual 
Rate of 
Growth 
(%) 
1970 11277 - 56.7 8630 - 43.4 - 
First 1971 13731 17.87 59.8 9232 6.52 40.2 13.3 
1972 16934 18.91 61.6 10561 12.58 38.4 16.5 
1973 19575 13.49 61.9 12067 12.48 38.1 13.1 
1974 18639 -5.02 58.8 13085 7.78 41.3 0.3 
1975 18869 1.22 54.8 15593 16.08 45.3 7.9 
1976 20375 7.39 51.4 19294 19.18 48.6 13.1 
Second 1977 21241 4.08 50.5 20787 7.18 49.5 5.6 
1978 21801 2.57 48.6 23037 9.77 51.4 6.3 
1979 23401 6.84 47.4 25970 11.29 52.6 9.2 
1980 24232 3.43 45.5 29050 10.60 54.5 7.3 
1981 21949 -10.40 40.5 32214 9.82 59.5 1.6 
Third 1982 13787 -59.20 28.5 34555 6.77 71.5 -12.0 
1983 12443 -10.80 25.8 35844 3.60 74.2 -0.1 
1984 11451 -8.66 24.3 35766 -0.22 75.8 -2.3 
1985 9785 -17.03 21.6 35519 -0.70 78.4 -4.2 
1986 13641 28.27 28.5 34183 -3.91 71.5 5.3 
Fourth 1987 12769 -6.83 27.1 34396 0.62 72.9 -1.4 
1988 14345 10.99 28.3 36388 5.47 71.7 7.0 
1989 14950 4.05 29.4 35875 -1.43 70.6 0.2 
1990 18094 17.38 32.2 38149 5.96 67.8 9.6 
1991 22876 20.90 37.5 38086 -0.17 62.5 7.7 
Fifth 1992 24495 6.61 39.1 38168 0.21 60.9 2.7 
1993 23564 -3.95 37.9 38700 1.37 62.2 -0.6 
1994 23606 0.18 37.7 38978 0.71 62.3 0.5 
1 1995 23619 0.06 37.6 39258 0.71 62.4 0.5 
Average 1.69 41.3 5.69 58.7 4.3 
Source: CjDF values taken trom NAMA Annual Keport ýi vvzs). 
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The third Development Plan (1981-1985) coincided with the sharp downturn in 
Saudi oil production. The oil sector's output fell on average 21.2% per year. As a 
result, during the five years of the plan, the average annual real GDP growth rate 
declined by 3.4% compared with a planned annual increase of 1.3%. The principal 
factors behind the continued positive rates of growth in the non-oil sector (3.9% 
on average per year) were the relatively few cutbacks in government expenditures 
and the continuation of major infrastructure and industrial projects despite 
declining oil revenues. The non-oil manufacturing sector and utilities expanded at 
12.4% and 18.6%, respectively, but at annual growth rates well below their 
targets. The construction sector contracted, but only at half the rate of what was 
expected. The agricultural sector grew rapidly, surging to 8.1% per year. The 
service sector maintained its momentum during the third plan, with commerce and 
government services leading the way. Transportation and finance, however, fell 
well below their targets. 
2.3.2 Economic Policv After the 1986 Oil-Price Crash 
The general thrust of Saudi economic strategy underwent a fundamental change 
after the oil price crash of 1986. The serious exhaustion of foreign assets, 
combined with the extensive decline in oil revenues, imposed a revised economic 
policy. The depreciation of the United States dollar on international financial 
markets also harmed Saudi purchasing power abroad. Saudi external terms of 
trade deteriorated rapidly, because oil exports were largely denominated in United 
States dollars, and the bulk of Saudi imports came from countries whose 
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currencies were appreciating relative to the US dollar, such as Western Europe 
and Japan. 
Reassessment of the development programme became necessary. The priority task 
was shoring-up government finances, yet domestic constraints allowed only a few 
options, especially in terrns of raising non-oil revenues. Imposing an income tax, 
for example, was out of the question, partly because of its political dangers in a 
country where it was an unknown procedure likely to raise questions of income 
distribution and taxation without representation. Also, an income tax seemed 
impractical because the bureaucratic difficulties involved in collection would be 
more expensive than the tax revenue would justify. The government held back 
some current account spending and cut capital spending, partly by delaying 
projects and also by cancelling some programmes. Moreover, it was informed by 
the governnient, that subsidies of private sector vast capital expenditures had 
ended for the present and, whereas certain major projects would be completed, the 
government's emphasis would shift to improving the efficiency and maintenance 
of its public assets. 
The government's attempts to deal with the persistent budget deficits, largely 
through expenditure reduction, depletion of foreign assets, and the sale of 
development bonds, generally helped stabilise its financial situation by the late 
1980s. It became clear by 1989 that the economy had weathered some of the other 
problems, such as the spate of bankruptcies of private companies, the growth of 
bad banking debts, and the massive outflow of private capital to overseas financial 
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centres that followed the oil-price crash of 1986. During 1989 and 1990, 
economic planners had renewed optimism. New plans were made to put the oil 
and non-oil sectors of the economy on a surer footing. The perceived recovery in 
international oil consumption and prices provided the government with the 
opportunity to resume spending to promote economic growth. As a result, two 
major initiatives became the basis of Saudi economic policy. 
Firstly, Saudi Arabia unveiled plans to raise crude oil production capacity to 
between 10.5 million and II million barrels per day (bpd) (Findlay, 1994). With 
the restructuring of the General Petroleum and Mineral Organisation (Petromin), 
formed in 1962; the creation of SamareC2, which was given control over most of 
the Saudi oil refineries; and the announcement of a major plan to upgrade 
domestic and export refineries, a comprehensive picture emerged of the 
government's effort to promote oil investments. Another indication of Saudi 
intentions came in 1989, when the national oil company Saudi Arabian Oil 
Company (Saudi Aramco) purchased 50% of Star Enterprises in the United States, 
a joint venture with Texaco, that signalled Saudi pursuit of geographically 
diversified downstream projects. 
Secondly, the government was not willing to continue its expansionist fiscal 
policies, Askari and Dastmaltschi (1990). Despite moderately higher oil prices, 
Samarec was acquired completely by Saudi Aramco in 1996. 
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defence expenditure, oil capacity expansion plans, and current expenditures 
accounted for the bulk of total spending, and did not pen-nit a fiscal boost. 
However, because the non-oil private sector remained largely dependent on 
government expenditures, the sharp reductions in capital expenditures constrained 
economic diversification. In the light of this failure, the government adopted two 
strategies to reorient and promote the private sector. 
Given the fall in oil revenues, the governinent funding agencies were unable to 
continue to provide enough sources to the private sector. The government 
recognised that existence of strong financial institutions can play a major role and 
channel the surplus private sector capital into development projects. As a result, 
reform of the financial sector was the government's main option. Since 1988, the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), created in 1952 to serve as the central 
bank, had made great steps in boosting commercial bank balance sheets through 
mergers, debt write-offs, and injection of funds to prevent failures. Subsequently, 
banking regulations and supervision were tightened, and compliance with 
international capital adequacy requirements enforced. SAMA also encouraged 
banks to take a more active role in financing private sector investments (Presley, 
1989). 
Protectionism as a government policy was also introduced during this period 
(1985-1989). Partly motivated by the impasse in Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC) negotiations with the European Communities (EC), but mainly to protect 
domestic private investment, Saudi Arabia began enforcing some restrictive tariff 
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and other barriers that had been instituted in the mid-1980s. Confonning to GCC- 
wide levels, it raised its tariff rates to 20% on most items, with certain industrial 
items gaining protection at higher rates. The government also began enforcing 
other regulations, such as preference for nationally-produced commodities and the 
continued application of preference for local contractors, as well as quality 
standards that favoured local production. In addition, it assiduously protected 
domestic banks from foreign competition by barring the sale of any foreign 
financial products and services. 
During the period of fourth Development Plan (1986-1990), oil revenues 
plummeted following the oil-price crash of 1986. Overall real rates of GDP 
growth averaged a positive 10.8% per year. The revival in crude oil output from 
the low levels of 1986, however, boosted oil sector growth rates to 4.1 % per year. 
The sharp decline in external income caused lower rates of output expansion in 
the producing sectors. Construction and non-oil mineral sector growth rates fell by 
8.5 and 1.9%, respectively. Other manufacturing continued to grow modestly at 
1.1% per year, but well below the 15.5 % target. Commerce, transport, and finance 
reflected the financial setbacks in the government's programme with annual 
average production declines. Two surprises helped to offset the depressed growth 
rates: agriculture, which had shown steadily higher rates of output growth in the 
second and third plans, rose by 13.4% per year on average during the fourth plan, 
and nearly doubled its planned rate; and the utilities sector's ability to surpass its 
planned target of 5% per year (see Table 2.3). 
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2.3.3 Economic Policy After 1990 
The Gulf War halted the 'mini-boom' that the above policies had fostered. In the 
immediate wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the government faced 
two tasks. Firstly, it had to deal with the massive outflow of assets from the 
domestic banking sector by liquidating the commercial banks (which lost more 
than 12% of their deposits within the first month of the crisis), encouraging a 
repatriation of private assets, and restoring the confidence of foreign creditors 
who had cancelled lines of credit as a precautionary measure. SAMA reversed 
most of the haemorrhage caused by the loss of confidence in the Saudi nyal. 
Secondly, the government was obliged to raise oil output to levels unseen since 
the early 1980s. Saudi Aramco had to respond to a serious crisis without an 
adequate consideration of its overall production capacity. It quickly became 
apparent that the country had sufficient capacity to replace the bulk of the 4.5 
million to 5 million bpd of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil embargoed by the United Nations 
(UN). Production increased rapidly to 8.5 million bpd, which restored some calm 
to the international oil market; however, by the end of 1990, oil prices were nearly 
double those in June 1990. 
Supporting the allied multinational forces, however, placed a massive burden on 
the govemment's budget. The deficits for 1990/1991 reached record levels, so the 
fiscal authorities were forced again to engage in further extemal asset draw- 
downs, increased volumes of development bond sales, and for the first time, 
external borrowing from commercial banks and export credit agencies. Saudi 
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Arabia was a prominent member of the World Bank 3. However, because of the 
country's high per capita income, it was not entitled to borrow from that 
organisation. Most of the major projects programmed before August 1990, 
however, were preserved. Moreover, external borrowing had gained credence as 
the means to fund not only budgetary deficits but also the capital programmes of 
major public enterprises. Notably, Saudi Aramco did not scale back its crude oil 
capacity expansion plan. Rather, it appeared that new ways of financing were 
being sought from foreign commercial banks, multinational companies, and the 
domestic private sector. Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) also moved 
to raise capital overseas, while Saudi Consolidated Electric Company (Sceco), the 
electricity company, requested foreign suppliers to help finance its expansion 
programme. 
The fiscal crisis did not cause economic problems for the private sector because 
the government's reduction of its budgeted spending was relatively small, as seen 
in Table 2.4. Domestic government spending in support of the Gulf War effort 
surged, and many Saudi companies benefited from Gulf War-related contracts. 
Also, as a result of the Gulf War, the more than 600,000 troops of the 
multinational forces increased domestic spending on consumer goods. The mini- 
boom, which was interrupted by the Iraqi invasion, was revived by this increase in 
government expenditures, and then received further stimulus by three other 
factors. 
' Saudi aid to IMF during the period 1976-1980 constituted 6% of the country's GDP 
(World Bank, 1980, World Development Report). 
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Table 2.4: Annual Saudi Budgets (Billion SR) 
Year Revenue Expenditure 
Total 
Budget 
Surplus 
Oil % 
Share 
Annual 
% 
Growth 
Rate 
Non- 
Oil 
% 
Share 
Annual 
% 
Growth 
Rate 
Totaf- and- 
Deficit 
1970 5.1 90 0.5 9.7 5.7 6.1 -0.4 
1971 6.8 86 17.1 1.1 14.2 5.8 8.0 6.3 1.7 
1972 9.8 88 29.7 1.3 11.9 1.9 11.1 8.1 3.0 
1973 13.5 88 36.6 1.9 12.2 5.5 15.3 10.2 5.1 
1974 39.3 94 258.3 2.4 5.8 5.5 41.7 18.6 23.1 
1975 49.2 89 99.1 5.9 10.7 34.9 55.1 35.0 20.1 
1976 93.5 90 442.9 9.9 9.6 39.9 103.4 81.8 21.6 
1977 121.2 89 277.1 14.8 10.9 48.6 136.0 128.3 7.7 
1978 114.0 87 -71.5 16.6 12.7 18.5 130.7 138.1 -7.4 
1979 115.1 88 10.4 16.4 12.5 -1.9 131.5 148.0 -16.5 
1980 189.3 90 742.2 21.9 10.4 54.7 211.2 188.4 22.8 
1981 319.3 92 1300.1 28.8 8.3 69.1 348.1 236.6 111.5 
1982 328.6 89 92.9 39.4 10.7 106.0 368.0 284.7 83.3 
1983 186.0 76 -1426 60.2 24.4 207.6 246.2 243.8 2.4 
1984 145.1 70 -408.8 61.3 29.7 11.2 206.4 222.3 -15.9 
1985 121.3 71 -237.8 50.2 29.3 -111.4 171.5 212.9 -41.4 
1986 42.5 56 -788.8 34.0 44.5 -161.3 76.5 260.0 -183.5 
1987 67.4 65 249.4 36.4 35.1 23.7 103.8 200.0 -96.2 
1988 48.4 57 -190.1 36.2 42.8 -2.1 84.6 159.6 -75.0 
1989 75.9 66 275.0 38.7 33.8 25.0 114.6 141.2 -26.6 
1990/91' 71 -8.1 18.1 76 36.6 23.6 154.7 140.5 14.3 
1992 127.0 77 - 38.4 23.2 - 165.4 359.6 -194.2 
1993 106.0 75 -210.3 35.5 25.1 -28.7 141.5 181.0 -39.5 
1994 95.5 74 -105.4 33.5 26 -19.6 129.0 197.0 -68.0 
1995 105.7 72 102.4 40.8 27.9 72.6 146.5 160.0 -13.5 
'Due to Uult War, Budget Allocation tor the tiscal year 199U was amaigamateci with the 
budget for 1991. 
Source: SAMA (1997). 
First, the private sector again repatriated capital, and the stock market boomed, 
with share issues rising to unprecedented levels. Secondly, changing regional 
politics encouraged many firms which had set up manufacturing and processing 
plants for the domestic market, to seek sales in Iran, Turkey, and Central Asia. 
Thirdly, the government cut domestic fees and utility charges almost in half This 
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increased subsidy was targeted to both lower and middle income Saudis, but had 
the net effect of raising domestic disposable income. 
As constrained resources shaped the fifth Development Plan (1991-1995), overall 
GDP growth rate was 2.2% per year below the target plan of 3.2%. Oil sector 
output was increased by 4.8% per year (nearly double the expected increase of 
2.2%), while non-oil sector growth rate was increased only by 0.6%, below the 
target of 3.6%. Agriculture, other manufacturing, utilities, and finance were to 
pace the economy, while other sectors would show only modest growth rates of 
2% to 4% year. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Saudi Arabia, like most of the developing countries, is a mono-economy. Crude 
oil is the main source of the country's foreign exchange. While oil revenues, since 
1970, replaced the old Saudi economy with a new economy, they made the 
country vulnerable to oil price fluctuations. We have seen in this chapter that 
during phase one of Saudi Arabian economic development, the authorities tried to 
consolidate the massive inflow of oil revenues to build the infrastructure and raise 
the living standard of Saudi citizens. In the second phase, however, these plans 
were interrupted by the negative consequences of the massive decline in oil 
prices. The authorities embarked on a series of political and economic reforms in 
order to improve the domestic economic conditions. The results of these reforms 
were impressive. In the third phase, however, the Gulf War again slowed down 
Saudi economic growth. 
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This chapter has presented a general overview of the Saudi Arabian economic 
development strategy. Saudi industrialisation policies will be analysed in the 
following chapter. Both oil and non-oil sectors industry will be examined in order 
to assess the Saudi diversification strategy away from crude oil as the main source 
of Saudi income. 
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Chapter 3: Industrialisation, Theory and Practice: Saudi Arabia, 1970-1995 
3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Saudi Arabia's heavy reliance on crude oil 
exports as a main source of income and exchange earnings resulted in a series of 
external shocks during the past twenty-five years. The decline in oil prices on 
1986 caused the country to experience a severe reduction of foreign exchange in 
which infrastructure development and production depended. As a result, the 
growth rate of the economy slowed. Since then, the Saudi planners changed their 
development policy by concentrating investment on non-oil sectors such as 
manufacturing, agriculture and, more recently, non-oil minerals to diversify the 
Saudi economic base and reduce dependency on crude oil as a major source of 
income. 
This chapter discusses the issue of industrialisation in developing countries, and in 
Saudi Arabia in particular. We begin with a critical survey of the main literature 
on the arguments for deliberate industrialisation, and then examine the 
industrialisation experience of Saudi Arabia between 1970 and 1995. 
3.2 Deliberate Industrialisation in Developing Countries 
Industrialisation has often been seen as a panacea for the problems of developing 
countries. A common justification for a deliberate Industrialisation programme as 
the most promising solution for economic difficulties of developing countries is 
related to the question of transmission of development through trade. The question 
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arises of how the industrialisation programme can best be implemented. This 
question has been tackled from a wide range of angles, and the result has been a 
variety of theories, including import substituting industrialisation (ISI), 'big- 
push', balanced growth versus unbalanced growth, etc. 
The selection of ISI as a development strategy starts when the government accepts 
the idea that development can be initiated by import replacement. In addition to 
the above arguments for deliberate industrial i sation, ISI is also advocated because 
of the LDCs' desire for political independence and their recurring balance of 
payments difficulties. The best sign that ISI is an intended policy is the growing 
pattern of tariff protection and other incentives given to different industries over 
time. 
The functioning of ISI has been easier than export expansion for governments, 
since the only action needed is to impose tariff and quantitative restrictions on 
imports. These restrictions on imports have various impacts, as perceived by 
Maitra (1967) and Van (1964) who had studied these impacts on East Africa. 
First, they set up obvious investment opportunities in the protected industries with 
extra profits as a result of protective measures. Investible resources were then 
directed into protected new industries (leading to structural change), thus 
increasing the capitalist sector. Assuming that capitalists are higher savers and 
reinvest their profits in the already expanded industrial activities, it was then 
expected that the process would lead to an increase in both the saving rate and 
investment. Secondly, foreign exchange realised by reduced imports of consumer 
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goods could be utilised in importation of raw materials and investment goods to 
expand further the process of the industrialisation. Thirdly, foreign manufacturers 
might be forced into setting up local plants through fear of losing the local market 
through import restrictions. A high profits share and hence a higher saving ratio in 
the protected sectors would lead to low demand for imports. As a result, the 
foreign exchange difficulties could be overcome, and more labour and natural 
resources could be utilised in productive industries. Moreover, in the long run, 
improvements in skill (learning by doing) and other favourable externalities from 
industrialisation could spread technical progress and investment to the export 
sectors. 
In general, ISI was perceived as a strategy of self-generating phases, in the sense 
that new industries come into existence as the domestic markets for goods are 
being shaped (Hirschman, 1968). It begins with consumer goods, and then extends 
into more sophisticated goods, and then gradually into investment and capital 
goods. The reason that ISI begins with consumer goods is firstly due to the 
existence of a large market primarily for consumer goods, while the market for 
capital and investment goods is limited because of the very small manufacturing 
sectors, so its expansion depends on previous investment programmes. Secondly, 
the cost disadvantage between domestically produced and imported goods is 
lower for consumer goods than for investment and capital goods; the initial capital 
expenditure for consumer goods is much lower than for the latter; also, they 
require much lower levels of technological sophistication. However, many 
economists have disagreed with the principle of the ISI model perceived by 
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Hirschman. They have found that, in practice, the transition from consumer to 
investment and capital goods is difficult and even virtually impossible to achieve 
in most LDCs (see, for example, Felix, 1968). Bruton (1970) also argued that 
consumer goods are inessential to the development process, and an increase in 
their cost and their prices is less hannful than an increase in the price of capital 
and investment goods which are perceived to be more vital for the development 
process. 
To promote ISI strategy, therefore, the imports of capital goods are also favoured 
against their domestic production by lower tariff rates and exchange rates that 
significantly understate their real costs to society. In other words, protective tariffs 
which are the main factor of the ISI strategy are usually biased against consumer 
goods and in favour of capital goods. High protection is given to final consumer 
goods, while capital goods, intermediate and raw material inputs receive less or no 
protection. To intensify ISI policy, other means are often used in conjunction with 
tariffs, import controls, and overvaluation of exchange rates. These means range 
from the provision of cheap loans by developments banks to direct government 
participation in the preferred industries. In short, ISI policy is expected to operate 
as the engine of growth, development, and social transformation. 
However, it is now fully recognised that ISI policy is not a panacea for the 
problems of the LDCs, and that it can not be relied upon to overcome these 
problems on its own and bring about the expected growth and development. In the 
neoclassical framework, maximum world welfare in terms of production is 
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attained if countries produce and trade according to their comparative advantage. 
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade, a country can 
promote a higher economic growth if it specialises in producing that good which 
uses the country's abundant factor of production. In other words, a country tends 
to have lower comparative cost in the commodity that uses the largest amount of 
the relatively cheapest factor in its economy. These considerations provide the 
fundamental rationale for specialisation. In this framework, ISI, by distorting the 
market through the imposing of tariffs and other protective systems, and by 
deviating from the principle of comparative advantage, leads to misallocation of 
resource and inefficiency, and is thus doomed to failure. Economists such as 
Krueger (1984) have rejected this theory because it is based on the assumption of 
a perfect competitive international market. They contend that, in reality, the 
international market is distorted. They also argue that history shows that not all 
LDCs have followed this theory, such as Korea, Mexico and Malaysia. If they did, 
they would have specialised in producing primary goods, while developed 
countries would have specialised in manufacturing goods. However, specialisation 
in producing primary goods might not be beneficial for LDCs because of the 
declining terms of trade for these goods, and price instability. As the assumptions 
of the neoclassical framework do not hold in reality, especially in the case of 
LDCs, then its absolute rejection of the ISI policy is not valid. This, however, 
does not mean that one can abandon the criterion of comparative advantage and 
efficiency altogether. 
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Other economists have also criticised the ISI policy. For example, Little et al. 
(1970) argue that excessive protection encourages over-development of ISI and 
contravenes the principle of comparative advantage, and gives rise to distortions 
in the domestic factor and production markets, in the sense that labour in 
manufacturing industries, and domestic currency in terms of foreign currencies are 
overvalued, while capital is undervalued. They argue in favour of promotion 
rather than protection of industries, i. e. subsidisation of labour cost, education, 
training, etc. These economists are concerned with development policy which 
promotes those industries which are potentially capable of using factors of 
production efficiently. They suggest that strategies for allocation of resources 
have to be carried out in such a way that it would eliminate the divergence 
between market and social costs and benefits. 
The Rosenstein-Rodan (1966) 'big-push' theory emphasises the need for external 
economies to be realised through industrialisation, and advocates a high minimum 
amount of investment in order to jump over the economic hindrances to 
development. The fundamental idea of a big-push, as perceived by authors such as 
Nurske (1964), was as a measure for conquering the cruel circle of poverty, i. e. a 
country is poor because savings are low, hence investment is low, hence there is 
no growth, and hence poverty continues. 
The 'big-push' approach has been included into a demand-side version of 
'balanced growth' theory. This version is based on indivisibilities in the 
production function and demand-side considerations. It states that in a developing 
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economy, the demand for a particular manufactured good is insufficient to support 
the minimum of output of an efficient manufacturing factory and, if it gets under 
way by itself, it is likely to fail, since its beneficiaries (owners and workers) will 
want to spend their earnings not only on the products of their factory but on a 
variety of other goods. As a result, this factory will not be established, and the 
only way to make development possible is to establish simultaneously a range of 
different new industries, 
Hirschman (1958) has three basic criticisms of the balanced growth theory. First, 
he argues that, from the demand point of view, balanced growth is only required 
in special situations; if the new industry is either cost-reducing rather than output 
increasing (or even output-increasing if its output is highly desired) or import 
replacing or export-oriented, it would be established separately from schemes for 
balanced growth. Second, he points out that although this balanced growth is 
rationally very satisfactory, it is extremely expensive in terms of scarce resources 
and independent decision-making. He added that the country's obtainable 
resources, especially in capital, entrepreneurs and decision-makers, at any one 
time, set some limits on the number of synchronised investments that can be made 
simultaneously. Thirdly, he argues that if LDCs had sufficient technical and 
enterpreneurial resources for the simultaneous setting-up of a large number of 
industries, they would not have remained underdeveloped any more. 
Instead of arguing for a broad front of investments, the advocates of 'unbalanced 
growth' theory stress that the task of a development strategy is to look after 
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disproportion and disequilibria. The economy is assumed to be 'squeezable', and 
it responds to the right kinds and doses of stimulus. The question they try to 
answer is this: Given a limited amount of investment resources, and a series of 
proposed projects whose total investment exceeds the available resources, how do 
we select the projects that will make the greatest contribution to development? 
According to Hirschman, the relative desirability of the growth of various 
economic activities may be analysed through considerations of the structural 
independence between any activity and all the others. He specifies two 
inducement mechanisms through which one activity gives stimulus directly and 
indirectly to the others: the backward linkage effects and the forward linkage 
effects. He argues that the most useful industrialisation policy would be to 
encourage those industries (sectors) with potentially higher combined linkages, 
because this will provide the maximum inducement to other sectors to develop. 
The notion of inter-industry linkages has attracted great interest, and has been 
used by several economists in the formulation of development strategy. Rostow 
(1956) in his 'take-off theory, for example, adopts this approach, and goes on to 
say that successful industrialisation is unbalanced, in the sense that a single or 
limited number of activities are the source from which an initial acceleration 
rarnifies through the economy. In his clarification, such activities have three 
channels of effect upon the economy: forward, lateral (which attempts to bring 
technology into the analysis), and backward linkages, of which the latter has 
conquered historically. Furthennore, he argues that the capital goods' industry is a 
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major stimulator of impacts, and its presence in the economy is a good index of 
the extent of industrialisation and probability of its extension. 
However, the linkage-based or growth-inducing mechanism as a development 
policy has been criticised. Firstly, there is argument as to whether countries which 
have had a better record of growth have emphasised the unbalanced route and 
high linkage sectors (Yotopoulos and Nugent, 1973). Secondly, it is also argued 
that, because of import leakages, it cannot be taken for granted that high potential 
linkages will be realised (Panchamukhi, 1975). Thirdly, it is suggested that output 
multipliers alone can barely provide the necessary information that the planners 
need for choosing the priority sectors in a situation of multiplicity of objectives. 
For example, industries with high backward linkages usually tend to have low 
employment and factor income linkages, and hence it is argued that the pursuit of 
linkage-based development policy leads to a conflict between employment and 
growth objectives (Mandeville and Jensen, 1978). Fourthly, this development 
policy is also criticised for its lack of consideration of final demand pressures, 
income distribution efficiency, comparative advantage, etc. (see for example, 
Burdekin; 1978, Riedel, 1976). There are also some criticisms regarding the 
method of measurement of linkages. We have devoted Chapter 6 to a 
comprehensive theoretical and empirical assessment of these arguments. 
3.3 Structural Features of the Saudi Econom 
In this section, we examine in detail the structural characteristics of the Saudi 
economy, the economic instability associated with exporting crude oil, and the 
industrialisation policies which aimed at increasing production of the non-oil 
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sectors. To have a better understanding of the characteristics of the Saudi 
economy structure, we concentrate our investigation in this chapter on the role of 
the oil sector and its impact on the Saudi economy. We will then provide insights 
into the non-oil sectors, particularly the industrial and agricultural sectors. 
3.4 Role of the Oil Sector in the Saudi Econom 
Saudi Arabia is the world's most important oil producer. Given its relatively high 
production levels, accounting for nearly 13% of world output and 35% of total 
output of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1991, 
and more significantly, its small domestic needs, the Saudi dominance of 
international crude oil markets is unchallenged. Although reluctant to play the 
role, Saudi has become the 'swing producer', balancing international oil demand 
and supply. Therefore, within limits, Saudi oil production strategies can have a 
profound impact on international prices. Since the early 1970s, Saudi Arabia has 
occasionally used this dominance to influence oil prices, usually to further its 
objectives of sustaining long-term oil consumption and ensuring economic 
stability in both the developed and developing countries. 
The oil sector is the key domestic production sector. For instance, oil revenues 
constituted 74% of total budgetary revenues in 1994. Export oil revenues accruing 
to Saudi Aramco, a large portion of which is allocated to the budget, accounted 
for 90% of total exports in 1991. Expenditures on oil sector development, 
however, are estimated as 10% of total budgetary spending annually (Michalski, 
1997). 
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3.4.1 Crude Oil Production and Pricing Polic 
Saudi oil policies, in terms of production and pricing, will also be important for 
the rest of the world, given the importance of Saudi oil as a major capital exporter. 
Saudi Arabia in fact has the capacity to provide 5% of the world's demand for oil 
products. According to Quandt (1981), Saudi Arabia's primary means for 
advancing its national interests is its oil production. Thus, decisions on production 
levels, prices, and investment in future capacity take on extraordinary importance. 
The Saudi oil policy was based on three objectives: (1) sustaining moderate 
international oil prices to ensure the long- ten-n use of crude oil as a major energy 
source, (2) developing sufficient excess capacity to stabilise oil markets in the 
short term, and maintain the importance of Saudi Arabia and its pen-nanence to the 
industrial countries as a crucial source of oil in the long tenn, and (3) obtaining 
minimum oil revenues to further the development of the economy. Although these 
Saudi oil production policies were, and may still be criticised by some OPEC 
members, it is justified by the fact that Saudi Arabia has the largest reserves of oil 
in the world. According to economists such as Quandt (1981) and Rustow (1983), 
Saudi moderation on prices, compared with other OPEC members, may have led 
to some short-tenn losses, but could be justified by longer-terrn preferences for 
discouraging the development of alternative energies on a scale that might replace 
Saudi production, and by a general interest in a stable international economic 
order and a strong dollar. 
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Despite the fact that the Saudi role was crucial in engineering the price leap of 
1973-74, the Saudis have made no secret of their preference for small and orderly 
price increases. Saudi behaviour in the oil market since then reflected its attempts 
to ensure both objectives. In the early 1980s, oil prices increased rapidly because 
of the breakdown of the old, vertically integrated system of multinational oil 
companies, following nationalisations by producer governments during the 1970s. 
Other causes of the price rises were the disruption of Iranian exports during and 
after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and the destruction of the Iranian and Iraqi 
oil sectors during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, which worsened an already low 
level of spare production capacity. High oil prices in the early 1980s stimulated 
the rapid growth of non-OPEC oil supplies such as in Siberia, the North Sea, and 
Alaska (Looney, 1990). 
The increase in supply accompanied by the fall in world demand, resulted by a 
global recession, caused oil prices to decline sharply in late 1982, forcing OPEC 
to establish a voluntary output reduction system by assigning individual quotas. 
The new scheme failed to stem the price drop, however. By 1985, spot oil prices 
had fallen to about US$25 per barrel, from an average of US$32 per barrel in the 
early 1980s. 
Saudi adherence to an official price system, which most OPEC members 
discarded, rendered the Saudi the swing producer. As a result, Saudi was forced to 
cut back production to ever lower levels. In 1979 and 1980, Saudi Arabia had 
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peaked at an output of more than 10 million bpd; by 1986, that amount had 
reached a low point of 3 million bpd (Masood, 1989). 
In early 1986, Saudi Arabia ended selling its oil at official prices and switched to 
a market-based pricing system called "netback pricing" that guaranteed purchasers 
a certain refining margin. In doing so, Saudi Arabia recaptured a significant 
market share from the rest of OPEC. The sharp increase in oil supplies 
precipitated the crash of spot prices from an average of US$28 per barrel in 1985 
to US$14 per barrel in 1986. Saudi Arabia had used its 'oil weapon', significant 
excess capacity combined with adequate foreign financial reserves cushioning the 
blow of lower oil revenues, to establish some discipline in OPEC (Soufi and 
Mayer, 199 1). 
It did not take long before OPEC agreed to a new range of quotas tied to a price 
target of US$18 per barrel. By late 1986 and early 1987, prices rose to US$15 or 
US$16 per barrel for the OPEC basket, from well below US$ 10 per barrel in early 
1986. To avoid a swing producer role, Saudi Arabia imposed an important 
condition on other OPEC members: a guaranteed quota of approximately 25% of 
the total output ceiling, correlated to a US$18 per barrel price objective. 
The latter became the centre of controversy within the organisation for much of 
the period before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. A revival in oil demand growth 
rates in the developed countries between 1988 and 1990, partly aided by several 
years of low oil prices and double digit annual consumption growth in the newly 
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industrialising countries of East Asia, gave OPEC the chance to induce price 
increases above US$18 per barrel. Some members called for OPEC's overall 
output ceiling to be expanded by a smaller factor than the growth in anticipated 
demand, which would in effect push oil prices up, possibly back to their early 
1980s' level. Whereas Saudi Arabia, however, has always endeavoured to 
maintain moderate oil prices, regional political and economic concerns have also 
motivated it not to depress prices too far, the 1986 Saudi-induced price crash 
notwithstanding. 
The Gulf War allowed Saudi Arabia to regain its status within OPEC. At each 
successive OPEC meeting until the gathering of ministers in February 1992, Saudi 
Arabia dictated the final agreements with virtually no opposition. The eleven 
active members were producing at capacity, while prices remained relatively high. 
Between March and July 1991, both Iran and Saudi Arabia expertly sequenced the 
unloading of large stocks of oil in 'floating storage', which had been built up as 
insurance during the Gulf War, and prevented an anticipated crash in oil prices 
during the spring and summer months of 1991 (Findlay, 1994). 
In 1992, the OPEC agreement reached was essentially what the Saudis wanted in 
the short run: a total production ceiling of almost 23 million bpd, and a temporary 
quota of 35% of the ceiling and the maintenance of price stability. They did not 
achieve their long-tenn objective: unanimous OPEC recognition of a 35% market 
share of all future OPEC output ceilings. 
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Short-tenn oil policy in the early 1990s was shaped by two major sequences of 
events. The first was the Saudi refusal to play the role of 'swing producer' in the 
mid-1980s, their subsequent attempt to maintain their market share, and desertion 
of the fixed oil price system after the 1986 price crash. The second was the Gulf 
War in 1990, the Saudi replacement of most of the oil lost from its two OPEC 
members, and the country's ascendance as unchallenged leader within OPEC after 
August 1990. Both set of events prompted formation of an oil policy that called 
for OPEC decisions to promote moderate and stable oil prices, but not 
compromise the Saudi demand for its market share. Before the Gulf War, the 
Saudis demanded about 25% of the OPEC production ceiling; after the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, the share rose to 35% (Zind, 1998). 
Longer-term Saudi policy imperatives for the 1990s were shaped by structural 
factors within OPEC and within the international oil market. Highest on the 
priority list was the decision to push domestic oil capacity to more than 10 million 
bpd sustainable capacity, with a further 1.5 million to 2 million bpd surge capacity 
in times of emergency. Three factors motivated these expansion plans. First, 
growth in world demand for oil over the previous several years, combined with 
the Gulf War, had pushed Saudi Arabia and other OPEC countries to their 
production capacities. With the expectation that demand for oil would continue to 
grow, and that most other exporters were constrained by depleting oil reserves or 
financing problems, a rapid rise in capacity could capture any increase in demand 
that might occur. Secondly, in light of the post- 1986 intra-OPEC market share 
competition, oil capacity expansions had a direct impact on the ability of 
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individual members to jockey for quota increases. Finally, the ability to increase 
output at will, in the event of a sudden price decline, would help to reduce 
instability of total oil revenues, which constituted the bulk of domestic budgetary 
income. 
Saudi Arabia's interest in moving downstream was also a priority of its oil policy. 
The drive to obtain overseas refining and storage facilities was designed to 
advance two objectives related to security of supply. First, Saudi Arabia wanted to 
obtain captive buyers of its crude, assuring stable prices and terms. Saudi Arabia 
would thus be more receptive to market conditions in consuming countries and 
avoid being closed out of certain countries. Gaining further profits from refining 
the crude was an associated reason for the move downstream overseas. Second, 
the Saudis sought to provide consuming countries with 'reciprocal security 
measures', under which they would undertake to guarantee supply through 
capacity additions or stocking arrangements abroad in return for consumer 
country decisions to avoid taxes and import restrictions on oil. Few consuming 
countries, however, responded favourably to such arrangements. Those that did 
included South Korea and the Philippines, Askari et al. (1997). 
It is clear from the above argument that continued Saudi dependency on oil is 
thought to be dangerous for a number of reasons. First, oil is a finite resource and 
reserves will eventually be exhausted. Second, the oil market is characterised by 
uncertainty and instability, because oil demand depends on many variables which 
are beyond the Saudi government's control, such as the performance of the world 
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economy, the availability of alternative energy sources, and the oil reserves of the 
industrial countries. Finally, the oil sector has weak linkages to the rest of the 
economy. 
3.4.2 Oil as a Depleting Resource 
One of the vital advantages of Saudi Arabia and oil producing countries lies in 
their possession of a resource that is readily converted into a large financial flow, 
much of it in the form of foreign exchange. However, Saudis must contend with 
4 the fundamental fact that their oil wealth is exhaustible . This fact makes the 
Saudi government realise that the base of their economy is very weak, as long as it 
depends on export of a single depleting commodity (Al-Hasan, 1997). 
This realisation led the planners to make every possible effort to diversify the 
economy, where continued dependence on oil revenue for socio-economic 
development is not a reliable option in the long term. Therefore, recent Five-Year 
plans for development (the fourth and fifth) emphasised economic diversification, 
which had to be done within a reasonable time period, otherwise the country 
might risk entering the 21st century within depleted oil resources, financial assets 
eroded by inflation, and much larger population. 
Although Saudi Arabia has the largest proven oil reserve in the world, which is 
estimated to be around 160 billion barrels, or a quarter of the world's total 
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reserves (Field, 1985, p. 49), this resource is not enough to last (at 1997 levels of 
production) for more than forty years. 
3.4.3 Oil Exports and Price Instabili 
One of the characteristics of many LDCs is their heavy reliance on pnmary 
exports, where primary commodities represent the major source of revenue and 
foreign exchange earnings. The high degree of dependency on a single commodity 
is believed to be more risky in the case of crude oil than any other primary goods, 
because the market has been characterised by a high degree of variability 
(instability) in the past twenty five years, as seen in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Trends in Average Price of Arabian Light Crude Oil 
Year US$/b' Change(%) Year US$ib' Change(%) 
1960-1969 1.8 - 1983 28.2 -2.8 
1970 L8 0.0 1984 28.0 -0.7 
1971 2.3 27.8 1985 21.0 -25.0 
1972 2.5 8.7 1986 13.7 -34.8 
1973 5.0 100.0 1987 17.2 25.5 
1974 11.7 134.0 1988 13.4 -22.1 
1975 12.0 2.6 1989 16.2 20.9 
1976 12.4 3.3 1990 20.8 28.4 
1977 13.7 10.5 1991 17.4 -16.3 
1978 13.7 0.0 1992 17.9 2.9 
1979 24.0 75.2 1993 15.7 -12.3 
1980 32.0 33.3 1994 15.4 -1.9 
1981 34.0 6.3 1995 16.7 8.4 
1982 29.0 -14.7 
i Otlicial Prices up to 1980 and spot prices thereafter. 
Source: SAMA (2000). 
For basic arguments on the core theory of exhaustible resources, see Hotelling (193 1). 
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This variability in the world market was very harmful to the oil exporting 
countries, especially Saudi Arabia, whose oil revenues slid from SR 328.3 in 1982 
to less than SR 42 billion in 1986, as shown in Table 2.1. The vanability of Saudi 
exports will be analysed and measured in more detail in Chapter 5, and a portfolio 
approach will be applied to show how Saudi exports' instability can be reduced. .r 
3.4.4 Oil and Economic Linkages 
In his study of OPEC countries and their economic problems, Amuzegar (1982) 
states that, unlike other activities which draw their inputs such as land, labour and 
capital from a wide variety of other smaller industries and in turn stimulate and 
induce a wide range of productive activities, oil offers few such backward and 
forward linkages. Petroleum remains a highly insulated and technologically 
advanced industry with little direct spill over into other economic sectors. 
Oil-producing countries have realised that oil production has little direct impact 
on development of the sectors outside the oil fields. Thus the relationship between 
the oil sectors and the rest of the economy is fundamentally financial. In the oil- 
based economy countries such as Saudi Arabia, the country is supposed, by 
exporting oil, to trade the crude oil for foreign exchange, which is essential to 
import desired goods to build the country's infrastructure base, and obtain capital 
goods or machinery which are necessary to improve productivity. 
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For example, if we assume that domestic output in Saudi is a function of capital, 
labour, and infrastructure, then: 
Output =f (capital, labour, infrastructure) 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, capital is the abundant factor relative to the other 
factors of production. Johany et al. (1986) argue that if the country utilises its 
income from oil in building the country's infrastructure base, such as schools, 
ports, etc., such an act will increase the marginal productivity of the abundant 
factor, namely capital, through increasing the supply of the relatively scarce 
factor. 
This happened when many Saudi planners, during the boom period in the 1970s 
and early 1980s, came to believe that the 'petrodollar' was capable of overcoming 
any economic obstacle, such as the poor infrastructure base and lack of skilled and 
trained labour. They were partially right, as the oil wealth enabled the country to 
increase the number of schools by 15% during the boom period, and university 
enrolment by more than fivefold from 9,000 in 1972 to about 50,000 in 1980. On 
the other hand, the oil sector has weak backward and forward linkages, with total 
employment accounting for less than 2% of the total labour force. This is 
attributable to the capital-intensive nature of the oil industry. The input-output 
approach is used in Chapters 6 to measure the oil and the rest of the Saudi 
economy sectors' linkage and multiplier impacts. 
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Due to depletability, market instability, and its weak backward and forward 
linkages, the Saudi government came to realise the limitations of dependency on 
oil exports. Therefore, it assigned a crucial role to the diversification of the 
economic base away from oil by investing in productive non-oil sectors, such as 
the industrial, agricultural and, recently, non-oil mineral sectors (Looney, 1990). 
3.5 Role of the Non-Oil Industrial Sector 
During the 1980s, the government established, virtually from scratch, a modem 
industrial sector. Saudi Arabia had virtually no industrial base in the early 1970s 
(Tumer and Bedore, 1979). The industrialisation process had two goals: first, the 
use of the country's enon-nous gas production as industrial inputs to produce 
chemicals and petrochemicals for export, and second, the construction of energy- 
intensive industries, some for import- substitution purposes and others to meet 
infrastructure needs. The government also established industrial cities and 
facilities to support its industrial programme, including those at Al-Jubail and 
Yanbu. 
By the early 1990s, the vast majority of these plants had been completed, and few 
major expansions were planned. Infrastructure requirements had largely stabilised 
and were adequate to meet the needs of the population and industry for much of 
the 1990s. Therefore, the government concentrated on maintenance of the 
infrastructure and on improving productivity and efficiency. To encourage more 
private sector investment in manufacturing, particularly in light industries, local 
business received incentives in the form of production and consumption subsidies. 
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3.5.1 Manufacturin 
Oil revenues accrue directly to the government, and hence the public sector plays 
a pervasive and extremely large part in industrial activity and economic 
management. As a result, the government has played an instrumental role in 
developing the manufacturing sector by directly establishing industrial plants, 
mainly in the basic industries sector, such as petrochemicals, steel, and other large 
manufacturing enterprises. Also, it has developed manufacturing through direct 
loans, mainly by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), and through 
industrial subsidies, offset programmes, set-asides, preferential buying 
programmes, and tariffs. Accordingly, greater efficiency and more 
competitiveness were established during the late 1980s, where the number of 
manufacturing units established was about 3700 units, with an increase of 150 
compared to the number of unit, established in the late 1970s. Most of these new 
manufacturing units concentrated basically on import substitutions, hydrocarbon 
or non- hydrocarbon industries (Ministry of Planning, 1999). 
The private sector, on the other hand, has developed small-scale, light industries 
oriented towards the internal markets. Most of the private ownership of 
enterprises was traditionally concentrated in those areas which generated quick 
profit, such as real estate, trade, and service sectors. In the 1980s, the bulk of 
private manufacturing investment was directed to plants that manufactured goods 
for the construction industry. The building materials' industry was the first major 
manufacturing branch where private enterprise played a dominant role. This 
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industry benefited much from the boom construction activities during the boom 
years in the 1970s. The cement industry, for example, expanded rapidly because 
of escalating demand, domestically available raw materials, and generous finance 
provided by SIDE Cement production grew from 0.8 million tons in 1973 to 
some 8.7 million tons in 1982, an average annual growth rate of 30.4%, and 
accounted for 57% of the total manufacturing employment. 
Due to the completion of the infrastructure base in Saudi Arabia and the low oil 
income in the early 1980s, the cement industry experienced a low growth rate. 
The early recession of the 1980s led to the closing of many of the less efficient 
manufacturing projects established during the boom of the 1970s. The cost of 
building and operating industries was reduced by 50%, mainly because of 
reductions in the cost of real estate, rents, labour, and building materials (Looney, 
1990). 
Partly because of private sector reluctance to invest in manufacturing, and partly 
because of growing oil revenues, the government was involved early in the 1960s 
in some basic industries. In the late 1960s, Petromin established a steel- rolling 
mill in Jeddah using imported billets, a urea fertiliser plant in Ad Dammam with 
49% private Saudi capital, and a sulphuric acid plant in the same location. In the 
early 1970s, as oil revenues grew, a co-ordinated plan emerged to collect and 
distribute gas that was flared to two yet unbuilt industrial sites, where it could be 
used in basic industries. The two sites selected were AI-Jubail and Yanbu. 
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In 1975, the Royal Commission for Al-Jubail and Yanbu was created. The 
commission was given authority to plan, construct, manage, and operate the 
infrastructure needed to support the basic industries the government intended to 
build, and to satisfy the community needs of the work force employed in these 
industries. The commission was also to promote investment in secondary and 
supporting industries, to develop effective city govenunent, and to train Saudis to 
take over as many jobs as possible. The commission received an independent 
budget to facilitate its work. 
By 1990, there were 16 primary industries, 46 secondary enterprises, and 
approximately 100 support and light industrial units at Al-Jubail. Yanbu, 
meanwhile, had attracted 5 primary industrial plants, 25 secondary plants, and 75 
support and light units. Although AI-Jubail benefited from the massive 
petrochemical projects of SABIC, both cities saw substantial growth during the 
1980s (Choudhury and AI-Sahlawi, 2000). 
With the establishment of SABIC in 1976, the govemment undertook a major 
effort to create a domestic petrochemical industry that was designed to augment 
oil export earnings and to use abundantly available domestic resources, 
particularly associated gas supplies. The investments were guided by a two-phase 
strategy. The first phase (1976-1987) included a number of large capital- intensive 
and export-oriented petrochemical projects that have been completed. Its aim was 
to produce bulk products such as ethylene, polyethylene, melamine, methanol, and 
downstream products, including derivatives of ethylene. Moreover, during this 
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period, SABIC undertook the construction of plants to produce fertilisers (urea, 
sulphuric acid, and melamine), metals (steel rods and bars), supporting industrial 
products (nitrogen), and intermediate petrochemical products (vinyl chloride 
monomer and polyvinyl chloride). SABIC also acquired shares in two Saudi 
aluminium companies and expanded overseas by investing in a Bahraini 
petrochemical complex. 
During the first phase, financing by joint venture partners and funding from the 
government's Public Investment Fund (PIF) provided the bulk of support for these 
projects. Domestic and regional private sector participation was also allowed after 
30% of the equity capital of SABIC (approximately SR 3 billion) was sold to 
residents of Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries. In 1987, SABIC split each 
share into ten shares to mobilise investments from smaller investors (Bardesi, 
1996). 
In 1995, SAIBIC owned, either outright or with a minimum 50 % stake, fifteen 
major industrial enterprises. Total output capacity was 13 million tons of various 
petrochemicals per year, up from 11.9 million tons per year in 1990 and 9.5 
million tons per year in 1989. Although total sales continued to rise, weaker 
international prices depressed profits during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
During 1991, SABIC registered net profits of SR 2.3 billion. About 95% of 
SABIC's sales were exported; total exports approached SR 16 billion per year. Its 
success in rapidly increasing exports and capturing an international market share 
have made SABIC's petrochemical exports subject to non-discriminatory restraint 
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in both EEC and Japan, its main export markets. Both the EEC and Japan have 
applied quantitative restrictions to Saudi exports. Moreover, urea exports from 
Saudi were subject to antidumping duties in the EEC, which no longer permitted 
preferential treatment under its General System of Preferences. 
SABIC's second phase plans were designed to maintain Saudi Arabia's 1992 
intemational market share and raise domestic petrochemical capacity by 40%. 
Because the available gas-based feedstocks (ethane and methane) were 
insufficient to meet requirements of the second phase, SABIC invested in two 
flexible feedstock crackers with a total combined capacity of about 1 million tons. 
The crackers helped reduce dependence on ethane and methane, and allowed the 
use of naphtha, liquefied petroleum gas or propane as feedstock. 
Moreover, with the onset of serious budgetary constraints, the government's role 
in advancing the domestic industrialisation process grew more indirect. The 
government was forcing a number of state-owned industrial institutions to seek 
financing for their new, capacity-expansion programmes from non-traditional 
sources, such as domestic and foreign commercial banks, stock markets, and 
private investors. In SABIC's second phase, 30% of financing plans (SR 15 
billion) was borrowed from the domestic and international commercial banks 
(Bardesi, 1996). 
As mentioned above, the private sector's role in industrialisation was largely 
restricted to light and medium-sized manufacturing units. However, some larger 
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merchant families had established larger-scale chemical, secondary-stage 
petrochemical, and car or truck assembly plants. By 1981, Saudi Arabia had 
approximate y 1,200 industrial plants of all sizes. At the end of the 1980s, this 
figure had doubled to about 2,000 units, and had risen to 2,533 by 1995. Most 
private manufacturing concerns in the 1980s produced construction materials, 
including cement, insulation materials, pipes, bricks, and wood products. Judging 
from data available from the Ministry of Industry and Electricity, there has been a 
marked shift from this sort of production to downstream chemicals, food 
processing, and metals, machinery, and equipment manufacturing. The annual 
number of new licences issued to companies in the chemical, rubber, and plastics 
sector rose from seven per year in 1987 to fifteen in 1990. Although this number 
constituted, at most, 20% of all licences granted, the size of the firnis was 
growing, judging from their authorised capital, which grew from 42% of total new 
investment planned to 90%. Trailing well behind this sector was the food- 
processing sector, which saw a rise in number of licences between 1987 and 1995, 
but the volume of authonsed capital declined, indicating smaller individual 
companies and more widespread participation. Metals and machinery 
manufacturing followed a pattern similar to chemical companies, with both the 
number of units and authonsed capital growing during the same period (Vassiliev, 
1998). 
The patterns of Saudi private manufacturing investment confon-ned to government 
investments. Incentives offered to private businesses included interest-free loans 
from SIDF of up to 50% of the cost an industrial project, repayable within fifteen 
59 
years. Exemptions from tariff duties on imported equipment, raw materials, spare 
parts, and other industrial inputs; land leases at significantly reduced prices; 
discriminatory buying practices by government agencies; and significant import 
protection, were some of the other incentives provided. 
However, the decision to increase the country's oil and gas resource development 
through downstream investments in refineries and hydrocarbon' (petrochemicals) 
plants was logical. Considering the country's resource endowment, Saudi planners 
applied the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade. Three factors motivated 
such a policy. Firstly, downstream investments were capital-intensive, which 
fitted the Saudi relatively small population and large oil revenues. The 
petrochemicals' industry enjoys one of the highest capital-to-labour ratios in the 
world. Looney (1982), for example, estimates the investment per job created 
between $20,000 to $100,000. Secondly, more value added revenue would be 
extracted and retained, thereby maximising Saudi revenues through the export of 
more refined petroleum products instead of crude oil. Finally, the natural gas that 
had been largely wasted before the 1980s would be processed and used. 
However, the Saudi petrochemical industry strategy came under criticism. Some 
economists, such as Turner and Bedore (1979), argued that the market for the 
products of large refineries and petrochemical plants in Saudi Arabia was 
relatively small. Most of the output would be sold in the international markets, 
and the westem nations would not welcome additional competition. Competition 
was also coming from other OPEC members, such as Iran and Algeria. As a 
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result, there was a trade war using quotas and tariffs. Turner and Bedore argued 
that there were at least eight variables which will affect the economic viability of 
Saudi capital-intensive ventures. Only two of these variables (feedstock prices and 
capital availability) were clearly in favour of the Saudis, with one other 
(environmental issues) cutting both ways. Three factors (high construction, fixed 
operating and high transport costs) would probably always work against the 
Saudis, and two others (markets and tariffs) were currently working against them. 
3.5.2 Agriculture 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the government undertook a massive restructuring of 
the agricultural sector. The stated objectives were food security through self- 
sufficiency and improvement of rural incomes. Although successful in raising 
domestic output of several important crops and foodstuffs through the 
introduction of modem agricultural techniques, the agricultural development 
programme did not entirely meet these objectives. In regard to self- sufficiency, 
the country produced a sufficient surplus to export limited quantities of food. 
However, if the entire production process were considered, the import of 
fertilisers, equipment, and labour made the country even more dependent on 
foreign inputs to bring food to the average Saudi household (Olsen, 1994). 
Two patterns of income distribution emerged. Traditional agricultural regions did 
not benefit from the development programme, and the government's financial 
support led to the establishment of large-scale agricultural production units. Some 
of these were managed and operated by foreign entities, and owned by wealthy 
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individuals and large businesses. From an environmental viewpoint, the 
programme had a less than satisfactory impact. Not only did it cause a serious 
drain on the Saudi water resources, drawing mainly from non-renewable aquifers, 
but it also required the use of massive amounts of chemical fertilisers to boost 
yields. In 1995, Saudi agricultural strategy was only sustainable as long as the 
government maintained a high level of direct and indirect subsidies, a drain on its 
budget and external accounts. 
Until the 1970s, sedentary agriculture saw few changes, and declined in the face 
of foreign imports, urban drift, and lack of investment. The use of modem inputs 
remained relatively limited. Introduction of mechanical pumping in certain areas 
led to a modest level of commercial production, usually in locations close to urban 
centres. Nevertheless, regional distribution of agricultural activity remained 
relatively unchanged, as did the average holding size and patterns of cultivation. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the government undertook a multifaceted 
programme to modernise and commercialise agriculture. Indirect support involved 
substantial expenditures on infrastructure, which included electricity supply, 
irrigation, drainage, secondary road systems, and other transportation facilities for 
distributing and marketing produce. Land distribution was also an integral part of 
the programme. The 1968 Public Lands Distribution Ordinance allocated 5 to 100 
hectares of fallow land to individuals at no cost, up to 400 hectares to companies 
and organisations, and a limit of 4,000 hectares for special projects. The 
beneficiaries were required to develop a minimum of 25% of the land within a set 
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period of time (usually two to five years); thereafter, full ownership was 
transferred. In 1989, the total area distributed stood at more than 1.5 million 
hectares. Of this total area, 7,273 special agricultural projects accounted for just 
less than 860,000 hectares, or 56.5%; 67,686 individuals received just less than 
400,000 hectares or 26.3%; 17 agricultural companies received slightly over 
260,000 hectares, or 17.2%. Judging from these statistics, the average fallow land 
plot given to individuals was 5.9 hectares, 118 hectares to projects, and 15,375 
hectares to companies, the latter being well over the limit of 400 hectares 
specified in the original plans (Findlay, 1994). 
The government also mobilised substantial financial resources to support the 
raising of crops and livestock during the 1970s and 1980s. The main institutions 
involved were the Ministry of Agriculture and Water, the Saudi Arabian 
Agricultural Bank (SAAB), and the Grain Soils and Flour Mills Organisation 
(GSFMO). SAAB provided interest-free loans to farmers; during 1989, for 
example, 26.6% of loans were for well drilling and casing, 23% for agricultural 
projects, and the balance for the purchase of farm machinery, pumps, and 
irrigation equipment. SAAB also provided subsidies for buying other capital 
inputs (Olsen, 1994 ) 
GSFMO implemented the official procurement programme, purchasing locally 
produced wheat and barley at guaranteed prices for domestic sales and exports. 
The procurement price was steadily reduced during the 1980s because of massive 
overproduction and for budgetary reasons, but it was substantially higher than 
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international prices. By the late 1980s, the procurement price for wheat, for 
example, was three times the international price. Although quantity restrictions 
were implemented to limit procurement, pressures from a growing farm lobby led 
to ceiling-price waivers. Moreover, the government encountered considerable 
fraud, with imports being passed off as domestic production. To control this 
situation, the government granted import monopolies for some agricultural 
products to the GSFMO, while procurement and import subsidies on certain crops 
were shifted to encourage a more diversified production programme. Finally, 
agricultural and water authorities provided massive subsidies in the form of low- 
cost desalinated water, and electric companies were required to supply power at 
reduced charges. 
The programme prompted a huge response from the private sector, with average 
annual growth rates well above those programmed. These growth rates were 
underpinned by a rapid increase in land brought under cultivation and agricultural 
production. Private investments went mainly into expanding the area planted for 
wheat. Between 1983 and 1995, the average annual increase of new land brought 
under wheat cultivation rose by 14%. A 35% increase in yields per ton during this 
period further boosted wheat output; total production rose from 1.4 million tons 
per year in 1983 to 3.5 million tons in 1989, and declined to 1.6 million tons in 
1995. Other food grains also benefited from private investment. For example, 
output growth rates for sorghum and barley accelerated even faster than wheat 
during the 1980s, although the overall amount produced was much smaller. 
During the 1980s, fanners also experimented with new varieties of vegetables and 
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fruits, but with only modest success. More traditional crops, like onions and dates, 
did not fare as well and their output declined or remained flat (Findlay, 1994). 
In the 1970s, increasing incomes in urban areas stimulated the demand for meat 
and dairy products, but by the early 1980s, government programmes were only 
partially successful in increasing domestic production, much of the meat 
consumed being imported, Although the meat supply was still largely imported in 
the early 1990s, domestic production of meat had grown by 33% between 1984 
and 1995, from 101 000 tons to 154,000 tons. This increase, however, masked the 
dominant role of traditional farms in supplying meat. Although new projects 
accounted for some of the rapid growth during the 1980s, a sharp decline of 
roughly 74% in beef stock production by specialised projects during 1989 resulted 
in only a 15% fall in meat output. This reversal also highlighted the problems in 
introducing modem commercial livestock-rearing techniques to the country 
(Olsen, 1994). 
Commercial poultry farms, however, greatly benefited from government 
incentives, and grew rapidly during the 1980s. Chickens were usually raised in 
controlled climatic conditions. Despite the doubling of output, as a result of the 
rapid rise in chicken consumption, domestic production constituted less than half 
of total demand. Egg production also increased rapidly during the 1980s. The 
numbers of broiler chickens increased from 143 million in 1984 to 390 million in 
1995, while production of eggs increased from 1,852 million in 1984 to 2,500 
million in 1995. 
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Fishing, however, was an underdeveloped aspect of the Saudi economy, despite 
the abundance of fish and shellfish in coastal waters. The major reasons for the 
small size of this sector were the limited demand for fish, and the comparative 
lack of fish marketing and processing facilities. Iraqi actions in releasing oil into 
the Arabian Gulf during the Gulf War caused appreciable damage to fish and 
wildlife in the Gulf. The Saudi Meteorology and Envirom-nent Protection Agency 
(MEPA), with the co-operation of other international organisations, had launched 
a massive programme to reduce the damage effect and eventually restore the wild 
life. These efforts took several years and the only fishing source was on the other 
side of the country, namely the Red Sea. In 1995, Saudi total catches on both seas 
were at more than 48,000 tons. 
Despite the government subsidies, it has been shown that there are many 
constraints on the development of a serious and soundly based agriculture in 
Saudi Arabia. According to McLachlan (1984), the two greatest difficulties are 
represented by the age-old problem of a harsh and unforgiving environment, on 
the one hand, and the complexities of accommodating agriculture to the economic 
regime of the oil-based economies in which agriculture is a poor competitor for 
water, labour and financial resources, on the other. On present evidence, of the 
two limiting factors, it might prove to be the environment that is most damaging 
to the future prospects for agriculture development in the Saudi Arabia. 
Moreover, observers have also criticised the Saudi philosophy on self-sufficiency 
in food. Rustow (1983), for instance, argues that such a philosophy was not 
66 
justified for three reasons. First, international experience has shown that food 
embargoes have generally failed unless accompanied by a major military 
campaign. econd, savings on food purchased from overseas could easily have 
been invested in inventory to safeguard against an external threat. Third, no social 
benefit is gained from such a programme. Agricultural employment continued to 
decline, and large companies, rather than peasant farmers, profited from most 
subsidies. Finally, subsidies could have been related to more appropriate 
production methods that promoted water conservation. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Saudi Arabia does not face the problems of other developing countries, which 
must first secure capital and then proceed with development procedures. A 
considerable amount of the large oil revenues was invested heavily in 
industrialisation, in an attempt to diversify the economy away from the crude oil. 
Adopting a balanced growth strategy, Saudi Arabia was ranked among the major 
industrial economies in the Middle East in 1992. 
However, most Saudi industries were oil and natural gas-based, in the public 
sector, and heavily dependent on subventions from the government budget. The 
private sector was reluctant to establish domestic processing plants, and those 
created had been heavily subsidised. Similarly, modem, water-intensive, and 
import-dependent agriculture came at a huge cost to the government. Moreover, 
there were many complex obstacles and limitations that hindered the development 
of the industrial sector, such as manpower shortages, lack of technical and 
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managerial know-how, and the lack of entrepreneurs capable of utilising 
investment capital efficiency. As a result, the non-oil sector remains relatively 
weak in terms of diversifying the economy away from oil as the major source of 
Saudi revenues. 
The non-oil minerals industry, as a sub-sector of the non-oil, will be introduced 
separately in the next chapter. The reason behind that is to examine its role in the 
Saudi Arabian economy in the period between 1970 and 1995 in more detail. 
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Chapter 4: Background to Saudi Arabian Non-Oil Minerals Sector 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has shown that the oil sector is the most important pillar of 
the Saudi Arabian economy, while the non-oil sector has a relatively weak role. 
In this chapter, we are going to examine the non-oil minerals sector and its role in 
the Saudi Arabian economy. Specifically, we will examine the sector's direct 
contribution to the Saudi Arabian economy. This examination is mainly of GDP, 
government revenues, balance of payments, foreign exchange savings and 
employment. However, before we examine this contribution, we feel that a 
general overview of the sector is needed. The present chapter provides the 
background to the Saudi Arabian non-oil minerals sector and its industrial base. 
Specifically, the chapter gives an overview of the main known mineral resources 
in Saudi Arabia, the production as well as the structure of the sector industry. 
Finally, the chapter highlights the main government incentives to develop the 
sector. 
4.2 Known Non-Oil Mineral Resources 
The geology of the Saudi Arabia may be divided, as shown in Figure A. 2, into 
two main terrains. The first is the Arabian Shield area in the west, adjacent to the 
Red Sea and covering one-third of the country. The second terrain is the area 
where the sedimentary rocks dip toward the Arabian Gulf, called the cover rocks. 
Saudi Arabian mineral deposits are located in both terrains. The metallic deposits, 
such as gold, copper, zinc and iron, are mainly associated with the rocks of the 
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Arabian Shield. The phosphate, bauxite, dolomite and gypsum deposits are 
located further to the east, in the cover rocks. 
The Saudi Arabian govenunent owns all subsoil resources. As a result, all natural 
deposits of minerals and quarry deposits are the government's exclusive property. 
The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (MPMR) is the 
governmental agency that is responsible for both oil and non-oil minerals sectors 
in the country. MPMR is the sole agency concerned with the application and 
administration of mining in the country. The Deputy Ministry of Mineral 
Resources (DMMR) is the govermuental legislative agency which issues licences 
and protects the government's rights in mining. DMMR is also responsible for 
geological survey, non-oil mineral exploration, geological services, and the 
promotion of mining investment in Saudi Arabia. 
Due to an extensive exploration effort sponsored by DMMR and undertaken by 
known organisations, including the US Geological Survey (USGS), the Bureau de 
Recherches Geologiques et Mines (BRGM) from France, Riofinex Ltd from the 
UK, and the Canadian Watts Griffis McOuat, since the 1950s Saudi Arabia has 
collected reasonably accurate data on the country's non-oil mineral potential. A 
summary of Saudi Arabian known non-oil mineral deposits, indicating the main 
regions of mineralisation, is given in Table A. 1, where 33 minerals are listed. 
More than 5 metallic and 15 industrial minerals were mined in Saudi Arabia in 
1995. Of the metallic ores, the gold deposits are of world importance because of 
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both their value and quantity. Some estimates suggest that Saudi Arabia is home 
to 20 million tons of gold ore. The gold deposits have significantly contributed to 
meeting the needs of the 2,000-ton domestic market, as well as that of foreign 
markets such as India, Europe, and the United States. Very large deposits of 
comparatively moderate-value industrial minerals, such as marble, magnesium, 
dolomite, rock salt, cement raw materials, glass and ceramic minerals, refractory 
clays, zeolites, phosphate, and bauxite are found. According to DMMR (1996), 
some minerals can yield 60 downstream products, while for other minerals, the 
Fursan mountains, for example, have 3 million metric tons of marble deposits, and 
it was projected that 22 factories could be set up for hamessing these resources. 
A brief description of some of these deposits, with comments regarding their 
development potential, is given below. This information is primarily based on 
economic assessments and feasibility study reports issued by DMMR (Collenette 
and Grainger, 1994; and DMMR, 1998b). 
4.2.1 Metals 
Copper and zinc 
Saudi Arabian land holds reserves of over 60 million tons of copper minerals. 
DMMR has recently invited private investors to bid on an exploration licence 
centred on the Jabal Sayid deposit, located approximately 150 km from Al 
Madinah, and believed to contain 20 million tons of copper ore. Japanese 
govenunent agencies have recently been awarded a licence to explore for copper 
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in the western region of the country (Michalski, 1997). The Al-Masane 
polymetallic sulphide deposit has reserves of 7.2 million tons grading 5.3% zinc, 
1.4% copper, 1.2 grams/ton gold, and 40.2 grams/ton silver. The Al-Masane 
deposit, licensed to the Arabian Shield for Mining Industries Company (ASMIC) 
continues to be studied. A pre-feasibility study conducted by DMMR on the 
Khnaiguiyah zinc deposit established reserves of 1.9 million tons grading 15.3% 
zinc and 0.9% copper mineable underground, or 3.2 million tons 12.2% zinc and 
0.8% copper possibly mineable by open pit. DMMR projections suggest an annual 
production rate of 34,400 tons of 56% zinc concentrates. 
Gold 
Several commercially significant gold deposits have been discovered in the 
Arabian Shield. There is potential development for three gold mines at Al-Hajar, 
Al-Amar, and Bulghah. The Al-Hajar project is under construction by the state- 
owned company, Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Ma'aden), at a target capital 
cost of less than SR 93.6 million, with an annual productive capacity of 55,000 
ounces of gold and 236,000 ounces of silver, starting in 2001. Al-Amar and 
Bulghah, with 30 million tonnes resource potential, have ongoing finalisation of 
engineering or feasibilities, -where the AI-Amar underground deposit could 
represent a production of between 60,000 and 90,000 ounces of gold per year, and 
the Bulghah open pit a similar amount. In December 1998, Ma'aden was also 
granted a licence to explore for gold at the Dowaihi, in the Makkah region. This 
site is believed to contain 14,000 kilograms of gold. Exploration is also in 
progress at Al Suq, and the Samran, Shayban and Hamdah prospects. 
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Iron Ore 
Saudi Arabia has several iron ore deposits, including the Wadi Sawawin deposit. 
The Wadi Sawawin iron ore deposit holds reserves of 84 million tons at 42.5% 
iron, sufficient for 25 years of pellet production at 2.2 million tons/year. Various 
plans for transporting the concentrate include ideas of a 60 km slurry pipeline to a 
Red Sea coastal plant for processing into direct-reduction pellets. 
4.2.2 Industrial Minerals 
Magnesite 
Saudi Arabia is home to the world's largest deposits of magnesite. Two sites 
containing impressive amounts of magnesite have already been identified. The 
first, located in the Zarghat area about 400 km northeast of Al Madinah, contains 
1.6 million tons of magnesite. Based on a completed feasibility study, the ores 
from this site are estimated to yield 20,000 tons/year of high-grade electrofused 
magnesia to be used in global refractory markets. The other major magnesite site 
is in Jabal Rukman, about 180 km southeast of Al Madinah. Also, one of the 
main sources of magnesium is dolomite found in Huraysan, 60 km east of Al 
Khaý. Another extensive source of dolomite is the Wadi Ar'ar deposits, covering 
more than 100 sq. km on both sides of the Al Jawf-Ar'ar highway, in the north 
western part of the country. 
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Phosphate 
Saudi Arabia holds some of the largest phosphate deposits in the world, located 
mostly in the north and north-western regions. The deposits at Turayf and Sanam, 
and the impressive Al Jalamid deposits, are estimated to be several hundred 
million tonnes. According to Ma'aden's estimates, the Al Jalamid deposit alone 
will allow for the exploitation of some 200 million tons of phosphate, which will 
support a 20-year mining operation in the country. Ma'aden has recently 
announced that an additional number of world-class phosphate deposits have been 
identified across the northern part of the country. With private sector investment, 
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Saudi Arabia can locally exploit the produced phosphate to consolidate its 
position as third exporter of fertilisers in the world (Spencer, 1999). DMMR 
anticipates that the country will capture 16% of the world phosphate market. 
Identified future markets for phosphate include China, India, Japan, Pakistan, and 
Iran. 
Bauxite 
Extensive exploration and testing have been conducted on the proven deposit of 
Az Zabirah, situated about 650 km west-northwest of AI-Jubail. Resource 
estimation and pre-feasibility studies have been conducted by DMMR. Tests have 
shown that bauxite at this site is amenable to the Bayer Process of alumina 
production. Total reserves would allow open-pit mining at an annual rate of 2.5 
million metric tons initially, for at least 20 years. The Az Zabirah deposit has the 
potential to supply an aluminium industry in the GCC. Several other sites in the 
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country are being investigated for bauxite, including AI-Zughbiyah and Al- 
Tiniyat. 
4.3 Production of Non-Oil Minerals and Commodities 
Statistics drawn from official data and showing the development of Saudi Arabian 
production of major non-oil minerals and commodities over the past decade are 
given in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Production of Non-oil Minerals and Commodities in Saudi Arabia 
(1989-1998) 
(Million metric tons unless otherwise specified) 
Commodity 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Copper' 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Cement' 11.4 12.0 11.4 15.3 15.3 16.0 15.8 16.5 15.4 21.2 
Gold (ton)' 3.6 5.6 4.3 5.6 7.5 7.6 8.1 7.5 7.3 7.3 
Gypsum 375.0 375.0 375.0 269.3 326.7 375.0 375.0 417.0 453.0 430.0 
Iron and 
Stee14 
1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 
Silver 
(ton) 1&3 
13.3 16.2 16.4 17.8 18.0 17.0 16.9 16.0 16.9 16.9 
Zinc 2.6 2.5 2.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Lime 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.8 12.4 11.6 14.0 
Lead' 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Synthetic 
Fertiliser 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.5 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 
' As a by-product ot old production at Mahd Act Uhatial). 
2 Thousand tons. 
' As concentrate and bullion. 
4 Metal, steel, and crude. 
Source: DMMR (1998b). 
Minerals mined and produced in Saudi Arabia but not included in Table 4.1 are 
salt, granite, red bricks, ground calcium carbonates, glass, ceramics, aggregate, 
mosaic floor tiles, barite, sodium silicates and caustic soda. Saudi Arabian ma'or j 
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minerals' production comprises cement raw materials, gypsum and ceramics. 
Gold, silver, copper, zinc, iron and lead are produced in moderate volumes and, 
therefore, are mostly consumed in the domestic market as a result of the 
expansion of manufacturing industry based on these metals during the past two 
decades. In minerals and mineral-based products, Saudi Arabia is a large importer 
of iron ore, phosphate rock, aluminium raw materials, and gold. 
The large-scale expansion of domestic mineral-based industry during the past 15 
years has resulted in a steep rise in the production. For instance, the eight cement 
factories finished their planned expansion, and increased their capacities by 40% 
in 1998. The output expansion of iron and steel and fertiliser production have 
been based on imports of their raw materials such as iron ore, coking steel scrap, 
phosphoric acid and potassium chloride. In 1998, the total mineral-based industry 
was 351 factories with a total cost over SR 28 billion. 
4.4 Structure of Non-oil Mineral Industr 
The private sector is involved in all mining operations except in gold mining. The 
government-owned company, Ma'aden, is the only company authorised to engage 
in gold mining in Saudi Arabia. Mineral-based industry is carried out by both 
sectors, and they share some industry together. A review of the major 
commodities and mineral-based industries is introduced in the next section. 
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Gold 
Gold is primarily extracted by Ma'aden from two gold mines, Mahd ad Dhahab 
and Sukhaybarat. According to Maaden, Mahd ad Dhahab will continue to 
produce approximately 90,000 ounces of gold, 300,000 ounces of silver, in 
addition to copper and zinc, for the next seven to ten years. The Sukhaybarat gold 
mine is an open pit, working with grades of 1.4 grams/ton. Gold reserves at that 
site are sufficient for three years at the current production rate of 50,000 ounces 
annually. Ma'aden has recently bought the 50% stake held by the Swedish 
Boliden, Ltd., its joint venture partner in the Sukhaybarat mine, for the amount of 
SR 25.8 million. This purchase makes Ma'aden the sole owner of the Saudi 
Company for Precious Metals (SCPM). Ma'aden's combined gold production in 
2000 was 140,000 ounces, at an average cost of less than $195 per ounce. 
The Dahab Co. Ltd., a Saudi Arabian/French joint venture opened, a gold refinery 
at Jeddah with a capacity of 110 tonnes/year gold and 20 tonnes/year silver, 
opened in 1998. The Saudi private sector holds 51% of the company, while the 
French concern, Thomson CSF, holds the remaining 49%. It refines local scrap 
plus bullion from Mahd Ad Dhahab and Sukhaybarat gold mines. 
Aluminium 
The Saudi Arabian government holds an equity share of an aluminjum, smelter 
(ALBA) in Bahrain with the Bahraini government. In 1996, ALBA production 
was 0.5 million tonnes of primary aluminium. Because demand for aluminium 
exceeds ALBA production, Saudi Arabia continues importing aluminium. In 
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1997ý the Saudi import of aluminium was 0.3 million tonnes. In 1997, Saudi 
Aluminium Recycling Co. opened a new plant at Jeddah on the Red Sea. The 
plant, a joint venture between the Saudi private sector and the Processing Co. of 
Gen-nany, has a capacity to produce 18,000 tonnes/year. 
Copper 
Until 1998, copper was a by-product of gold mining at Mahd Ad Dhahab. A new 
copper smelter and refinery plant started up in 1998. The plant, located at the 
second largest industrial city on the Red Sea, Yanbu, produces 150,000 
tonnes/year of copper cathode. Saudi Arabia imported an extra 40,000 tonnes of 
copper in 1997. 
Ferroalloys 
In 1998, the Gulf Ferroalloys Co. (Sabayek) constructed a ferroalloy complex at 
Al- Jubail, a location accessible to high-quality quartz and inexpensive energy. 
The complex has a 35,600 metric tonnes/year capacity ferrosilicon plant, a 10,000 
metric tonnes/year silicon metal furnace, and a 27,600 metric tonnes/year 
silicomanganese and 10,000 metric tonnes/year ferromanganese production. 
Sabayek's total cost was SR 236 million, and its major equity owners are United 
Gulf Industries Corp. 26%, SABIC 15% and Demetal A. 7%. The remainder is 
owned by various Arab investors and financial institutions. 
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Iron and Steel 
Saudi Iron and Steel Co. (Hadeed) at Al Jubail is the only plant for steel in Saudi 
Arabia. Hadeed cost about SR 3.6 billion, and produces about 2.4 metric 
tonnes/year from steel scrap and imported pellets. The plant supplies 50% of the 
domestic market. 
Cement 
The domestic cement industry accelerated its expansion programmes to meet a 
greater portion of the growing demand, currently estimated at 18 million 
tonnes/year. The eight cement plants produced about 20 million ton/year, with net 
profit estimated at SR 1.7 billion in 1997. Saudi Arabia exports 2.4 million tonnes 
of cement, estimated at SR 0.6 billion in 1997. Five cement plants are 100%- 
owned by the Saudi government, the other three are shared with the private sector, 
with the government as the majority shareholder. The total investment in cement 
plants in Saudi Arabia is estimated at SR14 billion. 
Fertilisers 
A reorganisation of the Saudi Arabian fertiliser industry was implemented by the 
merger of the three state-owned companies, Ibn Albaytar, Safco, and Samad. The 
merger was intended to increase capacity and boost earnings, as a part of a general 
effort to reduce the budget deficit. These companies have the combined capacity 
to produce more than 2 million tonnes/year of fertilisers from their 5 plants. The 
total cost of the Saudi Arabian fertilisers plants is estimated at SR 2 billion. 
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4.5 Contribution of the Non-oil Minerals Sector to the Saudi Arabian 
Econom 
In spite of its relatively long history of mining and the large non-oil mineral 
resources potential, mining constituted only about 0.3% of Saudi Arabian GDP 
between 1970 and 1995. The sector has not made up more than 0.4% in the past 
two decades because of the lack of capital available for mining investment from 
either public or private funds. 
Table 4.2: Average Share of Non-Oil Minerals, Manufacturing and Agriculture in 
Saudi Arabian Fixed Capital Investment (1970-1995) 
(Current values in SR, millions) 
Year Non-Oil Minerals Manufacturing Agriculture 
Value Share 
N 
Value Share 
N 
Value Share 
N 
1970 38 13.7 91 32.7 10 3.6 
1971 37 11.7 111 35.1 10 3.2 
1972 35 11.8 102 34.5 11 3.7 
1973 24 4.5 221 41.7 20 3.8 
1974 40 2.4 760 45.6 34 2.0 
1975 30 1.4 1011 46.9 38 1.8 
1976 59 2.7 1000 45.6 38 1.7 
1977 98 3.7 1161 43.6 74 2.8 
1978 274 6.0 1854 40.8 147 3.2 
1979 580 9.2 2408 38.1 169 2.7 
1980 637 7.4 3460 40.0 232 2.7 
1981 256 2.4 4587 43.7 408 3.9 
1982 216 2.1 4503 43.2 495 4.8 
1983 163 1.2 5667 41.8 931 6.9 
1984 437 2.9 6099 40.0 1073 7.0 
1985 663 4.6 5427 37.9 1045 7.3 
1986 310 2.3 5452 40.2 990 7.3 
1987 322 2.7 4749 39.2 967 8.0 
1988 549 4.8 4126 36.1 1019 8.9 
1989 382 3.4 4083 36.4 1124 10.0 
1990 253 1.9 5138 38.9 1193 9.0 
1991 449 2.7 6324 37.6 1604 9.6 
1992 514 2.6 7294 36.8 2071 10.5 
1993 670 2.6 9580 36.5 2853 10.9 
1994 810 2.5 12883 39.3 2708 82 
1995 558 1.9 12187 42.2 1669 5,8 
Source: Ministry of'Planning (1999). 
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As indicated in Table 4.2, the share of Saudi Arabian total fixed capital 
investment allocated to mining during the period 1970-1995 varied between 1.2% 
and 13.7%, the average for the period being about 4.4%. Because of the gradually 
decreasing rate of fixed investment in mining during the past 13 years, the average 
annual growth rate of mining has lagged behind those of manufacturing and 
agriculture, and of the economy as a whole. The averages for 1983-1995 were 
2.8% for mining, 38% for manufacturing industry, and 8.4% for agriculture. 
From further study of data given in Table 4.3 below, a general appraisal can be 
made as to Saudi Arabian balance of trade in non-oil minerals. 
Table 4.3: Imports and Exports of Saudi Arabian Non- oil Minerals (1984-1995) 
(Millions SR) 
Year Non-oil 
Minerals 
Imports 
% of Non-oil 
Minerals in total 
Imports 
Non-oil 
Minerals 
Exports 
% of Non-oil 
Minerals in total 
Exports 
1984 24369 20.5 345 0.3 
1985 17626 20.6 589 0.6 
1986 11334 16.0 795 1.1 
1987 11203 14.9 1119 1.3 
1988 12779 15.7 1674 1.8 
1989 12717 16.1 1666 1.6 
1990 16480 18.3 1895 1.1 
1991 18152 16.7 1380 0.8 
1992 20323 16.3 1025 0.6 
1993 17735 16.8 1032 0.7 
1994 14072 16.1 1567 9.9 
1995 17969 17.1 1954 10.5 
Source: Researcher's calculations based on SAMA (1998). 
Unlike oil and gas, Saudi Arabia has been a large importer for decades. It is the 
largest import market in the region and one of the top 15 importers in the world. 
In 1999, the country was estimated to have imported around SR 108.6 billion 
81 
worth of goods (United Nations, 2000). Between 1984 and 1995, the share of non- 
oil mineral commodities in total imports varied between 14.9% and 20.6%, with 
an average of 17.1 %. During the same period, the relatively high values of non-oil 
minerals imported to Saudi Arabia resulted in an outflow of hard currency 
payments of more than SR 212 billion. The main non-oil mineral commodities 
imported in large volumes are gold, iron ore, phosphate rock, ceramic and glass. 
The value of non-oil minerals in Saudi Arabian exports was much lower than that 
of manufacturing products. As indicated in Table 4.3, the share of mining 
products in total Saudi Arabian exports was relatively low, and vaned between 
0.3% and 9.9% in 1984 and 1995, respectively. Saudi Arabian main exports of 
major mineral commodities are ceramic products, glassware, stone articles, 
plaster, gems, and cements. 
Table 4.4 below indicates the development of workers in the non-oil mineral 
sector. The sector's workers have increased, and peaked to about 63 thousand 
workers in 1985. The figure has fluctuated, and dropped by more than 20% in 
1990, and increased again to 59.1 thousand workers in 1995. In terms of 
employment generation in the economy, the sector showed a very low percentage 
of the whole Saudi Arabian labour force. The share of the sector's workers did not 
exceed more than 3% between 1965 and 1995, and tended to decrease over time. 
This low contribution to employment could be attributed mainly to the 'Dutch 
disease' effect. Such an effect would transfer the workers, due to high wages, 
from the tradable sector to the booming sector inside the economy. Another 
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reason could be that the mining industry is becoming more advanced by gradually 
replacing more workers with new machines. 
Table 4.4: Development of Non-oil Mineral Sector's Workers (1965-1995) 
Year 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Workers 25.2 25.7 45.6 47.0 62.9 52.3 59.1 
(thousands) 
% of total Saudi 2.5 2.3 3.0 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.9 
Workers 
Source: Ministry ot Planning (1999). 
4.6 Development of the Saudi Arabian Non-oil Mineral Sector 
Despite its poor contribution to the Saudi Arabian economy, the government 
believes that the non-oil mineral sector could contribute significantly and, hence, 
is trying to enhance its role in the economy. Non-oil minerals have been 
highlighted in the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan (1996-2000), and there are 
big ambitions for the part they can play in the future prosperity of the country. 
According to the Sixth Plan, the sector is expected to grow at a target rate higher 
than any other sector of the economy. This optimistic growth rate is partly 
explained by the low base from which this sector is expected to expand, yet major 
mining projects are already out to tender and promise to enlarge the industry 
substantially. Others are expected to move forward in the coming years. 
The Saudi Arabian government has identified mining as an essential element in its 
programme to diversify the economy away from its present dependency on oil. 
The government's medium and long-term objectives for this sector include 
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reaching out to private and foreign investors to establish industries for extracting 
and processing the minerals, and providing the Saudi manufacturing sector with 
its requirements in raw materials, as well as making Saudi Arabia a leading 
exporter of minerals. With such a vast country as Saudi Arabia, the government 
has focused not only on finding the mineral deposits, but also on making them 
accessible for exploitation. Saudi Arabia occupies over 70% of the Arabian 
Peninsula, a vast area larger than Western Europe, encompassing a territory of 
nil dbout 2.25 million sq. km. As a result, the issue of accessibility has been 
prominent on the government's agenda. The European Parsons Bnnckerhoff has 
completed a govermnent-sponsored study on the economic viability of developing 
a railway network, including plans for a link between Al- Jubail and Ad Dammam 
on the Arabian Gulf, an east-west land bridge between Jeddah and Ad Dammam, 
and a link to connect proposed mining sites with Al- Jubail, either via the capital 
Ar Riyadh, or directly (Saudi Railways Organisation, 1996). The study's positive 
findings led to a recent review by the World Bank and the Saudi International 
Bank for possible financing of the cost of the railway which was estimated by SR 
1.2 billion. An integrated mining and transportation policy is expected to be 
unveiled in the first part of 2002. 
In a move to enhance its role in the Saudi Arabian economy, the non-oil mineral 
sector has received more attention from government in the last few years. In fact, 
the Saudi government has boosted the sector by announcing new plans to promote 
it. Firstly, the Saudi government announced the formation of the Supreme 
Petroleum & Mineral Affairs Council (SPMAC). The SPMAC is responsible for 
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the country's energy policy and will also supervise Saudi Aramco's projects. The 
SPMAC will also study and endorse general mining policies. 
Secondly, in April 1997, the Saudi govenunent established the state-owned Saudi 
Arabian Mining Company (Ma'aden), which will consolidate all mining projects 
in which the government is involved. This company is a 100% Saudi 
governmental holding company with an initial capital of more than SR 3.745 
billion reporting directly to MPMR, and the Minister himself is the Chairman of 
the board. Indications are that shares in the finn will be offered to the public for 
full or part subscription after it moves to a profitable footing by 2003. The 
establishment of Ma'aden was the main concrete indication of serious intent by 
the Saudi Arabian government for a significant expansion in mining activity. 
Ma'aden is expected to spearhead exploration and mining activities, and has 
already obtained many licences to mine precious and industrial minerals. 
Moreover, Ma'aden's major stated activities are to engage in upstream and 
downstream-related industries, and in increasing the country's gold output in the 
next few years. Although Ma'aden is state-owned, it does not have a monopoly of 
the mining sector and operates on a commercial basis, along the model of SABIC, 
the country's world-class petrochemical company. 
Moreover, Ma'aden is expected to be a catalyst for private sector investment. It is 
presently accomplishing this through direct investment in the development of the 
mining sector, as well as through joint ventures with private investors. Ma'aden 
will also encourage changes in mining legislation, and more transparency and 
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streamlining of regulations to stimulate private investment. According to 
Ma'aden's President, "Ma'aden recognizes the importance of having transparent 
laws and regulations, and the need to attract international mining expertise. Given 
the existence of mineral ores in remote areas that lack the necessary services for a 
potential mining industry, Ma'aden will also contribute to the development of 
sufficient infrastructure, such as water, electricity, and telecommunications" 
(ldrees, 2001). 
Thirdly, the country's investment laws and regulations have been recently 
changed and modified. The objective was to encourage private-sector investments 
in the mining sector, which is expected to grow strongly. The Saudi government 
views private investment as the engine of growth of the mining sector, and is 
anticipating more partnerships between local investors and international 
companies. As for the Mining Code, a multi-day workshop under the auspices of 
the World Bank was conducted in late October 1999, concerning legal, fiscal, 
financial and institutional issues to modernise the present Saudi Arabian codes. 
Should recommendations be implemented, they will impact positively on every 
aspect of mining business from the issue of exploration licences through to 
expediting capital project performance; specifically, matters related to land tenure, 
security and transferability are part of the equation. 
Pending completion of the process of promulgating the new Saudi mining code, 
the government has modified and changed many articles in the existing code to 
attract foreign investors, for example, granting tax exemption for between five to 
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ten years, and a 30-year extraction concession. Exploration licences guarantee the 
exclusive right to explore within the licence area, and the exclusive right to obtain 
a mining lease. The area granted could be as large as 10,000 sq. km. Exploration 
leases are initially for five years, and renewable for another four years. Mining 
leases guarantee the exclusive right to produce and exploit specific minerals in a 
mining area as large as 50 sq. km. Mining leases are initially for 30 years, and 
renewable for another 20 years. Mining leases come with a five-year tax 
exemption. Furthennore, all imported mining equipment is exempt from import 
and export duties. Foreign investors in the mining sector may repatriate their 
profits and capital with no restrictions. 
The incentives granted to private investors have made investment in this sector 
highly profitable. According to DMMR annual reports, between 1990 and 1997, 
the profits of companies that had mineral franchises including sandstone, 
limestone, and other quarry operations, exceeded SR 11.2 billion. Figure 4.1 
illustrates the increasing involvement in mining activities by both local and 
foreign companies. As a result of the improvement of investment attractiveness, 
the number of mining deeds and permits awarded increased significantly. For 
example, the number of valid building material permits and quarrying leases 
doubled in seven years and reached 841 in 1997. 
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Figure 4.1: Developments of Mining and Quarrying Valid Deeds and Pennits in 
Saudi Arabia (1990-1997) 
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Finally, in October 1999, another important move was the establishment of the 
Saudi Geological Survey Organisation (SGSO) as an independent entity. The new 
organisation was to be responsible for geological surveys throughout the country 
and the efficient dissemination of this information. It has representatives from 
MPMR, and has a close cooperation with Saudi Arabian national universities and 
academic institutions, including King Abdul Aziz City for Science and 
Technology (KACST), a leading research institution in the country. This has 
enhanced the dissemination of the wealth of infori-nation available in their 
Permits 
geological database. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
Saudi Arabia is home to the largest non-oil mineral deposits in the region. Non-oil 
mineral resources are abundant in the form of base and precious metals, as well as 
industrial minerals. These mineral resources range in size and value from limited 
potential to deposits large enough to sustain profitable exploitation. Current 
mining activities, however, are concentrated in building and construction 
materials and gold mining. Commercial mining is still limited and confined to a 
few minerals and metals, such as gypsum, silica sand, barite and salt, which can 
be easily extracted. As a result, the non-oil minerals sector is not an exception 
among the whole non-oil sector, and even has a relatively lesser role in the Saudi 
Arabian economy. 
In a move to enhance its role in the economy, as well as economic diversification 
to decrease the reliance on the oil sector, the Saudi Arabian government has 
announced new plans to promote the non-oil minerals sector. The new plans aim 
at finding and developing mineral resources, and hence integrating them into the 
Saudi economy. There are a number of basic chemical compounds available in the 
country, including acids, phosphates, alum compounds, iron, salt, barium, etc., 
which can meet a large part of the country's industrial requirements. Saudi 
industries are using imported minerals, and recycled metals as input raw 
materials. The new mining projects in Saudi Arabia, however, are expected to 
meet a large part of these industries' requirements, such as phosphate fertiliser 
materials, potash, raw materials, and the mineral raw materials such as alumina 
and iron. 
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Chapter 5: Saudi Arabian Non-Oil Export Diversification: A Portfolio 
Approach 
5.1 Introduction 
The developing countries are highly dependent on export earnings from primary 
commodities. According to the World Bank (2002), 32-36% of LDCs' export 
earnings were received from primary commodities in 2000. Commodity prices 
have always fluctuated, and over many periods tended to decline (Maizels, 1994). 
As a result, the developing countries' major concerns are both the long-ran 
commodities' price trends and the problem associated with fluctuations in their 
export earnings. 
This chapter will introduce the typical portfolio approach to export diversification, 
as proposed by Markowitz (1959). Moreover, the marginal portfolio approach 
(Alwang and Siegel, 1994) will be applied empirically to examine the potential 
for export diversification to meet the goals of sustained export earnings growth 
and enhanced stability for Saudi Arabia. The objective for applying this marginal 
approach is to provide guidance to Saudi Arabian planners who seek 
simultaneously to increase non-oil export earnings and reduce their instability. 
Before we apply the approach, we will shed light on the terms of trade between 
developing and less developed countries, and the variability in short-term 
commodity prices in terms of the causes and domestic consequences of export 
instability. The reason behind this is to provide a better understanding of the 
portfolio approach and its application in export diversification. 
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5.2 Terms of Trade 
It is commonly accepted that trade acted as an engine of growth (as compared 
with, say, technological change or investment) in the 19th century, at least for the 
currently developed countries. However, the adequacy of the transmission of 
economic growth, in recent times, from developed countries to the LDCs has been 
severely questioned. Some economists argue that in the interaction of developed 
economies with the primary exporting economies the gains from trade are 
unequal, and the latter tend to lose relatively more than the fon-ner. Prebisch 
(1950) and Singer (1950) asserted that the economic backwardness of developing 
countries had arisen from their traditional role as exporters of primary products to 
the developing economies. 
The Prebisch and Singer discussion was based on two distinct hypotheses: short 
(to medium)-run price instability of exports of the primary producing countries, 
and the long-run trend in the terms of trade. This section is devoted to explaining 
the long-run decline of the terms of trade of the developing countries, while the 
price instability issue will be introduced in the next sections. The most important 
arguments to explain the long-run decline are the structural differences among 
these developing countries and the monopolistic forces exercised by developed 
countries; the average income elasticity of demand for primary goods, which is 
significantly lower than the average income elasticity of demand for manufactured 
goods; the increased self-sufficiency of developed areas; and the direction of 
technical progress which favours the industrialised countries. 
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The evidence for the proposition that developing countries have faced and will 
continue to face, long-run decline in their terms of trade is not conclusive either, 
and there is a danger of over- simp li fication and over-generalisation. Onitiri (1965) 
studied empirically the relationships between primary and manufactured goods 
prices (measured as the ratio of the commodity price index to that of 
manufactured products). He found five more or less clearly defined phases, 
corresponding roughly to the following periods: 1) 1800-80,2) 1880-1913,3) 
1914-38ý 4) 1939-52, and 5) 1950-60. Onitiri argued that in the first and fourth 
phases the terms of trade moved in favour of primary goods, while in the other 
three this relationship tended to favour manufactured goods. However, there is no 
agreement about the trend over the period covering all of these phases. 
Another important study was carried out by Dantwalla (1965) who measured the 
terms of trade between developed and developing countries, instead of between 
manufactured and primary goods, between 1953 and 1960. He argued that some 
of the primary producing countries are themselves not insignificant importers of 
primary goods, and some of them, the so-called semi-industrialised, are also 
expanding their manufacturing exports. The trends in the terms of trade were in 
favour of developed countries in 1938, and reduced in 1948. In 1951, the trends 
were reversed in favour of developed countries, then tended to be equal by 1957, 
and finally the trends moved in favour of developed countries in 1960. 
Colman and Nixon (1978) have also shown that in recent years the relationships 
between primary and manufactured goods appear to be characterised by an 
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unclear trend. They argued that there is not a well-defined long-run trend, and the 
short to medium trend of these relationships visible in the statistics is highly 
sensitive to the initial and final years chosen for comparison. Johnson (1967) has 
argued that the 1950s were not typical, since they began with a year in which 
primary commodity prices had been increased suddenly by the Korean war boom, 
and ended with a year in which prices were drastically reduced by the United 
States economy and by the new supplies stimulated by the increased prices during 
the Suez crisis. 
Kindelberger and Herrick (1977) mention that developed countries do not export 
undifferentiated 'primary products', and therefore statements describing trends in 
the tenns of trade in the aggregate do not provide helpful guidance for 
development policy for any given country's specific situation. A striking example 
is the experience of oil-producing countries. Colman and Nixon (1978) have also 
illustrated other primary commodities which account for a high proportion of the 
exports of a certain number of developing countries, whose prices have over fairly 
long periods fared relatively well in international trade. 
Export instability and its causes and impacts on economic growth have also been 
of great concern to development economists for many years. However, the issue 
regarding the impact of export instability on the rate of economic growth has been 
far from determined. Empirical studies on the relationship between export 
instability and economic growth have revealed mixed results and findings. The 
traditional view that export instability has a negative impact on economic growth 
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was supported by many studies, such as Voivodas (1974), Knudsen and Parnes 
(1975), Love (1992), and others. They found that export instability has a negative 
and significant effect on the economic growth rate. Contrary to the traditional 
view, some studies, such as Caine (1958), MacBean (1966), Moran (1983), and 
Savvides (1984), have found a positive relationship between export instability and 
economic growth rate. Other researchers, however, have found no relationship 
between them, for example Moran (1983) and Kenen and Voivodas (1972). 
Clearly, this debate over the impact of export instability remains a source of 
continuing argument. 
5.3 Causes of Export Instability 
As mentioned above, instability was explained in terms of developing countries' 
specialisation in the export of primary commodities. Studies suggest that there 
have been a decline and higher fluctuations in the prices of primary commodities 
compared to the prices of manufactured products since the early 1970s. Grilli and 
Yang (1988) found that the commodity terms of trade dropped nearly 40% 
between 1980 and 1986, compared to a 30% drop between the period of the Great 
Depression, i. e., between 1929 and 1932. 
Numerous researchers have examined empirically the causes and effects of 
commodity prices and export earnings' trends and instability. They discussed the 
reasons why primary commodity prices have trended downward, and why 
increased instability should be expected, following recent changes in international 
markets. The empirical studies have classified the important factors contributing 
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to the export instability in the developing countries into two categories: (1) factors 
contributing to instability in world demand and the relation between world market 
and elements of instability in individual countries, and (2) factors associated with 
commodity, trade, and geographic concentration. 
In the context of the first category, i. e., causes of world market instability, the 
majority of empirical analyses suggest that supply factors are the major source of 
export instability in world market. Many studies were carried out by researchers 
such as Adler (1958), Brook et al. (1978) and Lord (1981) to investigate the 
relationship between quantity deviations and price deviations for different 
commodities. They found that supply disturbance was the major source of 
instability in world markets for most of the commodities included in the studies. 
Demand disturbance, however, was found to be the major cause of instability for a 
-Rew commodities, while 
both supply and demand were equally responsible in the 
rest of the commodities in world markets. 
The second category, however, has received larger attention in tenn of studies 
conducted to investigate the cause of export earning instability. Empirical studies 
on the causes of export instability have focused on examining three country- 
specific factors. These factors are (1) dependence on primary products, (2) 
dependence on one or a few commodities for export, and (3) dependence on one 
or a few export markets. Despite the evidence of a positive relationship between 
these three factors and export earnings instability, there has not been a well- 
established empirical link, in most studies, between export diversity and export 
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performance (see, for example, Coppock, 1962; Michaely, 1962; Soutar, 1977). 
Moreover, the widely used measures of export diversity in some of the other 
studies would not provide practical guidelines for planning changes in a country's 
export mix. 
5.4 Sources and Domestic Consequences of Export Instability 
The early literature on the sources and consequences of export instability on 
LDCs suggested two different views. The conventional view that export 
instability may negatively affect development plans in developing countries was 
supported by many studies, such as Nurske (1958), Knudsen and Panes (1975), 
and many others. These writers argued that the most harmful effect on the 
domestic economy of developing countries arises mainly from: 
(1) Export instability might induce short macroeconomic instability and generate 
uncertainty in the economy, which in turn affects the supply of savings and 
investment. Such instability induces higher levels of uncertainty, which in turn 
increase interest rates, and hence the cost of borrowing. A general increase in 
commodity prices causes a rise in inflationary expectations which, in turns, leads 
to higher interest rates to compensate for the expected loss in value of financial 
assets (Maizels, 1994). In addition, instabilities in the balance of trade may lead to 
instability in the exchange rate, and then a degree of uncertainty in the future 
course of the exchange rate. As a consequence, foreign capital and domestic 
saving may leave the home country in search of more stable foreign investment 
markets. In other words, uncertainty, in this case, leads to risk-averse behaviour. 
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(2) Export instability is assumed to reduce import capacity and influence 
government revenue and expenditure. This is because export earnings are the 
major determinants of imports for many developing countries, since a sudden 
reduction in foreign exchange flows impairs import ability. A typical developing 
country is assumed to depend heavily on imported materials for investment 
projects. Such projects are sensitive to changes in ability to pay for imports, and 
may result in damage in the development plans. 
The other view, however, is that export instability has a beneficial impact on the 
domestic economy through three main channels (see, for example, Caine, 1954; 
Michaely, 1962): (1) uncertainty associated with high-risk high-return projects 
may encourage risk-loving behaviour, (2) short-tenn instability may not alter 
investment decisions; moreover, increased investment in periods of high earnings 
is partially offset by disinvestments (saving) in periods of low earnings, (3) 
unstable incomes may tend to increase the recipients' precautionary balances, 
which increases the marginal propensity to save, which in turn increases the level 
of investible funds. 
Numerous empirical studies have been conducted to investigate the impact of 
export instability on developing countries (see, for example, MacBean, 1966; 
Maizels, 1968; Love, 1992). Such studies were generally inconclusive and 
sometimes even contradictory conclusions were obtained (see Love (1987) for a 
rich, detailed analysis). AIjerrah (1993) investigated the impact of variations in 
trade balance on the economy of Saudi Arabia and four other OPEC countries, for 
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the period 1970-89. He adopted a macroeconometric-simulation approach, 
consisting of three struct-ural relationships (consumption, imports, and investment, 
as well as an equilibrium condition). AIjerrah concluded that trade balance 
variations had negative impacts on the economies of Saudi Arabia and the other 
four OPEC countries. 
5.5 Relationship Between Export Diversiflcation, Export Earnings Growth 
and Stabilit 
It is believed that a diversified national export portfolio can help lower variability 
in export proceedings by providing a broader base of exports, and improve growth 
by substituting commodities with positive price trends for those with negative 
trends. Growth, in turn, may also be improved by increasing the value added of 
export commodities through additional processing and marketing, and by 
substituting imported goods. Although there are potential trade-offs between the 
growth and stability of export proceedings, diversification cannot be considered a 
panacea. 
The concept of comparative advantage would suggest that a country concentrates 
on those goods and services in which it holds a comparative advantage, and this 
could lead to the production of a narrow range of goods and services for export. 
The diversification of export mix may help to stabilise export earnings, but at the 
cost of losing the benefits of specialisation. Numerous studies have investigated 
the impacts of diversification of exports on stability and growth. Most studies 
found that export diversification by itself will not automatically create either 
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increased stability or growth. They found that diversification into non-traditional 
and/or less concentration in commodity exports does not necessarily reduce 
instability (see, for example, Love, 1983, and MacBean and Nguyen, 1980). Love 
argued that evidence such as this does not imply that export diversification cannot 
reduce proceedings' variability, only that in practice it has not done so. He 
attributed the weak relationships to the fact that export concentration is often 
associated with concentration in a commodity whose export proceedings 
(determined by both prices and volumes) are stable, and that countries often 
diversify into commodities whose proceedings fluctuations are positively 
correlated with their existing mix. 
5.6 Portfolio Theor 
Modem portfolio theory provides an approach to financial investment. The theory 
implies that rational investors will seek efficient portfolios which provide the best 
risk-return combinations. Therefore, a portfolio is called efficient if it (1) 
maximises the expected rate of return for a given level of risk, and (2) minimises 
risk for a given level of expected return. Markowitz (1952) was the pioneer in 
forming a model of portfolio selection, using diversification principles which laid 
down the foundation of modem portfolio theory. 
In his model, Markowitz assumed that: (1) while investors desire high returns, 
they are averse to a high variance, e. g. risk, (2) investors base investment 
decisions regarding risky assets on estimated means, variance, and covariances of 
rate of returns, (3) investors are considered to be expected utility maximisers 
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when they make investment decisions. In other words, the utility of an investor is 
a function of expected return and risk of portfolio. The Markowitz mean-variance 
portfolio selection model generates the efficient set of portfolios, or as it often 
called in the portfolio literature, the efficient frontier of risky assets. This could be 
explained by the fact that, for a given level of expected return, investors are 
investing exclusively in that portfolio with the smallest risk. Alternatively, for a 
given amount of risk, only a portfolio with highest expected return will be of 
interest to investors. In both cases, however, Markowitz assumes that the investor 
will choose a portfolio that lies in the efficient frontier. 
By superimposing a particular set of the investor's indifference curves (utility 
functions) on the risk/reward region, the investor's optimal portfolio can be found 
where the highest indifference curve is tangent to the efficient frontier. Though 
several studies have extended the portfolio theory based on the above model, the 
Markowitz analysis remains the dominant factor in the area of decision-making 
regarding risky investments (see, for example, Tobin, 1958; Sharpe, 1964). 
5.7 Portfolio Model 
As explained earlier, Markowitz showed that for given levels of return, a portfolio 
could be selected by choosing a share of assets allocated to different investment 
opportunities in Order to minimise risk. By varying the level of returns across the 
range of feasible returns, holding total assets fixed, and minimising risk at each 
level, an expected eaming/vanance (EV) in earnings frontier can be constructed. 
This EV frontier defines an 'efficient set' of portfolios. An upward sloping EV 
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frontier implies that increases in earning come at the expense of more variability 
(instability). The investor can select from this 'efficient set' based on preferences 
for variability, risk (V), and eamings, retums (E). 
Thus, the risk (V) of an export portfolio may be written: 
v=l]w'VAR(P, X, )+l w, wjCOV(PX,, jý, Xj) 
.., i -., 
1: (1) 
where, 
wi is non-negative export share of commodity i 
PjXj is export earning from commodity i 
Pi is price 
Xi is export quantity (volume) 
VAR (PXi) is variance of export earnings for commodity i 
CO V (PXiPjXj) is covariance in export earnings from commodities i andj. 
Covariances are important for decreasing the risk of earnings' variability. Thus, if 
export proceedings from commodities i and j are negatively correlated, this 
covariance lowers the overall variance of the export portfolio. Even if there are no 
covariances, the share of a stable commodity (VAR (PiXi) is low) can be increased, 
and shares of unstable commodities reduced to lower the overall instability. In 
other words, instability minimisation in the case of no covariation implies 
complete specialisation in the most stable commodity. 
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Markowitz begins with a fixed asset base, and shows how the assets can be 
distributed among N investment alternatives. The Markowitz problem becomes as 
follows: 
Min (V) 
Subject to: M=IP *i wi A (2) 
fwj =1 Wi ý! 0iýI 
where, 
I PXj) represents total financial assets, 
wi 
Pi X 
P ixi 
P*j is expected percentage change in the price of the i th commodity and, 
M is expected return from investment. 
Most non-oil mineral commodities have followed the same feature of other 
primary commodities. For many commodities, the non-oil mineral statistics have 
shown a sharp downtrend in prices and short-tenn instability (Roskill, 1996). 
However, the Saudi planners should perceive the non-oil mineral sector as a 
means of diversification of the export base in order to insulate their country from 
the downward trends and instability in export earnings. Diversification outside of 
non-oil minerals (vertical diversification) into exports using non-oil mineral 
materials as inputs (for example, fertilisers) has long been cited as a means of 
combating downward price trend and instability for primary commodities 
(Sapsford and Balasubramanyam, 1994). More recently, there has been interest in 
increasing diversity within the non-oil mineral sector (horizontal diversification) 
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by substituting into commodities with favourable and stable price trends, and by 
exporting commodities whose price instability is negatively correlated with that of 
the existing export mix. 
5.8 Portfolio Model for Export Diversification 
Portfolio theory has been widely applied to the analysis of exports. The 
diversification principle in portfolio theory states that the risk of a portfolio is 
mainly detennined by the interactions among individual investments, rather than 
by the specific riskiness of each investment. An optimal export portfolio can be 
created by selecting commodities which together minimise the risk (instability) of 
export earnings while achieving a given level of export growth rate. Planners 
seeking to diversify commodity composition of exports of a country can employ 
this approach to help to maximise and stabilise export eamings. 
Many studies have applied export diversification to developing countries to 
combat downward price trends and instability for primary commodities (see, for 
example, Prebisch (1951) and Kaldor (1987)). Most of these studies agree that 
export earnings' instability has more consistently negative impacts on 
development efforts than does commodity price instability. 
Although portfolio theory has been widely applied to the analysis of exports, care 
must be exercised when applying the Markowitz approach to choose export 
portfolios. In other words, there are differences between the use of portfolio 
theory for financial assets and its use in determining export mix. As can be seen 
103 
by examining equations (2) and (3), wi enters both V and the constraints. 
According to equation (1), the share of total assets, wi, dedicated to the 1,1h 
investment opportunity is chosen to minimise V. Therefore, there is a congruence 
between the wi, the variation in earnings, and total assets. Thus financial assets 
can be freely allocated among the NXis. In contrast, in the case of export earnings, 
it is less clear how to define A, and hence how to adjust wi. Exports 'assets' 
(presumably productive assets used to produce exports) are not very liquid, and 
the total value of exports is, in reality, determined by the allocation of productive 
resources among a variety of possible industries. Moreover, this allocation cannot 
be instantly or costlessly adjusted, substantial lags and significant adjustment cost 
are likely. 
When adjusting, for example, non-oil export earnings, the Saudi planner does not 
realistically choose from a clearly defined A. For export mixes, A represents total 
possible export revenues, given the country's total productive resources such as 
land, labour, capital, etc. Changes in policies designed to adjust export volumes 
generally result in changes in the allocation of productive resources and, thus, the 
total value of non-oil exports. The total potential set of feasible export 
combinations is determined by an export possibilities' frontier (EPF). The EPF, in 
turn, cannot be known without an investigation of production possibilities 
combined, given a liberalised domestic market, with an evaluation of domestic 
demand. 
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In order to overcome this problem, economists have used a portfolio risk approach 
to evaluating export earning in different ways. Labys and Lord (1990), and others, 
create an export share-weighted price portfolio that describes the intemational 
price behaviour that a country faces. They use this price portfolio and minimise its 
variability, subject to different values of an export share-weighted index of export 
prices. This approach to evaluating export variability came under criticism for 
some important conceptual weaknesses. Such an approach does not address the 
issue of how to deten-nine the total amount of assets. The approach, called priced- 
based portfolio, ignores variabilities in production and export quantities of 
different commodities. The priced-based portfolio approach contradicts numerous 
studies that have shown export volume instability to be generally greater than 
intemational price instability (see, for example, Glezakos, 1973; Svedbreg, 1991). 
So if export earnings are to be stabilised, instability of the volumes (quantities) 
must also be considered. Since there are likely to be covariations, either positive 
or negative, between export quantities and export prices, both components of 
export proceedings should be examined simultaneously 5. The need for including a 
quantity-based approach in export diversification programmes, however, entails 
changes in domestic production and trade patterns of commodities. 
Some authors have used another way of avoiding the problems of adjusting 
feasible export volumes ftom the total asset base by using the portfolio variance 
5 Under the assumption of low short-run price elasticity of world market supply and demand, one 
concludes that disturbances caused by demand (supply) factors lead to movement in prices and 
volumes in the same (opposite) direction. 
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(equation (1)) solely as a measure of variability (see, for example, Love, 1983). 
They use portfolio theory to decompose export proceedings to variability by each 
commodity's contribution to total instability. 
This decomposition allows the planner to identify covariances that can lower 
overall instability. However, this approach also ignores the potential for 
examining the impact of marginal changes in export quantities. Alwang and 
Siegel (1994) have modified the standard approach in order to calculate these 
impacts. 
5.9 Marginal Portfolio Approach and its Mechanism 
Employing a modified portfolio approach to export proceedings, Alwang and 
Siegel (1994) examined the potential for export diversification to reduce export 
variability and maintain export earnings' growth for a group of sub-Saharan 
African countries over the period 1967-87. As seen above, they argued that the 
use of portfolio variance in previous studies as a description of instability does not 
take into account the potential for examining the impact of marginal changes in 
export quantities. Thus, the problem is not to choose among different 
commodities' share combinations (commodity share, wi, is no longer treated as 
choice variables), but to change the quantities (resources are adjusted to different 
production activities). The impact of marginal changes in export volumes on 
variability is given as elasticity by differentiating equation (1) above with respect 
to Wi 
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av 
=1-. 
d 
w Co v(pi xi, lý xj) 
&Wi - 
2w-VAR(PiXi) + 2: , 
And noting: 
avW. 
) 
Pi 
awi , Y, pi 
. /X. i 
Combining equations (4) and (5) yields: 
av 
=(I-W. ) 2wVAR(PiXi)+I]wjCOV(PiX,, PjX, ) (6) aw, , lpixi ii, 
which can be computed for each commodity. The marginal change can be 
converted into an elasticity: 
av xi 
axi v 
where V is the portfolio variance, Xi is the export volume of commodity i. 
The elasticities produced by using equations (6) and (7) can be paired with 
commodity price growth forecasts or historical growth rates to examine the trade- 
off between the growth and stability for marginal changes in quantities of exports. 
In a condition where export possibilities are not well known and stability 
relationships are variable, then the above marginal approach may be applied. The 
model can provide guidance about the best changes to make in the short-run, or 
the best path towards a long-r-an optimal portfolio. If instability relationships are 
changing over time, the marginal approach employed here can provide guidance 
nI, about desirable changes to minimise short-run variability. 
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The above marginal portfolio model was applied to Saudi Arabia based on the 
assumptions that: 
(1) Commodity composition of Saudi exports is assumed to consist of nine major 
commodity groups of non-oil exports, which accounted for 96%, on average, of 
total export receipts (excluding revenues from crude oil) in the period 1984-1995. 
Three of these nine commodity groups, come under the non-oil minerals, and are 
classified as: (1) ceramic products, glass, and articles of stone, (2) precious metals 
and gems, and (3) base metals. The rest of the commodity non-oil exports groups 
are classified as: (4) foodstuffs, (5) petrochemical products, (6) paper materials, 
(7) textiles, (8) machinery and electrical equipment, and (9) transport equipment. 
(2) World prices are not affected by diversification efforts in Saudi Arabia. That is 
another reason for excluding crude oil from the model. 
5.10 Data Sources 
Data on export values in US$, volumes in metric tonnes, and domestic commodity 
production in metric tonnes, come from commodity trade statistics issued by the 
United Nations. Export unit values are calculated by dividing export values by 
volume, which give an fo. b. unit value US$ per metric tonne. Data on world 
commodity prices are from publications by the World Bank's International 
Economics Department, International Commodity Markets Division. Current 
prices in US$ are converted to real prices in 1987 US$ by using the GNP implicit 
' The decision to exclude theoretically and analytically a major commodity, crude oil, 
precludes any possibility of dominance of one commodity over other commodities in total 
exports. 
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price deflator of the US Department of Commerce. Unfortunately, detailed data 
-for Saudi Arabian non-oil exports commodities prior to 1984 do not exist. 
As a result, we decided to use the Saud' Arabian non-oil exports between 1984 
and 2000. While this period excludes the oil shock in 1973-74 and the subsequent 
disruption in the world commodity market, it includes both the first and second 
Gulf Wars, and is a period when drastic declines occurred in most commodity 
pnces. 
5.11 Saudi Arabian Non-oil Sector: Exports, Growth, and Stability 
The Saudi Economy experienced remarkable changes between 1970 and 1995. 
Since the first oil price shock in 1973-74, the government expenditure has become 
the dominant stimulator of economic activity in Saudi Arabia. Such expenditure 
stimulated domestic investment activity in the non-oil sectors. This policy was 
further enhanced after the oil price mini-boom in 1979-80 (Al-Hasan, 1997). 
Thus, any adverse change to oil revenue would affect the growth of non-oil 
sectors in the economy. The drastic cut in oil prices in 1980s caused a sharp fall in 
Saudi oil revenue which, in turn, resulted in the first ever, both budget and current 
account deficit, in 1983. These deficits kept on growing in subsequent years, in 
which the budget deficit reached the unprecedented level of SR 98.7 billion in 
1991. 
The Saudi Arabian government has recognised the fact that dependence on a 
single product, namely crude oil, as the main source of income would not be a 
109 
successful economic policy. In order to sustain economic growth, the Saudi 
Arabian main policies are to strengthen the role of the private sector and to 
diversify the economy away from the oil sector. This objective has received great 
attention from all levels of the Saudi Arabian government officials, and became a 
national priority. Although the Saudi Arabian govermnent's dependence on oil 
has declined in recent years due to large revenue generated from increasing prices 
of its basic services to the public (by cutting subsidies), and selling more of its 
export-oriented products (mainly petrochemicals and non-oil mineral products), 
unfavourable changes in the oil economy would have a considerable impact on 
much of the economic activity in the domestic non-oil economy, particularly the 
private sector. This has been the case in the past two decades, and will continue at 
least in the near future. 
Nevertheless, the Saudi Arabian government diversification effort during the past 
two decades has resulted in a substantial decline in the relative role of oil exports. 
Non-oil GDP increased more than fourfold, with a real average annual growth of 
6%. The value added by the non-oil sector as a share of GDP increased from 53% 
in 1970 to 67% by the year 1995. The contribution of non-oil revenues to total 
government revenues increased from 9% in 1970 to 28% in 1995. Non-oil exports 
increased from 8% in 1970 to about 21% by the year 1995. Despite the fact that 
the Saudi planners have succeeded, to some extent, in diversifying the export base 
over the past five Development Plans, 1970-1995, they are still concerned with 
the problem of instability of earnings. 
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The role of the non-oil sector in total exports is illustrated in Table 5.1. Non-oil 
export slightly increased its share of total export earnings over the two periods 
examined, even though non-oil export earnings were stagnant in the second 
period. Stagnant non-oil export earnings were accompanied by increasing export 
shares, indicating poor perfon-nance for the entire non-oil export sector. Export 
earnings' instability, however, fell relatively across the two periods 7. In the 
subsequent section, we examine how the portfolio approach could be applied to 
reduce export instability. 
Table 5.1: Saudi Arabian Non-Oil Export Eamings (1984-1990 and 1991-2000) 
Year Average Share in total Growth rate in real Coefficient of 
Value (SR export earnings export earnings (% variation 
million) (%) per year) 
1984-1990 6081.66 19.9 2.06 13.19 
1991-2000 17782.91 26.6 0.05 5.38 
Source: Author's calculations based on SAMA (1998). 
5.12 Analysis of Results 
The analysis focuses on two distinct periods, 1984-1990 and 1991-2000. The 
break in 1990 corresponds to the oil price shock when Kuwait was invaded by 
Iraq, believed to have caused subsequent disruption in world commodity markets. 
Table 5.2 below illustrates the trade-offs between growth and stability in export 
earnings. c, j, or column (1) shows the elasticity of the portfolio variance (P) (see 
' Coefficient of variation as a measure of variability is predicted on the assumption that 
the time series of export earnings is stationary along deterministic trend. 
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equation (1)) with respect to change in export volume for each commodity. The 
commodities are ranked according to these elasticities in column (2). 
Table 5.2: Elasticities of portfolio variance, percentage change in export eamings, 
and price trends by commodity groups (1984-1990 and 1991-2000) 
1984-1990 
Commodity Evi wil World Price Trends US$ 
Group Stability 
(1) 
Ranking' 
(2) (3) 
% Change 
(4) 
Ranking 
(5) 
Non-oil 1 0.32 7 0.01 0.6 3 
Mineral 2 -0.09 5 0.01 0.3 4 
3 -0.56 4 0.09 -0.1 5 
Other 
Non-oil 
4 
- 
2.85 8 0.10 -0.7 8 
5 -4.64 1 0.61 -0.5 7 
6 3.51 9 0.03 -4.2 9 
7 0.29 6 0.02 -0.2 6 
8 -2.50 2 0.07 5.5 1 
9 -1.10 3 0.08 3.2 2 
1991-2000 
Non-oil 1 0.57 5 0.1 -0.2 3 
Mineral 2 0.28 4 0.1 -1.5 6 
3 1.76 6 0.8 -0.6 4 
Other 
Non-oil 
4 6.34 8 0.10 -1.2 5 
- 5 3.42 7 0.58 -10.1 8 
6 8.15 9 0.02 -15.7 9 
7 0.0 3 0.02 -3.3 7 
8 -4.53 1 0.08 2.9 1 
9 -2.51 2 0.10 1.7 2 
E, j is calculated as equation (/)- 
'Because it is the share of the commodity in total non-oil exports, Wi represents the 
percentage change in export earnings given a I% increase in quantity of the i'hgood. 
'Rankings are from 1 (= best outcome) to 9(= worst outcome). 
Source: Based on author's calculations. 
During 1984-90, a 1% increase in the volume of ceramics (commodity no. 1) 
exported would have increased Saudi Arabian overall export variance by 0.32%. 
Similarly, a 1% increase in volume in foodstuffs, paper materials and textiles 
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would also have increased Saudi Arabian earnings' instability by 2.85%, 3.51% 
and 0.29%, respectively. Increases in the volumes of precious metals, base metals, 
petrochemicals, machinery and transport equipment, however, would have 
lowered Saudi Arabian overall export variance by 0.09%, 0.56%, 4.64%, 2.5% 
and 1.1%, respectively. 
To place these elasticities in perspective, however, the percentage change in 
export earnings associated with aI% increase in the volume of each commodity is 
shown in column (3) in Table 5.2. Petrochemical products, because they comprise 
a large share of Saudi Arabian non-oil exports, are associated with the greatest 
percentage increases in export earnings. Therefore, a 1% increase in 
petrochemical goods would increase total non-oil export earnings by 0.61% 
during 1984-1990. A 1% increase in volume in machinery and electrical 
equipments volume, although it would reduce export earnings' stability, would 
however increase total non-oil exports by only 0.07% during the same period. 
Changes in international markets' commodity prices affect the expected earnings 
from a change in export portfolio; the historical price changes and their rankings 
are shown in columns 4 and 5, respectively. A comparison of the rankings in 
columns 2 and 5 shows that there is a link (trade-offs) between earnings growth 
and earnings stability for Saudi Arabia. Petrochemical products, for example, 
ranked high in terms of stability enhancement, but are ranked relatively low in 
terms of price changes, as the real market price of petrochemicals declined by 
0.5% per year in 1984-1990. This decline was due to the world surplus of 
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production capacity in some basic petrochemicals. Moreover, Saudi 
petrochemicals' exports were facing the problem of the continuation of customs 
barriers over the past decade in some markets, particularly the European ones. 
Depending on the preferences of Saudi Arabian policy-makers for stability and 
growth, Table 5.2 can be used to determine which commodities' export quantities 
should be increased and which decreased. For example, ceramics is relatively 
destabilising, but its market prices have shown consistent growth among Saudi 
Arabian non-oil exports. Precious metal commodities are moderately stability 
enhancing, and also show a reasonable price-trend ranking. On the other hand, 
increased dependence on export of paper materials is clearly undesirable, due to 
both their high level of instability and negative price trends. 
The 1991-2000 period results show that many of the stability rankings changed 
from the first to the second period. The relatively higher portfolio variance 
elasticities in the second period are caused by decrease in overall instability from 
the first to the second period 8. A comparison across the two periods in Table 5.2 
reveals some of the dangers in trying to reduce variability by making adjustments 
dbian government placed heavy in export quantities. If, for example, the Saudi Arab 
emphasis on stability, then the first period suggests that petrochemicals' exports 
created much more instability than did exports of either machinery, transport 
equipments or textiles. At the same time, petrochemicals prices fell by a greater 
' Note that the elasticities uses the value of the portfolio variance, V, as the base. 
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percentage in the second period than in the first. An increase in petrochemicals 
products' share between the first and second periods would have increased export 
earnings' variability and led to relatively less earnings' growth for Saudi Arabia. 
Had Saudi Arabian planners decided that earnings growth rather than instability 
was important, and had they relied on historical trends to forecast future growth, 
at the end of the first period they might have decided to increase exports of 
ceramic commodity. 
Although Table 5.2 shows that there are fewer trade-offs between stability and 
earnings growth, the choice of the 'best' export portfolio is clear for Saudi 
Arabian planners. During both periods, international price trends for both 
machinery and transport equipment and the impact of their exports on earning 
stability (as measured by Crnachinery and Etransport) were ranked best. Outside 
machinery and transport commodities, however, there are fewer examples of 
commodities that rank favourably in terms of both price trends and stability, or in 
tenns of consistency across the two periods. 
Finally, Table 5.2 shows that there is inconsistency in the impacts of change in the 
commodity quantity on stability and earnings' growth from period to period. The 
commodities' impact on instability or earnings changed dramatically from one 
period to the next. Thus, the design of 'optimal' adjustments in the export 
portfolio is complicated. If it may be assumed that price trends can be forecasted 
more accurately than proceedings instability, then it is wiser to choose changes in 
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the export portfolio based on expected proceedings. Decisions regarding 
production adjustments should also include analyses of domestic production 
possibilities and resource costs, etc.. 
5.13 Conclusion 
Dependence on export earnings from a narrow base of commodities has created 
pressures on LDCs to diversify their export base. This chapter examines the 
potential for export diversification to meet the goals of sustained export earnings 
growth and enhanced stability for Saudi Arabia. 
Conditions in international markets are such that prices of many pnmary 
commodities have been declining at the same time as there has been increased 
price instability. As far as we are concerned with the non-oil mineral 
commodities, ceramics and glass showed relatively slower prices trends than base 
metals and precious metals. However, precious metals came as the best of the 
non-oil mineral commodities in terms of stabilising the Saudi Arabian exports, 
followed by base metals, and finally by ceramics and glass. 
It was shown that the portfolio approach could assist in designing diversification 
programmes that enhance perfon-nance. The analysis showed that Saudi Arabian 
planners could make changes in their non-oil export earnings' growth and 
stability. Increasing both machinery and transport equipment, for example, would 
have met growth and stability goals in 1991-2000. 
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The optimal distribution of export proceedings can still not be deten-nined without 
investigating production possibilities, the cost factors, the market access, along 
with adjustment costs needed to achieve the new optimal export mix. The above 
portfolio approach, however, does not take account of the components 
incorporated in each of the Saudi Arabian non-oil export commodities. Saudi 
Arabian planners should calculate the ratio of total imports required to produce 
output for each of the commodities (industries). Using input-output in the next 
chapter, we are going to calculate the import content of exports in each Saudi 
industry. 
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Chapter 6: Linkage and Multiplier Effects of Saudi Arabian Non-Oil 
Minerals Sector: An Input-Output Approach 
6.1 Introduction 
We have seen in Chapter 3 that within the balanced development strategy 
following the decline in oil price in the 1980s, more emphasis was put on the non- 
oil sector, especially on the manufacturing, and agriculture sectors and more 
recently, the non-oil minerals sector, in order to diversify the economy away from 
oil. These non-oil sectors were considered as the engine of the Saudi Arabian 
economic development which could contribute to the creation of an integrated 
economy. Indeed, it was believed by the Saudi Arabian policy-makers that these 
sectors (industries) were able to induce further investments both in upstream and 
downstream industries through backward and forward linkages. The Fourth 
Development Plan (1985) defined diversification as transforming the economy 
from a country of comprehensive dependence on oil to one of diversified 
industrial and agriculture production. It was necessary to select those industries 
most suitable to the country, in terms of a comparative advantage, and that had a 
strong backward and forward linkage to the domestic economy (Nazar, 1985). 
Unfortunately, however, the identification of key (leading) sectors was made 
arbitrarily by the Saudi Arabian policy-makers, and without any prior empirical 
investigation to see whether any chosen sector could actually develop backward 
and forward linkages with other sectors. The question of whether the sectors that 
were chosen by the Saudi Arabian policy-makers as leading sectors (with more 
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emphasis on the non-oil minerals sector) have contributed fairly well to the inter- 
sectoral integration of the Saudi Arabian economy can be investigated 
empirically. The empirical investigation will, moreover, identify the leading 
sector in the Saudi Arabian economy on the basis of the linkage and multiplier 
effects. Accordingly, a judgement will be made on the selection of leading 
sector(s) by the Saudi Arabian policy-makers. 
Therefore, in the present chapter, we are going to apply the input-output model to 
evaluate and estimate two measures of the effects of diversification. Firstly, the 
sectoral economic multipliers, namely the output multipliers, the income 
multipliers, the employment multipliers, and the foreign exchange earnings and 
savings multipliers generated by the non-oil minerals sector and the other sectors 
of the economy. The purpose is to find out which sectors could satisfy our policy 
objective. Secondly, the inter-sectoral linkages between sectors, with more 
emphasis on the inter-sectoral linkages of the non-oil minerals sector with the rest 
of the economy. 
For this purpose, we have used the recent Saudi Arabian input-output table which 
was constructed on 1994. 
6.2 Input-Output Model 
An input-output table is a way of recording the flow of goods and services 
between the different sectors of a national economy during a particular period of 
time. It classifies each flow by its origin and by its destination. A flow can be 
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classified by its origin as coming from one of the sectors of production in the 
national economy, such as manufacturing, agriculture, etc., or as being based on a 
factors of production, such as imports, wages and salaries. By its destination, a 
good can be classified as being delivered to one of the sectors of production, or as 
being part of the final demand categories, such as consumption, export, 
investment, etc.. Each flow is registered only once at the interaction of the 
column, which represents the sector from which the flow leaves, and the row, 
which stands for the sector into which it enters. The rows and columns of the 
input-output table correspond to the debit and credit sides, respectively, of the 
sectors. The row and column totals for any particular sector must be equal. 
This calculation can be represented mathematically by a set of simultaneous linear 
equations such as: 
n 
xi Xu + fi (i = 1,2,3 ............. .............................. 
where xi stands for the gross output of the ith industry, while Xjj is the product of 
the ith industry used as input by thejth industry, andfi is the output of industry i 
available to final demand. This equation is termed a balance equation, which 
means that the gross product of a commodity is equal to the quantity used as 
intermediate product plus that in final goods, which can be consumed, invested or 
sold abroad. 
It is assumed that there is a linear production requirement summarised by 
Xu = au Xj 
which can be written as the following input-output coefficient: a 
Xý 
xi 
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If we denote this tenn by aij, then we can rewrite equation (1) as: 
n 
xi aXj +f (i = 1,2,3 ............. n) ........................ (2) j=l 
This equation constitutes the fundamental relationship of the input-output system. 
To explain such relationships further, it could be useful to represent the above 
system in schematic form: 
Output 
Industry 1 2 3 ................ n f xi 
I X1 + X13 + X13 + xlýl + f, X, 
Input 2 X21 + X23 + X-13 + X2n + f2 X2 
3 X31 + X33 + X33 + X3n + f3 X-j 
N Xn 1 + Xn3 + Xn3 + xnD + f4 X11 
In this forrn, the total of the inter-industry demand fi, as mentioned before, 
represents the gross output of industry xi. The column, on the other hand, 
represents the intermediate input required by the industry denoted by the column 
to produce its output. Entries in the column represent the structure of that input by 
dividing each entry (cell) of the given industry column by its output. We obtain 
the input coefficients of product in that industry i. e. 
ýLl 3=a, 
3 'which 
is the input X3 
proportion of industry (1) products required for industry (3) as an input to produce 
one unit of its output. By a similar treatment of all entries, we can obtain a table of 
a,, a12 al3 ,, **al n 
a2l a22 a23 ****a2n 
a3, a32 a33 ... 
a3, 
coefficients such as: A=I 
anl an2 an3 - *, ann 
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This is usually called the structural matrix of the economy. If that matrix is 
denoted by the letter A, then an input-output system in matrix form can be written 
as: 
x=AX+f ............................. 
(3) 
where x is total output nxI column vector. A is an nxn coefficients matrix, andf 
is final demand nxI vectors. It is obvious from the above that once we have the 
matrix A and the total output vector x, we can easily obtain the value off. By the 
same token, when matrix A and vectorf are given, then one can solve for X. Thus, 
from (3) above, we can obtain: 
=x-AX .................................. 
(4) 
Or f =X(I-A) ................................. 
Therefore x=Q- A)-'f ................................ 
(6) 
The symbols f, x, and A denote quantity available to final demand, gross output, 
and input coefficients matrix as before. (1), on the other hand, represents an 
identity matrix, all elements of which are zero, except those cells on the diagonal, 
which have a value of one. The tenn (I-A)-' is called the 'Leontief Inverse Matrix'. 
This matrix plays an important role in input-output analysis. Once such a matrix 
has been found, an equilibrium level and composition of output to satisfy a given 
level of final demand can be calculated, assuming that the economy was in 
equilibrium when the input-output table was estimated. Such an assumption 
means that there is a full adjustment of the use of inputs to the composition of 
final demand. 
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However, since the static input-output model normally encompasses a large 
number of industries, its framework is of necessity rather involved. To simplify 
the problem, the following assumptions are as a rule adopted: 
(1) Homogeneity: each sector in the input-output table produces only one single 
output with a single input structure, and there is no technical substitution between 
the outputs of different sectors. The homogeneity assumption means that when the 
j. th final demand increases, only the jth sector's output is affected in the first 
instance. This will only be satisfied if there are no joint products (between 
sectors), so that the principal product of the jth sector must not be produced 
elsewhere, as either a secondary or a by-product. 
(2) Production in every sector is subject to constant returns to scale and technical 
progress is absent, i. e., the production function is assumed to be linear. 
(3) Each sector uses a fixed input ratio for the production of its output, i. e., the 
technical coefficients are fixed, which means that there is no substitutability 
between inputs. This assumption stems from the fact that the input-output model 
is effectively isolated from such external economies by the absence of price 
effects. Accordingly, the impact of capacity expansion in a sector, say i, on the 
output of a sectorj, such that the output ofjth sector uses as input the ith output, 
via the change in the price of ith input, is ignored in the input-output model. 
Although these assumptions are open to criticism, they enable a one-to-one 
correspondence between sectors and product, besides rendering the model 
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analytically manageable9. As far as we are concerned, these assumptions are quite 
valid because we are intending to use an static input-output model to estimate the 
linkage and multiplier impacts of the different economic sectors during a 
particular period of time. In other words, these assumptions may be violated in the 
case of forecasting, which is not involved here. 
6.3 Saudi Arabian Input-Output Table 
The latest published Saudi Arabian input-output table relates to 1994. The 
construction of the table, produced by the Ministry of Planning, was based on the 
data from various government sources. The table consists of 10 production 
sectors, 6 components of final demand, and 6 primary inputs. 
The input-output for the Saudi Arabian economy, given in Appendix C, can be 
regarded as falling into four quadrants (matrices). The first matrix consists of 10 
rows and 10 columns, one for each production sector in the economy and 
represents the intermediate transactions among the ten sectors. As the sectors in 
the rows are the same as those in the columns, this quadrant is square. The 10 
major sectors are as follows: 
No. Industry 
I Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
2 Oil Production & Refining 
3 Non-Oil Minerals 
4 Manufacturing Industry 
9 Many writers have investigated the effect of these assumptions, such as Koopman 
(195 1) and Bulmer-Thomas (1982). 
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5 Electricity, Gas and Water 
Construction 
7 Commerce, Restaurants and Hotels 
8 Transport, Communication and Storage 
9 Finance, Insurance and Banking 
10 Services 
The second quadrant consists of purchases of commodities by the main categories 
of final demand. These comprise labour, capital (fixed capital consumption), 
households (private consumption expenditure), government expenditure, 
institutions (gross fixed capital forination and change in stock), and exports. This 
gives a 10 x6 matrix. The third consists of entries representing purchases of 
primary inputs into production sectors. These are labour income (wages and 
salaries), capital income, household income, government income, institutions, and 
imports. Thus it is a6x 10 matrix. Finally, the fourth quadrant represents entries 
of primary input used by final demand categories, i. e., a6x6 matrix. 
Like most developing countries, Saudi Arabia does not produce an input-output 
table frequently. The latest official Saudi Arabian input-output table, constructed 
by survey, was produced in 1977. Due to the time and expense required to 
construct a new table, the Ministry of Planning decided to establish the 1994 
input-output table by using existing official data. The household income (row) has 
been assumed by the Ministry of Planning to come entirely from the earnings of 
the two factors, labour and capital. 
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The Saudi Arabian input-output table highlights some features of its economy. 
The cell entries in the sectors' matrix table vary between zero and relatively high 
values. The higher the values, the greater are the inter-sectoral linkages, and vice 
versa. Another feature is the domination of the manufacturing and oil sectors in 
the economy, which respectively account for 32% and 22% of the total industry 
output. The importance of the oil and petrochemical industries becomes apparent. 
Agriculture, non-oil minerals, and manufacturing sectors are the major importing 
sectors of the economy (SR 13,786.5 million, SR 5,055.4 million, and SR 
108,039.9 million, respectively). Import figures for the seven remaining sectors 
have been shown as imports of the capital and households sectors. 
6.4 Multiplier Effects 
The most important characteristic of the Leontief inverse matrix is that it is vital 
for the impact analysis of a given change in final demand on the different 
constituents of the economy. To see how this is the case, let us go back to the 
solution of the input-output system, which appears as x= (I-Aflf. Further, let Z= 
[zijl represent the inverse matrix (I-A)-', then the solution to the equation above 
can be written as x= Zf. 
In matrix form, this will be: 
xi zllfl Z12f2 Z13f3, *****Zlnfn 
X2 Z21 fl Z22f2 Z-13 A fn 
X3 Z31fl Z32f2 Z33f3 ******Z3nfn 
Xn 
ýZnlfl 
Zn2f2 ZJ3 
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The general answer to what will be the rate of change in x with respect to a change 
in final demand f can be found by partially differentiating the value of x with 
respect tof i. e. 
dxj 
dfi zij 
(j, i=1,2,3 ............... 
By carrying out the differentiation process for all terms in the system, the original 
matrix (Z) will be obtained (which is the inverse matrix). This indicates the 
importance of this matrix as a tool for economic planning through which the 
direct and indirect impact of a given change in one or more final demand 
constituents on the different sectors of the economy's activities can be 
ascertained, and consequently its impact on the economy as a whole. 
It is useful to measure multiplier effects to identify the sectors of the economy 
which can fulfil certain policy objectives. The policy objectives in which we are 
interested are output growth, exports' maximisation, imports' minimisation, 
income maximisation, and employment generation. These policy objectives are 
captured, respectively, by the following economic multipliers: the output 
multipliers, export multipliers, import multipliers, income multipliers, and the 
employment multipliers. 
6.4.1 Output Multipliers 
1=( Let Z= (I-A) - zu). 
The matrix Z is termed the matrix of interdependence coefficients. Each element 
zij indicates the total (direct and indirect) requirements from sector i arising from 
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increase in sales of one unit, say one Saudi Arabian riyal, to final demand by 
sector j. The Z matrix therefore provides extremely important structural 
information relating to the economy under study, by indicating the strength of 
inter-sectoral economic linkages. 
The coefficients zij indicate the extent to which changes in the level of activity of 
one sector will affect, directly or indirectly, the level of output of all other sectors. 
Each element zij shows the direct and indirect effects on the output of each sector 
from an increase in sales of one riyal to final demand by sector j. It follows that 
the z,, , or the column sums of the inverse of the open model, will show the 
total effect on all sectors in the table (i. e., the total output effect on the local 
economy), of an increase in sales of one riyal by sectorj to final demand. For this 
reason, z, is termed the 'simple output multiplier'. 
When the model is closed with respect to households, i. e., the household rows are 
included in the processing sector, the inverse Z* = 
[z,, *. ]= (I - A*)-' may be 
obtained, where each element z *ij provides, in the non-household rows of the 
inverse, the effect (direct, indirect and induced) on the output of each sector of 
increases in sales to final demands by sector j. The column sum of the non- 
household z*ý provides a measure of the total output multiplier for each sector. 
Hence, it is possible to distinguish three effects in the output multiplier: 
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(1) Direct effect. This is shown by the direct coefficients ay, and represents the 
immediate or first round effects on each sector of an increase in output of sectorj. 
(2) Indirect effect. This is shown, together with the direct effect in the zy, or 
elements of the inverse of the open model, and represents the second and 
subsequent round industrial support requirements from each sector, following an 
increase in sales to final demand of any sector. The indirect effect for any sector 
can be calculated simply as zy - ay. 
(3) Induced effect. This is shown, together with the direct and indirect effects, in 
the non-household rows of z*y, or elements of the inverse of the closed model, 
and represents the effect on the output of each sector occasioned by increased 
household consumption as a result of increased sales to final demand of any 
sector. The induced effect for any sector can be calculated simply as z*ij - zy. 
The facility to disaggregate multipliers into direct, indirect and induced effect is 
an important advantage of the input-output approach, in that the different 
components of an impact may be recognised and compared. This facility is 
applicable also to both income and employment multipliers. 
In Table 6.1 below, two types of multipliers were calculated, namely the simple 
output multiplier, as a summation of the columns of the inverse of the closed 
model in Table B. 2, and the total output multiplier, as the summation of the non- 
household row of the inverse of the closed modello. The simple output multiplier 
'0 All calculations involved in this chapter and the next chapter were performed using 
'MATHCAD' software. 
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for sector j indicates the direct and indirect industrial support requirements from 
all sectors required for each increase of one unit in sales of the output of sectorj 
to final demand. For example, each increase in the sale of the output of the non-oil 
mineral sector to final demand requires a total increase of SR 1.113 from the rest 
of the sectors in the economy. The additional SR 1.113 required is in the form of 
industrial support from other sectors; the disaggregation of these requirements by 
sector can be gained from the inverse of the open model. 
Table 6.1: Output Multipliers 
Sector Direct & Indirect Rank Total Rank 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 1.095 9 1.140 7 
Oil Production & Refining 1.044 10 1.055 10 
Non-Oil Minerals 1.113 7 1.119 9 
Manufacturing Industry 1.112 8 1.137 8 
Electricity, Gas and Water 1.563 2 1.643 3 
Construction 1.528 3 1.668 2 
Commerce, Restaurants and Hotels 1.283 4 1.397 4 
Transport, Communication and Storage 1.196 5 1.303 5 
Finance, Insurance and Banking 1.151 6 1.301 6 
Services 1.732 1 2.0 1 
Average 1.282 1.376 
Source: Author's calculations based on 1994 input-output table. 
The total output multiplier for sector j measures direct, indirect and induced 
requirements for all sectors, for each riyal increase of sales of sector j to final 
demand. In addition to the components of the simple output multiplier, it therefore 
includes the induced effect, or that increase in output from the sector occasioned 
by increased household income as a result of the increase in sales to final demand. 
For example, an increase of one riyal in the sale of the output of the non-oil 
minerals sector produces a total increase in output of SR 1.119. The induced 
effect of the increased sales will therefore be only SR 0.006. 
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An examination of Table 6.1 above provides some important information with 
respect to the expected output response of each sector in the economy. This may 
be summarised as follows. First, similarities, to a great extent, which occur in the 
rankings of both multipliers. Secondly, the output multipliers of services, 
constructions, and electricity are the largest among the sectors. This draws 
attention to the importance of these sectors as leading components of the Saudi 
Arabian economy. Finally, the low Saudi Arabian figures are due to the relatively 
open nature of the economy, imports amounting to about 30% of GNP. Saudi 
Arabia is the largest import market in the region and one of the top 15 importers 
in the world. In 1999, the country is estimated to have imported around US$ 29 
billion worth of goods (United Nations, 2000). This level of imports causes severe 
leakage from the system, resulting in relatively low multipliers for many sectors 
which depend heavily on imported raw materials. 
The smallest output multipliers amongst all sectors, when the induced effect is 
included, are for the oil sector, followed by the non-oil mineral sector. This was 
expected, as the oil sector is an enclave sector. Clearly, the low output multiplier 
of the non-oil mineral sector reflects its insignificant importance in the Saudi 
Arabian economy in 1994. 
6.4.2 Export Multipliers 
The sectoral exports multipliers are obtained by dividing exports of each sector by 
the total output of the same sector. 
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n 
XMi = ZEj 1xi 
i=l 
The export multipliers indicate the increase in total exports or foreign exchange 
earnings in the whole economy, when final demand in sector j increases by one 
unit. The purpose of calculating the exports' multiplier is to measure the role 
played by the non-oil minerals sector and the other sectors in providing the 
economy with foreign earnings. This measure will in turn be used as a basis for 
making sectoral assessment with respect to the maximisation of exports, which is 
one of our proposed policy objectives. 
Table 6.2: Export Multipliers 
Sector Exports Impact Rank 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0.001 8 
Oil Production & Refining 0.462 1 
Non-Oil Minerals 0.022 3 
Manufacturing Industry 0.002 7 
Electricity, Gas and Water 0.0 10 
Construction 0.0 9 
Commerce, Restaurants and Hotels 0.004 5 
Transport, Communication and Storage 0.033 2 
Finance, Insurance and Banking 0.003 6 
Services 0.016 4 
Average 0.054 - 
Source: Author's calculations based on 1994 input-output table. 
From Table 6.2, the export multiplier of the oil sector, as expected, is large due to 
the fact that a very large proportion of its final demand is in the form of exports. 
The low effects of the other sectors' multipliers reflect the domination of oil as the 
main source of foreign earnings. However, the non-oil mineral sector shows that 
an increase in final demand by one riyal will contribute SR 0.022 to the Saudi 
Arabian economy. 
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6.4.3 Import Multipliers 
The impact on imports can be estimated by finding the import contents of output 
required to satisfy one unit of change in final demand. In order to do so, however, 
it is necessary to net out the import content from the total coefficient matrix, since 
imports represent leakages from the incremental inter-industry flow generated by 
such expansion in final demand. For this purpose, the following model is used: 
M == Mj (I-A) -1 
where: 
M= Row vector of import requirements of a given one unit increase in final 
demand. 
M= Row vector of import coefficient in the Table B. 3. i 
Inverse of total coefficient matrix. 
The expression Mj (I-A) -1 represents the direct and indirect sectoral import 
required to produce one unit of demand for products of that sector. To incorporate 
the induced impact on import requirements, the Z* matrix will again be used. 
The net effect on domestic output can be found by subtracting the above result 
from the original (I-A) -', i. e.: 
M (I-A) -1 
or let 
(I-A) -1 = zu and Mj (I-A) -1 = Mij 
,V, ý ZJ - 
Jý Mij therefore: jDj =Y 
133 
The solution for these equations is given in Table 6.3. The table shows that for 
every one riyal of increase in final demand, the direct and indirect import content 
needed as a result of one riyal unit increase in demand for non-oil mineral is equal 
to SR 0.44. This will reduced to SR 0.37 when induced effects are incorporated, 
i. e., Type 11. 
Table 6.3: Import Impact and Net Impact on Domestic Gross Outpu 
Total Impact Import Leakages Net Effect on 
Sector (Impact) Domestic Impact 
TYPE 11 TYPE 112 TYPEI TYPEII TYPEI TYPE 11 
Agriculture, 1.095 1.14 0.633 0.453 0.462 0.687 
Forestry and Fishing 
Oil Production & 1.044 1.055 0.043 0.021 1.001 1.034 
Refining 
Non-Oil Minerals 1.113 1.119 0.440 0.370 0.673 0.749 
Manufacturing 1.112 1.137 0.564 0.190 0.548 0.947 
Industry 
Electricity, Gas and 1.563 1.643 0.001 0.001 1.562 1.642 
Water 
Construction 1.528 1.668 0.004 0.002 1.524 1.666 
Commerce, 1.283 1.397 0.001 0.001 1.282 1.396 
Restaurants and 
Hotels 
Transport, L196 1.303 0.002 0.003 1.194 1.300 
Communication and 
Storage 
Finance, Insurance 1,151 1.301 0.001 0.001 1.151 1.300 
and Banking 
Services 1.732 2 0.001 0.002 1.731 1.998 
Average 1.282 1.376 0.169 0.098 1.113 1.272 
Direct and Indirect Effect. 
Direct, Indirect and Induced Effect. 
Source: Author's calculation based on 1994 input-output table. 
Clearly, in terms of high import content, the non-oil minerals sector comes third, 
directly after the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. The identification of the 
content of imports could be valuable information to Saudi Arabian policy-makers. 
The planners can derive the appropriate policy for import substitutions. 
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6.4.4 Analysis of Multipliers' Results 
Table 6.4 shows the sectoral output multipliers, sectoral export multipliers, and 
sectoral import multipliers with their rankings, for the Saudi Arabian economy in 
1994. Sectors are ranked by values of their multiplier indices, so that those with 
the largest indices come first. However, imports' multipliers are treated 
differently, in the sense that sectors with lower than average imports' multipliers 
are to be lesser in tenns of leakages. The sectors are therefore ranked by the size 
of their imports' multipliers, with the smallest indices coming first. 
Table 6.4 shows that the top five sectors, as far as output multipliers are 
concerned, were sectors 10,6,5,7, and 8. In terms of exports' multipliers, the 
table reveals that the top five sectors were sectors 2,8,3,10 and 4. The top five 
sectors according to the import multipliers criterion were sectors 9,10,7,5 and 8. 
It is obvious that only sectors 8 and 10 (Transport, communication and storage, 
and Services) ranked within the top five sectors in terms of all three economic 
multipliers. The non-oil minerals sector was ranked third on the exports 
multiplier, and failed to be ranked in the top half, in terms of both output and 
imports multipliers. On the other hand, the oil sector had the highest index for the 
exports multiplier, which indicates the important contribution of the sector in 
providing the Saudi Arabian economy with the necessary foreign exchange 
earnings. In the meantime, the sector had high leakages into imports, which means 
that the sector was using inputs which were not produced domestically. 
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Table 6.4: Sectoral Multipliers and Ranks 
Sector Output Rank Exports' Rank Imports' Rank 
Multiplier Multiplier Multiplier 
I Agriculture, 1.140 7 0.001 8 0.633 10 
Forestry and 
Fishing 
2 Oil Production & 1.055 10 0.462 1 0.043 7 
Refining 
3 Non-Oil Minerals 1.119 9 0.022 3 0.440 8 
4 Manufacturing 1.137 8 0.002 7 0.564 9 
Industry 
5 Electricity, Gas and 1.643 3 0.0 10 0.001 4 
Water 
6 Construction 1.668 2 0.0 9 0.004 6 
7 Commerce, 1.397 4 0.004 5 0.001 3 
Restaurants and 
Hotels 
8 Transport, 1.303 5 0.033 2 0.002 5 
Communication 
and Storage 
9 Finance, Insurance 1.301 6 0.003 6 0.000 1 
and Banking 
10 Services 2.0 1 0.016 4 0.001 2 
Average 1.376 0.1054 
Source: Calculated frorn'lables 6.1,6.2 and 6.3. 
The correlations between the rankings of sectors on the basis of the above input- 
output multipliers show that the only positive (even though insignificant) 
association was found between output and imports criteria, with a Spearman's 
rank correlation coefficient of 0.61. The rank correlation coefficients between 
output and exports criteria, and between exports and imports criteria, were found 
to be negative, at respectively - 0.37 and - 0.16. This absence of association 
indicates the virtual incompatibility of the policy objective mentioned above. 
Taking sectors which had above-average output multipliers, above average-export 
multipliers, and below-average import multipliers to be the important sectors in 
the Saudi economy, and by assessing them in terms of possible alternative policy 
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objectives, such as the maximisation of output, the maximisation of exports 
(foreign exchange earnings), and the minimisation of imports, we obtain the 
results presented in Table 6.5. This table reveals that there appeared to be a great 
degree of incompatibility between the suggested policy objectives, as there was no 
sector which would allow a maximum dispersion of impact in any of those policy 
objectives. Indeed, the oil sector was the only sector which qualified as an exports 
maximiser and imports minimiser, while it did not qualify as an output maximiser. 
The non-oil minerals sector, however, did not qualify in any of those objectives, 
along with the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. 
Table 6.5: Important Sectors showing Conthbutions to Proposed Altemative 
Policy Objectives 
Sectors Maximise Output Maximise Exports Minimise Imports 
I NO NO NO 
2 NO YES YES 
3 NO NO NO 
4 NO NO NO 
5 YES NO YES 
6 YES NO YES 
7 YES NO YES 
8 NO NO YES 
9 NO NO YES 
10 YES NO YES 
Source: Based on'lable 6.4. 
6.4.5 Income Multipliers 
Income multipliers measure increases in income occasioned by a specified change 
in the economy. The direct effect of increases in output on household income is 
given by the household row coefficient alli for each sector, where alli is the 
appropriate entry in the household row of the A matrix. The direct and indirect 
effect of an increase in sales of any sector to final demand is derived by 
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multiplying the direct and indirect output changes, the elements of the Z matrix, 
by the corresponding household row coefficient, i. e., obtaining zij alli for each 
element. The direct and indirect income multiplier for sector i is obtained simply 
as zýaHj . 
The indirect income effect on each sector is calculated as zy alli - alli. 
The direct, indirect and induced income multiplier (total income multiplier) is 
obtained from the household row of the Z* matrix. The induced effect can be 
calculated as zij *- zy alli. 
Table 6.6 below provides income multipliers for the Saudi Arabian economy 
sectors. These are provided in three forms, namely (1) the direct income multiplier 
or household coefficient, indicating the first round effect on household income of 
an increase in output of each sector. For instance, an increase of one nyal of the 
non-oil minerals sector would increase household income in that sector by SR 
0.004; (2) the direct and indirect income multiplier, including the income increase 
occasioned in all sectors in the economy by an increase in sales of one riyal to 
final demand by each sector. For instance, the direct and indirect income effect of 
the non-oil minerals sector would be SR 0.006, as a result of industrial support 
requirements. Finally, (3) the direct, indirect and induced effects are listed, 
including the increase in income due to increased consumer expenditure in Saudi 
Arabia; this figure is SR 0.009 for the example quoted. 
The indirect effect may be calculated in this case as 
SR 0.006 - SR 0.003 = SR 0.003; 
and the indirect effect as 
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SR 0.009 - SR 0.006 = SR 0.003, also per SR of increased sales of the non-oil 
minerals industry sector to final demand of the Saudi Arabian economy. 
Table 6.6: lncome Multioliers 
Sector Direct Rank Direct & 
Indirect 
Rank Total Rank 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing 
Oý041 7 0.045 7 0,049 7 
Oil Production & Refining 0.008 9 0.011 9 0.014 9 
Non-Oil Minerals Oý003 10 0.006 10 0,009 10 
Manufacturing Industry 01022 8 0.024 8 0.026 8 
Electricity, Gas and Water 0,054 6 0.080 6 0,110 6 
Construction U20 3 0.140 3 0,163 3 
Commerce, Restaurants and 
Hotels 
Oý083 5 0.114 4 0,150 4 
Transport, Communication and 
Storage 
0.095 4 0.107 5 0.121 5 
Finance, Insurance and Banking 0.132 2 0.150 2 Oý 171 2 
Services 0.232 1 0.268 1 0.308 1 
Source: Author's calculation based on 1994 input-output table. 
The direct income multipliers suggest, in effect, the labour intensity of each sector 
in the economy. These show, as expected, a wide disparity in those coefficients 
between sectors, reflecting the differences in labour intensity. These range, for 
example, from SR 0.003 to SR 0.232 per one riyal. of output in the non-oil 
minerals and services sectors, respectively. 
The total (i. e., direct, indirect and induced) income multipliers show a consistency 
between the sectors in the upper and lower rankings. Those sectors with the 
highest direct coefficients, namely the services and finance sectors, show also the 
highest total income multipliers over the economy. This is further evidence of the 
contribution made by these sectors to the personal income of Saudi Arabian 
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labour. Each increase of one riyal in the value of the output of the services sector 
destined to final demand adds an additional SR 0.308 to household income. 
However, the same riyal increases in the non-oil minerals sector would raise this 
income by only SR 0.009. The relatively low non-oil minerals' household income 
multiplier reflects its highly capital-intensive nature. 
6.4.6 Employment Multipliers 
Both output and income multipliers are calculated from elements within the input- 
output tables. These tables, however, do not contain elements relating to 
employment per sector. It is therefore necessary to derive, independently of the 
tables, an employment coefficient. The simplest method of obtaining this 
coefficient is the expression of the number of employees per unit of outputi 1. 
Once this coefficient has been obtained, the calculation of employment multipliers 
parallels to some extent the calculation of income multipliers. The direct effect on 
employment in each sector of a change in output of sector i will be given by aEi, 
the employment equivalent of the household row. The direct and indirect 
employment effects will be shown as zu aEi for all sectors. The direct, indirect 
n-I 
and induced effects are calculated as zy* aEi. and as I z, a i. e., over non- U Ei I 
i=1 
household sectors for the total employment multiplier. 
" This method was first proposed by Bills and Barr (1968). 
140 
Table 6.7 below presents the employment multipliers of the sectors for the Saudi 
Arabian economy. These are provided in three forms, parallel to those described 
nlk above for income multipliers. In general terms, if the wage rate between sectors is 
constant, employment multipliers would be expected to reflect income multipliers 
in terms of ranking between sectors. The extent to which the income multipliers 
and employment multipliers vary in ranking highlights differences in personal 
income levels between sectors. 
Table 6.7: Employment Multipliers 
Sector No. of Direct Rank Direct & Rank Total Rank 
Employees' Indirect 
Agriculture, 663,000 28.722 2 30.514 2 30.560 2 
Forestry and 
Fishing 
Oil Production & 66,000 0.472 9 0.706 9 0.717 10 
Refining 
Non-Oil Minerals 50,200 0.400 10 0.575 10 0.581 9 
Manufacturing 538,200 2.692 8 2.837 8 2.861 8 
Industry 
Electricity, Gas and 147,400 31.932 1 34.344 1 34.424 1 
Water 
Construction 580,900 6.720 7 8.845 7 8.985 7 
Commerce, 493,000 13.251 4 16.689 4 16.803 4 
Restaurants and 
Hotels 
Transport, 310,700 9.389 5 10.603 5 10.710 5 
Communication and 
Storage 
Finance, Insurance 130,200 8.908 6 10.384 6 10.534 6 
and Banking I 
Services 1,308,700 1 17.761 3 23.841 3 24.109 3 
'Ministry of Planning (1999). 
Source: Author's calculation based on 1994 input-output table. 
For example, while the agriculture sector (Table 6.6) showed a low requirement 
for direct income, its direct income in tenus of employment (Table 6.7) is 
relatively high. In contrast, the construction sector shows low labour usage in 
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terms of employment, but higher contributions to household income, reflecting the 
higher levels of wages and salaries in this sector. On the other hand, the non-oil 
minerals sector indicated that the wage rate within the sector is constant. 
The direct employment requirements column shows variations between sectors. 
The relatively high employment requirement of the electricity, gas and water, and 
agriculture sectors reflects the nature of these sectors as highly labour-intensive. 
In contrast, the non-oil mineral sector illustrates, again, its highly capital -intensive 
nature. 
6.4.7 Type I and Type 11 Multipliers 
It has been conventional in input-output analysis for some time to calculate Type I 
and Type 11 income and employment multipliers. Hirsch (1959) was the first to 
derive the now standard Type I and Type II income multipliers. The Type 11 
multiplier assumes a linear and homogeneous consumption function, since its 
calculation requires the insertion of households into the endogenous matrix. 
Type I multipliers are expressed as: 
Direct and indirect effects 
Direct effects 
and Type 11 multipliers as: 
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Direct, indirect and induced effects 
Direct effects 
It is important to establish the distinction between the types of multipliers which 
have been mentioned. For example, the income multipliers described in the 
sections above measure the direct, indirect and induced effects of a change in 
sales of one riyal of the output of a sector to final demand. Type I and Type 11 
income multipliers measure the income generated following a riyal change in 
household payments, as a result of a change in final demand for the relevant 
sector. In other words, the income multipliers measure the income impact of a 
change in sales to final demand, while the Type I and II income multipliers 
measure the income impact of a change in income. Similarly, the employment 
multipliers measure the employment impact of a change in sales to final demand, 
and the Type I and 11 employment multipliers measure the employment impact of 
a change in employment. 
Table 6.8 shows that non-oil minerals has the highest income multiplier when 
Type I and Type 11 are considered. This means that for each riyal change in 
household income of non-oil minerals employees, there will occur in Saudi Arabia 
a change of SR 1.5 (direct and indirect effects only) and SR 2.25 (direct, indirect 
and induced effects). 
The employment multipliers of the oil sector followed by the non-oil mineral 
sector were the highest when Type I and Type 11 are considered. This indicates 
that for each person employed in the non-oil minerals sector, an additional 0.438 
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persons will be employed in other industries in Saudi Arabia, taking into account 
only direct and indirect effects. When induced effects are also included (Type 11), 
this becomes an additional 0.453 persons. 
Table 6.8: Type I and Type II Multipliers 
Sector Income Multiplier Employment Multiplier 
Type Rank Type Rank Type Rank Type Rank 
1 11 1 11 
Agriculture, Forestry 1.098 9 1.195 9 1.062 10 1.064 9 
and Fishing 
Oil Production & 1.410 3 1.795 4 1.496 1 1.519 1 
Refining 
Non-Oil Minerals 1.500 1 2.250 1 1.438 2 1.453 2 
Manufacturing Industry 1.091 10 1.182 10 1.054 9 1.063 10 
Electricity, Gas and 1.481 2 2.037 2 1.076 8 1.078 8 
Water 
Construction 1.167 5 1.358 5 1.316 4 1.337 4 
Commerce, Restaurants 1.373 4 1.807 3 1.259 5 1.268 5 
and Hotels 
Transport, 1.126 8 1.274 8 1.129 7 1.141 7 
Communication and 
Storage 
Finance, Insurance and 1.136 7 1.295 7 1.166 6 1.183 6 
Banking 
Services 1.155 6 1.328 6 1.342 3 1.357 3 
Source: Author's calculation based on 1994 input-output table. 
This result supports the aim announced by Ma'aden's president, for the company 
to add 5,000 to Saudi Arabian employment in the non-oil minerals sector, and 
create about 50,000 new jobs in other related industries in Saudi Arabia by the 
year 2010 (ldrees, 2001). The employment multiplier of the non-oil minerals 
sector is quite important for the Saudi Arabian policy-makers in terms of the 
Saudisation process and employment generation, especially as Saudi Arabian 
unemployment reached 20% in 2000 (SAMBA, 2001). 
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6.5 Linkage Effects 
The term 'linkage effects', as proposed by Hirschman (1958), refers to economic 
expansion in a given in ustry resulting from the development of another industry. 
To help describe the structural interdependence of the sectors within an economy 
and, in particular, the Saudi Arabian non-oil minerals contribution to the inter- 
sectoral integration, Rasmussen (1956) derived two measures. These are the 
backward and forward linkages indices. 
As mentioned earlier, an important feature of the inverse matrix is that it shows 
the magnitude and level of linkages of each particular industry. Summing across 
the row gives us the size of the 'forward linkage' of the industry to which the 
column belongs, while summing down the column we obtain the 'backward 
linkage' of the industry to which the column belongs. In other words, production 
in a particular sector has two economic sectors. Firstly, if production is increased 
in one sector of the economy, then production in other sectors whose products are 
used as inputs to that sector will also increase. This type of interaction is tenned 
backward linkages. An increase in the same sector's output, on the other hand, 
means that an extra amount of its products is available for use as input to other 
sectors. This is tenned forward linkages. 
Quantification of these linkages can be summarised as follows: 
bj : Yz, 
where bj = backward linkage of sectorj 
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and zu = element of inverse matrix (I - A)-' 
In other words, it is the output multiplier. 
As for the forward linkages, this represents the row sum of that inverse, i. e.: 
fi = Ezu 
This shows the output generated in sector i, where final demand in each sector of 
the economy has increased by one unit. The relative importance of these linkages 
is measured by either of the respective indices. These are derived as follows: 
Let Vj = backward linkage index, then: 
bj 
n 
ii 
The numerator is the sector's backward linkage, i. e., the output multiplier of the 
Type I model. The denominator is the average backward linkage of all sectors in 
the economy. When the index is greater than one, i. e., Vj >I for a particular 
sector, this indicates a high backward linkage. In other words, the sector is 
generating above-average response in other sectors, i. e., other sectors' output is 
motivated by the change in this sector's output. 
Forward linkage index is measured as follows: 
ui fi 
n 
- lzý 
Again, a value of Uj >I indicates a high forward linkage, in the sense that the 
sector's output displays above-average response to other sectors' output, such that 
the sector's output being stimulated by the change in other sectors' output. 
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When this is applied to the Saudi Arabian economy, the result is as summarised in 
Table 6.9. It shows these linkages in two ways. Firstly, by using the domestic 
input coefficient matrix to calculate the domestic linkages, and secondly, by using 
the total technology matrix (domestic as well as imports) to calculate the total 
forward and backward linkages. 
Table 6.9: Backward and Forward Linkage in Saudi Arabian Economy 
Sector Backward Linkage Forward Linkage 
Domestic Rank Total Rank Domestic Rank Total Rank 
Agriculture, 1.095 9 2.245 2 1.213 4 1.225 7 
Forestry and 
Fishing 
Oil Production & 1.044 10 1.054 10 1.246 2 3.351 1 
Refining 
Non-Oil Minerals 1.113 7 1.865 6 1.167 6 1.274 5 
Manufacturing 1.113 8 2.098 3 2.451 1 2.533 2 
Industry 
Electricity, Gas 1.563 2 1.933 5 1.021 10 1.023 10 
and Water 
Construction 1.528 3 1.901 4 1.198 5 1.229 6 
Commerce, 1.283 4 1.389 7 1.039 9 1.056 9 
Restaurants and 
Hotels 
Transport, 1.196 5 1.313 8 1.145 7 1.298 4 
Communication 
and Storage 
Finance, 1.151 6 1.188 9 1.110 8 1.126 8 
Insurance and 
Banking 
Services 1.732 1 2.267 1 1.229 3 1.311 3 
L Average Linkage 1.282 1.725 1.282 1.543 
Source: Author's calculation based on 1994 input-outPut table. 
From an examination of the backward linkages in the above table, one can 
pinpoint which industries should be encouraged to switch their purchases from 
foreign to Saudi Arabian suppliers, in order to generate the highest effect on the 
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total economy. These are services, agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and 
electricity, gas and water. 
The difference between the domestic and the total forward linkages indicates 
those industries with high potential to replace imported goods. In the Saudi 
Arabian case, those industries with high potential are oil, followed by 
manufacturing. Sectors like electricity and commerce have little or no export 
potential, and are thus demoted in the total forward linkage. 
Table 6.10: Intermediate Inputs and Sales of Non-oil Minerals Sector from and to 
other Sectors of the Econom 
(Millions of SR and %) 
Sectors Intermediate Inputs Intermediate Sales 
Value % Value % 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Oil Production & Refining 143.6 11.2 143.6 2.0 
Non-Oil Minerals 995.3 77.4 995.3 13.5 
Manufacturing Industry 22.5 1.7 5953.0 81.0 
Electricity, Gas and Water 4.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Construction 76.4 5.9 259.0 3.5 
Commerce, Restaurants and Hotels 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 
Transport, communication and Storage 24.7 1.9 0.0 0.0 
Finance, Insurance and Banking 1.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Services 16.8 1.3 0.2 0.0 
Source: Based on 1994 input-output table. 
The non-oil minerals' sector has a relatively higher backward linkage than 
forward linkage in the economy. However, compared with other Saudi Arabian 
sectors, the sector's linkage ranking was, on average, sixth. Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that the backward index should not be taken on its own as an indication of 
a high interdependence of this sector with the rest of the sectors, since as much as 
77.4% of Saudi Arabian non-oil minerals inputs were drawn from the sector itself, 
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and only 22.6% drawn from the rest of the economy, as Table 6.10 reveals. 
Moreover, the relatively low forward linkage index means that the sector poorly 
supplies downward activities with its output. Of this small supply, the bulk is 
received by the manufacturing sector, 81% of non-oil minerals intennediate sales 
were made to this sector. 
6.6 Identification of Kev Sectors in the Saudi Arabian Econo 
Key sectors or 'leading sectors' are defined as those whose backward and forward 
linkages are greater than unity, as explained by Hirschman (1958). The extent of 
the strength of backward and forward linkages of sectors in an economy is usually 
used to identify leading or key sectors in that economy. If the backward linkage of 
sector A is larger than that of sector B, this means that a one unit expansion of 
sector A's output would be more stimulating to the economy than an equal 
expansion in B's output. In terms of productive activities, it would generate 
throughout the economy, i. e., expanding the demand side. Similarly, if sector Xs 
forward linkage is higher than that of sector Z, it could be concluded that, in tenns 
of productive activity that it would support, a unit of expansion in sector Xs 
output would be more essential to the rest of the economy than the same 
expansion in that of sector Z, i. e., expanding domestic supply for goods demanded 
by other sectors. 
Given the Hirschman definition, and using the domestic criteria, there appear to 
be no key sectors in the Saudi Arabian economy in Table 6.9. Looking at the total 
linkage, only the manufacturing sector seems to be described as a key sector. 
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Although the result depicted above is valuable to the planners in deciding their 
priorities, many economists 12 have criticised the practice of measuring key sectors 
in this way. In the case of Saudi Arabia, for instance, this method ignores the 
nil auilityof a sector to generate income, this point being evident by the status of the 
oil sector. Furthermore, it could be argued that some sectors have gained from the 
backward linkages created by the investment. 
Hazari (1970) introduced a new measure to overcome this problem. Such a 
measure could be used as well as the above method to identify the key sector. The 
method measures the variation of coefficients as follows: 
Y(n 
- 1) 
(z, zi) 
V*i n 
(lyn)zj 
Y(n 
- 1) 
1(Zü -n Zi) 
Low V*j means that a particular industry relies evenly upon the system of 
industries. On the other hand, a high index implies that the industry draws 
unilaterally on the system of industries. U"i can be interpreted in the same way. 
Therefore, by applying the new method of coefficients of variation, two methods 
have been proposed to identify key sectors. In the first method, key sectors are 
" For detailed literature on a critical view of these objections, see McGilvray (1978). 
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identified as those which are presented by Hirschman, i. e., Vj >1 and Uj >1, and 
in the second method, V*j and U*i are relatively low. In fact, these are very 
restrictive criteria, and hence, only a small number of sectors could satisfy these 
requirements. 
Table 6.11: Coefficients of Variation 
Sector Backward Linkage Forward Linkage 
Domestic Rank Total Rank Domestic Rank Total Rank 
Agriculture, 0.101 9 0.794 5 0.943 7 0.095 6 
Forestry and 
Fishing 
Oil Production 0.099 8 0.993 10 0.876 4 0.054 1 
& Refining 
Non-Oil 0.102 10 0.828 7 0.983 10 0.096 7 
Minerals 
Manufacturing 0.094 6 0.775 4 0.608 3 0.065 2 
Industry 
Electricity, Gas 0.081 2 0.718 2 0.981 9 0.100 10 
and Water 
Construction 0.082 3 0.732 3 0.893 5 0.090 5 
Commerce, 0.086 4 0.827 6 0.970 8 0.098 8 
Restaurants and 
Hotels 
Transport, 0.093 5 0.885 8 0.939 6 0.089 3 
Communication 
and Storage 
Finance, 0.098 7 0.963 9 0.302 2 0.099 9 
Insurance and 
Banking 
Services 0.079 1 0.692 1 0.287 1 0.090 4 
Average 0.092 0.821 0.778 
Source: Author's calculations. 
However, given that backward linkages are more caused, while forward linkages 
are pen-nissive, Schultz (1976) has defined the key sectors as those which present 
high backward linkages (Vj greater than unity), and low coefficients of variation. 
Applying the above method, which was proposed by Hazari (1970), or the one 
proposed by Schultz, we get the results as shown in Table 6.11 above. 
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Accordingly, for a sector to qualify as a key sector it should satisfy the new 
definition. This sector should have above-average backward and forward linkages 
and relatively low dispersion. In order to identify these sectors, we classified the 
sectors according to six different criteria, as shown in Table 6.12. 
Table 6.12: Identification of Sectors by Criteria 
Criteria Sectors 
1. Sectors with above-average Vj 1,3,4,5,6,10 
2. Sectors with below-average V*j 1,4,5,6,10 
3. Sectors with both above-average Vj and below-average V*j 1,4,5,6,10 
4. Sectors with above-average Uj 2,4 
5. Sectors with below-average U*i 2,4 
6. Sectors with both above-average Uj and below-averageU*i 2,4 
7. Key Sectors (Sectors which satisfy both criteria 6 and 3) 4 
Source: Based on Tables 6.9 and 6.10. 
There was only one sector with simultaneously both above-average Vj and below- 
average V*j, and above-average Ui and below-average U*i, namely the 
manufacturing sector. Furthermore, the manufacturing sector was the only key 
sector, even when we also applied the Schultz definition for the key sector. 
The reason is that the other sectors with high Vj & low V*j had either low Uj or 
high U*i, and vice versa. This is indicated by the Spearman rank correlation 
results given in Table 6.13. 
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Table 6.13: Results of Spearman's Rank Correlation between Criteria 
Ranking Correlation 
Backward Linkages Vj and Backward Coefficient of Variation V. j 
0.88 
Backward Linkages Vj and Forward Linkages Uj -0-07 
Backward Linkages Vj and Forward Coefficient of Variation U*I' -0.03 
Forward Linkages Uj and Backward Coefficient of Variation V*j -0.16 
Backward Coefficient of Variation V*j and Forward Coefficient of 
Variation U*i 
-0.16 
Forward Linkages Uj and Forward Coefficient of Variation U*i 0.927 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Indeed, the association between the backward and forward linkages was negative, 
as the rank correlation coefficient indicates (407). The association between 
backward linkages Vj and the forward coefficient of variation U*i, and that 
between backward coefficient of variation V*j and forward coefficient of 
variation U*i , were also negative at - 0.03 and - 
0.16,, respectively, indicating a 
poor integration between sectors. 
As far as the non-oil minerals sector was concerned, the sector did not qualify as a 
key sector. The non-oil minerals sector actually had an average backward linkage 
index, and an above-average corresponding coefficient of variation, which means 
that the sector relied relatively heavily on the rest of the sectors for its inputs. This 
also means that the linkages of the sector were confined to only a few sectors of 
the economy and to the sector itself, as indicated in Tables 6.12 and 6.13. On the 
other hand, the sector did not have either above-average forward lirikage or a 
relatively low corresponding coefficient of variation. It must also be noted that 
Sectors 7,8 and 9 were the only sectors which did not satisfy any of the criteria 
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cited in Table 6.12, in spite of the huge amount of both public and private 
investment given to these sectors at the expense of other sectors. These sectors 
were commerce, transport, and finance and banking. 
It must be indicated here that the oil sector did actually have both an average 
forward linkage index and a low average corresponding coefficient variation, 
which means that the other sectors relied heavily and evenly on the sector's 
outputs. On the other hand, the oil sector did not have either above-average 
backward linkage or a relatively low corresponding coefficient of variation. This 
means that the sector did not rely evenly on the rest of the sectors of the economy. 
This was expected, as the oil sector in Saudi Arabia uses highly sophisticated 
machinery and equipment which are not supplied by the domestic market. This 
analysis and results have indicated the inability to spread the oil linkages over a 
wide range of sectors. Thus, it can be said that the Saudi Arabian oil sector is an 
enclave with respect to the rest of the economy. 
6.7 Conclusion 
An input-output model was applied in this chapter to investigate both the inter- 
industry linkages between the non-oil minerals sector and the other sectors of the 
economy and the sector's multipliers. The Saudi Arabian input-output table 
reflects the dominance of oil as the main source of foreign exchange, and hence 
the relatively low multipliers, which indicates the poor integration between the 
sectors. 
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With regard to the non-oil minerals sector, even though the sector has moderate 
backward and forward linkages, these linkages were developed only with the 
sector itself and a few other sectors, as indicated by the high coefficients of 
variation of those linkages. Thus, the sector did very little in terms of inducing the 
inter-sectoral integration of the economy. In addition, the estimation of the 
economic multipliers has shown (with the exception of its relatiVely high exports' 
multiplier) that the sector had insignificant impacts on the economy. However, 
when induced effects are included, the sector reveals relatively high income and 
employment multipliers. The sector had the highest index of income generation 
and the second employment generation in the Saudi Arabia economy. This 
indicates that the non-oil minerals sector can be stimulated by an increase in final 
demand, and generate more income and employees than other sectors of the 
economy. Therefore, it is expected that, for instance, the impact of an expansion 
and/or an introduction of a new industry within the non-oil minerals sector would 
have significant effects on the Saudi Arabian economy. 
The oil sector was perceived, by the Saudi Arabian govenunent, as the key sector. 
However, we have shown empirically that the sector loses its key sector status 
when the coefficients of variation of its linkages are taken into account. The sector 
which we identified as a key sector in the Saudi Arabian economy in 1994 was the 
manufacturing sector. The manufacturing sector seemed to offer maximum effects 
on all the policy objectives which we have suggested. However, while this fact 
confirms the important role played by the manufacturing sector in terms of these 
objectives, it does not necessarily confirm the incompatibility of these policy 
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objectives in the Saudi Arabian case as applied to the non-oil minerals sector. This 
is simply because the major development and expansion of the non-oil minerals 
sector, as shown in Chapter 4, has taken place since the Saudi Arabian input- 
output table was prepared in 1994. 
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Chapter 7: Economic Impacts of New Non-Oil Minerals Industry 
7.1 Introduction 
We have seen in the previous chapter that the economic impacts of the non-oil 
minerals sector were insignificant in 1994. However, since then, the sector has 
expanded remarkably, and is expected to increase its contribution in the coming 
years. This is mainly due to the new steps and incentives provided by the Saudi 
Arabian government to develop and promote the sector, as shown in Chapter 4. 
Therefore, we are interested in this chapter to examine the effects of an expansion 
within the non-oil minerals sector resulting from changes in the final demand for 
that sector product. 
Specifically, this involves an empirical application of an input-output approach to 
the analysis of the economic impact of the introduction of three new mining 
industries. Those are the aluminium industry, the phosphate industry, and the iron 
industry. The three new mining industries will be inserted inside the existence of 
the Saudi Arabian input-output table of 1994. This chapter presents quantitative 
results in terms of projected industry output, household income and employment 
multipliers (effects). The chapter will draw on the economic impacts of these 
major extensions in the sector, individually and collectively. 
7.2 Impact of New Industry 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, input-output multipliers have their widest 
application, particularly, in the analysis of a small change in composition of 
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demand. Amongst them is examination of the effect on an economy of starting a 
new industry. Let the input-output table represent the Saudi Arabian economy in 
equilibrium ten-ns and subject it to a shock such as the location of further major 
industry inside the country. When the repercussions of the shock have moved 
through the economy, what will be its new equilibrium position in tenns of 
industries' output, household income, and employment? This involves the same 
standard procedure applied in the previous chapter, with slightly additional 
procedures. An overview of the major developments and refinements of the 
13 
procedures will be introduced here . 
Tiebout (1967) was the first to suggest that the impact on an economy of a new 
industry can be analysed by augmenting the original input-output table. His 
technique involves the following steps: (1) augment the input-output table with a 
new row and column representing the new industry; (2) invert table to calculate 
new multipliers, including multiplier for the new industry; (3) use projected final 
demand sales of the new industry to estimate the effects of the economy's output, 
income and employment, as discussed earlier. However, Bonner and Fahle (1967) 
have paid attention to some additional adjustments that may be required in step 
(1), before calculating the inverse, to take account of the changes in direct 
coefficients due to the change in country trade resulting from the new industry, 
i. e., some output previously exported may now be an input to the new industry. 
" An extended literature review of the analysis of impacts of a new industry can be found 
in Richardson (1972), Stone (1973), and Mandeville and Jensen (197 8). 
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Sadler (1973) has recognised that the above technique shows the impact only of 
the production of the goods, and takes no account of the impact on the economy 
of building the factory or plant. In order to measure the total impact, however, he 
has added an additional significant refinement to the measurement of the impact 
of a new industry by considering two phases of impacts: the constructing phase 
and the operating phase. In the first, constructing, phase a multiplier for new 
construction can be applied to the investment used in building the factory, and the 
result can be taken as the impact of this investment output, incomes, and 
employment during the construction period, to represent the average impact for a 
year. The second, operating, phase however, consists of applying the industry 
multiplier to final demand, the exports and consumption of the new product, in 
order to assess the long-tenn effects of the industry itself. The latter will come 
into effect only when the construction of the factory is completed and the 
multiplier effects of the latter expenditure are likely to have worked themselves 
out. Similarly, measurement of the impact of the operating phase will involve 
augmenting the input-output matrix with a new row and column representing the 
new industry. 
If more than one industry come into existence at the same time, however, the 
developments can be measured in combination by augmenting the matrix with m 
(number of the new industries) rows and columns simultaneously. Economic 
impacts can be measured in both aggregate and relative terms. In aggregate tenns, 
total increases in output, income and employment resulting from the given 
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economic stimulus can be calculated; in relative terms, the increases in output, 
income and employment can be related to a unit increase in the original stimulus. 
The assumptions of an input-output model in investigating the impact of new 
industry remain the same as in the previous chapter. This is because we are 
concerned with evaluating the short-run effects of the introduction of new 
industries into the Saudi Arabian economy. Similarly to the previous chapter, the 
effects of any final demand change, real or simulated, can be considered an 
economic impact on a country. The emphasis here is to draw distinctions between 
the use of an input-output model in impact analysis and forecasting. Forecasting 
which may violate these assumptions is not involved. 
However, two more assumptions must be added when analysing the effect of 
introducing a new industry to validate the model. 
(1) There are unemployed or under-utilised resources in the Saudi Arabian 
economy, otherwise the introduction of the new mining industry will do no more 
than shift resources from other sectors to the non-oil minerals sector. 
(2) The operation of the new mining industry must be associated with an increase 
in the final demand in the economy, such as government expenditure, capital 
formation, or net exports. If it is not, the new mining industry does no more than 
displace an existing one, and even if it uses hitherto unemployed resources in one 
area, it will cause unemployment of resources in another. 
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7.3 New Non-Oil Mineral Industries 
We have seen in Chapter 4 that Ma'aden already had the permits and licences to 
explore some non-oil minerals resources. They have also intended to mine and 
build several new, non-oil minerals projects within the present national Five-Year 
Plan. Three of these projects approved so far concerned the largest mining 
industries inside Saudi Arabia. Aluminium, phosphate, and iron projects are the 
largest in tenns of their reserves, capital and operation costs. 
Investments in these projects have attracted, besides the local mining companies, 
some of the large international corporations. However, Saudi Arabian mining law 
requires a detailed economic and technical perspective to be offered by investors 
before any release action can be taken. This perspective has to meet the Saudi 
Arabian objectives in mining development policy, otherwise the offer will be 
rejected. Recently, Ma'aden has met the Saudi Arabian policy requirements, 
especially in terms of integrating the sector with the economy, by offering to 
process the ore locally instead of extracting the ore and exporting it as a raw 
material. Although Ma'aden has the required capital to finance these projects, it is 
intended to have a joint venture with large corporations in this field. This will 
ensure transfer of the technology needed to construct the plants, as well as help in 
marketing the products in the operation phase. 
DMMR and Ma'aden have studied these projects extensively from the economic 
and technical points of view. The economic information on these projects was 
collected from various official sources. A brief economic and locational 
description of these industries will be introduced and outlined below. 
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7.3.1 Aluminium Industry 
The main source on the aluminium industry data was the DMMR (1993). The 
proposed production of the metal aluminium from its ore, bauxite, consists of 
three distinct phases: 
(1) Mining and screening. Bauxite is mined and screened at the ore site, Az 
Zabira. 
(2) Alumina refinery. Refining is a process which involves dissolving out 
aluminium oxide with caustic soda. The refinery plant will be located at the Az 
Zabira ore site. 
(3) Aluminium. smelter. The smelting process involves dissolving alumina in 
cryolite flux and electrically reducing with carbon. Often, smelting is done at the 
ore site. Az Zabira is an exception to the general case, primarily owing to the 
isolation of the location, the smelter plant will be built instead at the industrial 
city, Al -Jubail port, on the Arabian Gulf This will reduce the cost of the power 
source needed for the smelter, due to the low price offered by AI-Jubail. However, 
the 650 km between Az Zabira and AI-Jubail would maximise the cost of 
transportation. The building of a railway between them was finally suggested to 
overcome the transportation cost. After long negotiation, the Saudi Arabian 
government has been persuaded to finance part of the proposed railway, and to 
extend it further by linking it with other potential mining locations in the 
country 
14 
14 The work on the railway is supposed to be started in 2002 (Al Riyadh, 200 1). 
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Generally speaking, the aluminium industry exhibits significant economies of 
scale of production, and concomitant large initial capital investment requirements. 
In addition, the production process is one of continuous operation for 24 
hours/day throughout the year. As indicated above, the three developments 
included in the analysis for the aluminium industry are (1) mining facilities such 
as laboratory, milling plant, etc., (2) alumina refinery plant, (3) aluminium. smelter 
plant. 
The initial proved mine life would be 20 years. In the operating phase, the refinery 
plant is expected to produce, annually, I million tonnes of alumina. On the other 
hand, the smelter will produce 300 hundred tonnes. Investment in the project is 
estimated at SR 404 million. The plants will require 1550 employees. The major 
inputs into the process are bauxite, alumina, electricity, fuel oil, and labour. Other 
raw material such as coke, pitch, aluminium fluoride, and soda ash will be 
imported and used as input. The project is likely to be fully operational in 2003. 
7.3.2 Phosphate Industry 
The main source of data on the phosphate industry was the DGMR (1992). The 
project has been designed for the production and concentration of phosphate ore at 
the mine site, Al-Jalamid. The concentrate will then be transported by the 
proposed railway to AI-Jubail, where part of it will be used to produce 
diammonium phosphate (DAP) fertiliser, and the reminder will be exported. 
Therefore, the developments included in the analysis for the phosphate industry 
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are the concentration plants and the railway to transport the concentrate to Al- 
Jubail. 
The proved life of the mine is 20 years, at an annual production of 11 million 
tonnes of concentrate. Investment in the project is estimated at SR 6.5 billion. The 
significant capital cost is due to the high-cost nature of phosphate processing. In 
addition, the phosphate industry, owned by SABIC, will contribute to a part of the 
proposed railway. The plants will require 1800 employees. The major inputs into 
the process are phosphate, electricity, fuel oil, and labour. The project is likely to 
be fully operational in 2004. 
7.3.3 Iron indust 
The main source of data on the iron industry was DMMR (1994). The project has 
been designed for the extraction of iron ore and the production of iron pellets from 
Wadi Sawawin. Part of the production will be sold to the iron and steel plants 
locally, and the remainder will be exported. 
The proven life of the mine is 25 years, at an annual production of 2.2 million 
tonnes of iron and pellets. Investment in the project is estimated at SR 2.8 billion. 
The plants will require 1220 employees. The major inputs into the process are iron 
ore, electricity, fuel oil, and labour. The project is likely to be fully operational at 
the end of 2003. 
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7.4 Economic Impact Analysis 
In order to insert the additional row and column representing each project, the 
data of the three new industries were deflated in 1994 Saudi Arabian riyals. 
Therefore, it should be borne in mind that the procedures are estimating the effect 
on the 1994 Saudi Arabian economy of developments that will be fully 
operational in the 2010s. On insertion into the input-output table, all data need to 
be ultimately in the form of cost coefficients, i. e., inputs per riyal of output. 
Appendix C shows the augmented construction matrix and operating matrix, Z-IF 
respectively, with the new rows and columns representing the new industries. 
7.5 Construction Phase of Proiects, 
The required infonnation on construction costs incurred in each new industry was 
sufficiently detailed in their presented studies. The Saudi Arabian input-output for 
1994 was augmented with a new row and column representing the building and 
construction sector, associated specifically with construction of each of the three 
new industry plants individually. The construction phase impact was measured for 
the peak year in each project in order to catch the maximum effect. The multiplier 
effects of the construction phase of the new industries are summarised in Table 
7.1 below, and can be interpreted as follows: 
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Table 7.1: Construction Phase of New Industries' Multipliers 
'Includes unit initial stimulus. 
Source: Author's calculation based on 1994 augmented input-output table. 
Multipliers Aluminium Phosphate Iron 
Output 
Direct 0.481 0.641 0.174 
Indirect 1.215 1.302 1.072 
Induced 0.930 1.043 0.477 
Total 2.625 2.985 1.724 
Total Output' 3.625 3.985 2.724 
Simple Output' 1.696 1.943 1.247 
Income 
Direct 0.385 0.313 0.279 
Indirect 0.268 0.295 0.069 
Induced -0.203 -0.205 -0.045 
Total 0.405 0.403 0.303 
Type 1 1.696 1.943 1.247 
Type 11 1.169 1.288 1.086 
Employment 
Direct 18.077 17.188 17.442 
Indirect 12.574 16.205 4.303 
Induced 8.117 6.909 5.285 
Total 38.768 40.302 27.030 
Type 1 1.696 1.943 1.247 
Type 11 2.145 2.345 1.550 
7.5.1 Output Effects 
Each riyal invested in the construction of the new projects, i. e., aluminium 
industry, phosphate industry, and iron industry, can be expected to produce an 
immediate, direct effect (first round) on the output of other intermediate sectors of 
SR 0.481, SR 0.641 and SR 0.174, respectively. Further industrial support 
requirements (indirect effects) associated with each riyal of construction activity 
will require additional SR 1.215, SR 1.302 and SR 1.072, respectively, from Saudi 
Arabian industries. The induced effect of each riyal invested, i. e., those effects on 
output originating from increased household consumption arising from increased 
output will be SR 0.93, SR 1.043, and SR 0.477, respectively. 
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The total (direct, indirect and induced) effect of each riyal invested in the 
developments will be SR 3.625, SR 3.985 and SR 2.724, respectively, i. e., each 
SR invested in each of the aluminium, phosphate, or iron industries can be 
expected to bring forth an additional SR 2.625, SR 2.985 and SR 1.724, 
respectively, in the output of Saudi Arabian industries. If only direct and indirect 
effects are being considered, the multipliers become SR 1.696 for aluminium, SR 
1.943 for phosphate, and finally, SR 1.247 for the iron industry. 
7.5.2 Income Effects 
The income multipliers in Table 7.1 indicate the effects on household income 
which can be expected to accrue as a result of each riyal invested in the 
construction phases of the new industries. They show, for instance, that each riyal 
invested would directly increase household income through payments to the 
construction workforce of SR 0.385 for aluminium, SR 0.313 for phosphate, and 
SR 0.279 iron industry. Furthennore, the indirect household income through 
industrial support linkages for the same riyal invested will be SR 0.268, SR 0.295, 
and SR 0.069, respectively. 
However, the interesting impact will be the induced effect resulting from 
investing one riyal in each of the above three new industries. The induced effects 
of household income were all negative. Bearing in mind that zu* - zij alli this 
means that for each one riyal invested in each of aluminium, phosphate and iron 
industries there will be a leakage in household income of SR 0.203, SR 0.205 and 
SR 0.045, respectively. This could be explained by the fact that investment in the 
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new industries will cause more imports to be used as input in the construction 
phase, or/and by the remittances of foreign labour being employed in these 
industries. This leakage may not seriously affect the investment in the new 
industries, and the Saudi Arabian economy in turn, due to the fact that the 
construction phase is a short period only; less than 5 years. 
The total income effects are expected to be low and affected by the negative 
induced income. They are estimated at SR 0.405 for aluminium, SR 0.403 
phosphate, and SR 0.303 iron industries. The Type I and 11 income multipliers for 
the aluminium industry show respectively that for each riyal change in households 
of construction employees, there will occur a change of SR 1.696 and SR 1.169. 
For the phosphate industry, the Type I and 11 income multipliers become, 
respectively, SR 1.943 and SR 1.288. Finally, for the iron industry they become, 
respectively, SR 1.247 and SR 1.086. 
7.5.3 Employment Effects 
The employment multipliers indicate the increase in employment measured in 
persons which can be expected to occur as a result of each SR 1,000 invested in 
construction. They show, for instance, that each SR 1,000 invested in the 
aluminium industry construction could result in the employment of 18 persons as 
the direct effect, of 13 persons as the indirect industrial support effect, and 8 
persons from induced consumption effect; thus a total of 39 could be employed 
for each SR 1,000 spent on the aluminium industry. Similarly, a total of 40 and 27 
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persons would be expected to be employed, respectively, for each SR 1,000 spent 
on the phosphate and iron industries. 
However, the relatively high employment multipliers reflect the high labour 
intensity required for the construction phase, especially for the railway network. 
The other reason could be, as mentioned in the procedure earlier, the choice of 
industries' peak years. The timing of construction of the various developments has 
a considerable effect on the results. For instance, the aluminium industry 
construction workforce in the peak year is 940, while in the next year it will be 
reduced to 600 only. Therefore, the construction multipliers indicate the 
maximum impacts arising from a particular year during the construction phase. 
In contrast, the Type I multiplier indicates that for each person employed in the 
construction phase of the aluminium project, an additional 1.696 persons are 
employed in industries in Saudi Arabia. In Type 11, this becomes an additional 
1.145 persons. Similarly, Type I and Type II employment multipliers for 
phosphate and iron industries are 1.943 and 1.247 persons, respectively, while 
their Type 11 employment multipliers are expected to become an additional 1.345 
and 0.55 persons, respectively. 
7.6 Operating Phase of Projects 
The same procedure was applied using the estimated operating data for the three 
industries. Our objective was extended further to measure the cumulative effect of 
the three new industries together. Thus, the new industries were integrated into 
Saudi Arabian matrix. 
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Unlike the construction phase, where only individual impacts were calculated, for 
the operation phase, the aggregate impact of the new industries was calculated 
also. Although the fon-ner phase will cause some economic impacts, such impacts 
will not be pennanent, but will occur only as a result of current construction 
activity. The aggregate calculation for the latter phase will measure the pen-nanent 
impact of these industries within the Saudi Arabian economy. Both relative and 
aggregate output, income and employment multipliers relating to the operational 
phases of the three projects are presented in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: O-Derational Phase of New Industries' MUltlDliers 
Multipliers Aluminium Phosphate Iron Aggregate 
Outpu 
Direct 0.537 0.551 0.565 0.902 
Indirect 1.397 1.288 1.252 0.884 
Induced 0.673 0.500 0.555 0.546 
Total 2.607 2.339 2.372 2.332 
Total Output' 3.607 3.339 3.372 3.332 
Simple Output' 1.934 1.839 1.817 1.786 
Income 
Direct 0.395 0.342 0.422 0.382 
Indirect 0.369 0.287 0.345 0.300 
Induced -0.092 -0.130 -0.212 -0.208 
Total 0.666 0.559 0.555 0.474 
Type 1 1.934 1.839 1.818 1.785 
Type 11 1.701 1.459 1.315 2.304 
Employment 
Direct 1.304 1.370 1.393 1.352 
Indirect 1.218 1.150 1.138 1.063 
Induced 0.877 0.685 0.773 0.738 
Total 3.399 3.205 3.304 3.153 
Type 1 1.934 1.839 1.817 1.786 
Type 11 2.607 2.339 2.372 2.332 
'Includes unit initial stimulus. 
Source: Author's calculation based on 1994 augmented input-output table. 
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7.6.1 Output Effects 
An examination of Table 7.2 shows, to a great extent, similarities between the 
three proposed new industries in terms of their multiplier impacts. For instance, 
each riyal of output of the aluminium. industry (mining, refining and smelting) 
will produce an immediate (direct) effect on the output of industries in the Saudi 
Arabian economy of SR 0.537. In other words, 53.7% of the aluminium industry's 
inputs are purchased locally. 
The direct linkages are mainly for the smelter's use of electricity and alumina. 
Further industrial support or indirect effects illustrate some of the actual linkages 
existing. The relatively high indirect effects, SR 1.397, also could be attributed to 
the fact that the refinery purchases the bauxite locally. Compared to the indirect 
effect, the induced effect is relatively low. The simple output multiplier for the 
aluminium industry is SR 1.934, reflecting the strong linkage between the entire 
developments of each new industry. This is due to the fact that the aluminium 
industry, generally, shows a high degree of vertical integration. 
The relative high direct output in the aggregate reflects the high linkages between 
the three industries themselves, while the relatively small indirect output effect on 
the aggregate suggests the low linkages with other industries in the Saudi Arabian 
economy. However, the output multipliers for the aggregate are generally similar 
to those of the individual new industries. 
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7.6.2 Income Effects 
Income multipliers in all three proposed new industries are again, to a great 
extent, similar. The low income multipliers illustrate the effect of highly capital- 
intensive industries. For instance, the high direct income effect, representing 
39.5% of the aluminium industry's cost structure, reflects the labour intensity of 
aluminium. In addition, the indirect income multipliers for all three industries are 
also low, reflecting the weak linkages with other industries. 
The negative induced income multiplier reflects the existing leakage and the 
relatively weak linkages with other industries. For instance, in the aluminium 
industry, there is a leakage of 0.09% resulting in each riyal paid to households. 
This leakage could be in the fonn of importing raw material for the industry, or 
could be in the form of remittances by the foreign labour working in these 
proj ects. 
Type I and 11 multipliers are relatively high, reflecting in general the strong 
linkages between these industries and other industries in the economy. Income 
multipliers for the aggregate are close to those for each individual industry. 
Therefore, they can be interpreted in the same way as the income multipliers of 
each new industry. 
7.6.3 Employment Effects 
The capital-intensive nature of the mining industries and their strong direct 
linkages are reflected even more dramatically in the employment multipliers in 
Table 7.2. Each SR 1,000 of turnover of each project, and for the three projects in 
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aggregate, could be expected to result directly in the employment of about 1.3 
persons. Indirect employment per SR 1,000 of turnover in the three new industries 
is 1.218,1.15 and 1.138 persons, respectively. For every worker in the new 
industries, the Type 1 employment multiplier suggests that an additional 0.934, 
0.839 and 0.817 jobs will be created respectively in new industries. 
However, the year on which the input-output table is based has considerable 
implications for the interpretation of the employment multipliers. Since the Saudi 
Arabian table pertains to 1994, we should expect that the employment multipliers 
calculated from this table would overestimate impacts pertaining to 2000 and 
beyond. According to Jensen (1978) all industries, including mining, are 
becoming more capital-intensive over time, with mechanisation displacing labour, 
and, thus, dated employment multipliers will tend to overestimate employment 
impact. 
7.7 Backward and Forward Linkages of New Industries 
It is expected that the development of these industries could attract further 
substantial light and heavy manufacturing to Saudi Arabia. For instance, the 
advice associated with the aluminium industry suggests that forward linkage 
industries to the smelter, such as aluminium fabrication and finishing plants, are 
expected to be in Saudi Arabia. The location of the proposed aluminium smelters 
by the sea supports this expectation of a pull on later fabricating operations. This 
is mainly due to the fact that aluminium fabrication plants are market-oriented in 
their location, since ingots, being less bulky than aluminium sheet, cost less to 
transport. Similarly, the manufacture of finished goods is market-oriented. 
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In contrast, when backward linkages are considered, these industries are not 
expected to attract further substantial light or heavy manufacturing. Industries, 
however, they may indirectly attract further industry by enhancing Saudi Arabian 
reputation as an industrial growth country. As indicated earlier, the railway 
linking both Az Zabira and the phosphate mining sites to the important industrial 
city on the Arabian Gulf, AI-Jubail, will be the infrastructure directly associated to 
these industries. This will involve also other infrastructures to serve these areas, 
such as bridges, improved road access, a power feeder line, water, and port 
facilities. 
7.8 Conclusion 
As an application of input-output analysis, this chapter has synthesised a system 
of measuring the economic impacts of new non-oil mineral industries, 
incorporating the following technical features: both the construction and operating 
phase impacts of new industries can be considered, and the impact of several 
different industries can be examined. The model was empirically applied to assess 
the impacts, in terms of industries' output, household income, and employment on 
the Saudi Arabian economy, of the developments in the aluminium, phosphate 
and iron industries. These projects are all likely to be in operation before mid- 
2010. 
In the construction phase, it was found that the new mining industries have 
relatively high output and employment multipliers. The railway network as well 
as the smelters and refineries were possibly the main reason. In contrast, income 
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multipliers were relatively low, due to the leakages caused by foreign workers in 
this phase. In the operation phase, however, it was found that the new industries 
have strong intra-industry linkages, as well as inter-industry linkages with each 
other. On the other hand, the new industries have relatively small linkages with 
other sectors of the Saudi Arabian economy. This could be mainly due to the use 
of imported machines and other imported inputs. The relatively high income 
multipliers reflect the high linkages of these new industries with other sectors in 
the economy. The new industries will created little additional employment, 
reflecting the capital- intensivity of the mining industries. 
The emphasis, in this chapter, was on measurement, which implies a focus on the 
quantitative as distinct from the qualitative aspects of impact. Only economic 
effects were considered, to the exclusion of other impacts such as social, political 
and envirom-nental. 
175 
Chapter 8: Impact of Oil Boom on Non-Oil Minerals and Saudi Arabia 
Economy: A Dutch Disease Approach 
8.1 Introduction 
While the oil boom accelerates economic development and raises the standard of 
living for an oil exporting country, it creates imbalances in the pattern of sectoral 
growth. It is widely accepted that in an open economy, especially when operating 
at or near full employment, an increase in the price of an exportable resource or 
discovery of a new resource results in the relative expansion of non-tradable 
sectors and the relative contradiction of tradable sectors. 
This chapter is an attempt to provide an empirical study of some of the structural 
changes which have taken place in the Saudi Arabian economy occasioned by the 
oil export price increase, on the one hand, and the oil price decline in 1986 
onwards, on the other. The reason is to show that the oil boom might be 
considered as an obstacle to the development of the non-oil minerals sector and 
hence to economic diversification in Saudi Arabia. The chapter will begin with a 
brief review of Dutch disease theory. 
8.2 Dutch Disease Theo 
The discovery, in the1970s, of oil and natural gas in Netherlands gave a boost to 
the Dutch currency, the guilder. As a consequence, the guilder became a highly 
sought after currency. The value of the guilder appreciated relative to other 
currencies, causing the price of Dutch exports in the currencies of the exporting 
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countries to rise. As a result, the Dutch exports of manufacturing products 
declined. This phenomenon is addressed in the literature under the name of 
'Dutch disease'. Some economists, however, believe that oil and gas are not the 
only causes of Dutch disease. Corden (1984), for instance, argues that the boom in 
the technologically advanced part of Japan's manufacturing sector in the 1960s 
had adverse effects on the less dynamic tradable sectors. Corden also stated that 
the discovery of gold in Australia in the eighteenth century and in Spain in the 
sixteenth century in its colonies are other examples of the 'Dutch disease'. 
However, the Dutch disease is not unique to developed countries. The recent 
growth in oil and gas industries has led many economists to study the impact of a 
booming industry on the domestic economy. Most of the studies seem, 
theoretically, to agree that there is relative increase in the non-tradable sectors, 
such as services, relative to the tradable goods sector, e. g., manufacturing and 
agriculture. Hence, the output of the tradable sectors will contract relatively. The 
last point can be explained as follows. Under a fixed exchange rate, a booming 
(resource exports) traded sector will cause the domestic spending to go up. If the 
short-run response to higher demand of non-tradable sectors were not large, prices 
of non-tradable sectors' goods would rise. This would lead to higher prices which, 
in turn, would raise profits if input costs were to lag behind output prices. 
The basic model can be summarised as based on the Corden (1984) model, and as 
developed by Neary and Wijnbergen (1986). There are three sectors, the booming 
sector (B), the tradable or lagging sector (T), and the non-tradable sector (N). The 
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first two sectors produce tradable goods which face a given world price. The 
prices of the non-tradable sector are determined within the domestic economy 
through the interaction between domestic supply and demand. Output is produced 
using the neo-classical production function with capital and labour. Capital is 
fixed and cannot be shifted between sectors. Labour is mobile between sectors. 
The boom in sector B is assumed to occur due to the following causes. However, 
these are not the only ones: (1) a once and for all technical enhancement in the 
sector which is confined to the economy in question, (2) discovery of a valuable 
new source, (3) an exogenous increase in the price of the sector's product. This 
will increase the aggregate income of the factors employed there. It hinges on the 
presumption that the boom will improve the current account balance, and part of 
this revenue will be spent on the non-tradable sectors. In studying Dutch disease, 
one confronts two effects resulting from the resource boom: the spending effect, 
and the resource movement effect. 
8.2.1 Spending Effect 
The spending effect, as explained by Corden and Neary (1982), can be analysed 
through the following general equilibrium model: 
n Pn = Cn 
A, 
9y AA 
where: 
represents output of non-tradable goods, 
C it represents consumption of non-tradable goods, 
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represents relative prices of non-tradable to tradable goods, 
A 
Y represents income. 
An increase in the demand for non-tradable goods will raise their price. An 
increase in the price or in the revenue of oil will raise the income of the factors 
employed there (providing that the booming sector, oil, employs a negligible 
fraction of the labour force). Spending will occur either directly by the owners of 
the factors or indirectly by the government. The production possibility frontier 
(PPF) is the initial endowment of the economy. 
In order to explain how the spending effect mechanism works, as illustrated in 
Figure 8.1 below, we assume that the economy produces two goods. One is a 
composite of oil goods and tradable goods (T), and the second is a non-tradable 
good (N). The price of N is domestically determined, while the price of T, 
precisely tradable goods, is exogenously determined. Initially, we are at point A, 
where the price line PO is tangent to the original PPF. At this point, producers 
maximise their profits by setting the marginal rate of transformation equal to the 
price ratio P0. Utility maximisation, however, requires that the marginal rate of 
substitution is equal to the price ratio too. If we assume that the boom is defined 
as a transfer from the rest of the world which is embodied in tradable goods, due 
to the increase in income, the shift in the PPF will be vertical to NT. This happens 
due to the fact that the boom does not change the maximum output of non- 
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tradable goods, ON; instead, it raises the maximum output of the tradable goods 
from OT to OT'. Therefore, the PPF shifts up vertically. 
Figure 8.1: Spending Effect due to Resource Boom 
CY 
cl 
0 
Point A is the initial exchange rate which equals the slope of the price ratio. If the 
income elasticity is equal to zero, then the new point will be B. The relative price 
P, is equal to the old price ratio. At point B, there is an excess demand for N and 
an excess supply of T. However, at this price, the demand for N will be at point C. 
Moreover, at this point, there will be an excess demand for N, causing P, to go up. 
From the profit maximisation point of view, point A is no longer profit 
maximisation, because the new price ratio is higher than the marginal rate of 
transformation. The long-run analysis will be at point D, with more of N 
produced. In conclusion, the spending effect inevitably increases non-tradable 
output. 
Non-tradables Quantity 
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8.2.2 Resource Movement Effect 
Using the same assumption of three sectors, the spending effect can be 
represented as: 
nq=: Cn (q, Y) 
w 
where: 
w is wage rate measured in terms of tradable goods, 
q is relative price of non-tradable to tradable goods. 
The labour market equilibrium condition is satisfied so that the marginal 
productivity of labour in each sector is equalised. When the total labour 
endowment is divided between the three sectors as proposed by Corden (1984), 
the increase in the marginal product of labour in the booming sector B at constant 
wage rate w, leads to an increase in the demand for labour in B. As a result, labour 
will move from both tradables T and non-tradables N to B. The movement of 
labour from T into B lowers the output of T, causing the so-called 'de- 
industrialisation' or de-agriculturalisation. Given the different structures of 
developed and developing countries, one would expect the manufacturing sector 
to contract, while the agriculture sector would be most severely affected in 
developing countries, Benjamin et al. (1986). Accumulating both effects, resource 
movement and spending, further appreciation of the real exchange rate will occur. 
Both effects increase the relative price of non-tradable goods, pull resources from 
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both B and T, and as a consequence, reduce output of these sectors. Hence, T will 
decline, but the net effect on output in N and B is indeterminate. 
As illustrated in Figure 8.2 below, Corden (1984) has explained the resource 
movement as follows. 
Figure 8.2: Combination of Spending and Resource Movement Effects 
si so 
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The resource boom increases the demand for labour, causing the supply curve to 
shift up. Hence, the final equilibrium will be at point C. Now, if the resource 
movement causes the decline in N, this implies that the real wage in term of non- 
tradables will go up 
W because of the rising marginal productivity in this 
P 
sector. Hence, real wage w rises. The spending effect causes N to rise, leading to a 
decline in W However, w could rise and fall. The increase in the price of N 
P 
will lead to an expansion of this sector. Since the labour is the specific factor in 
this sector, the higher wage will attract more labour into this sector. According to 
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the Stopler-Samuelson theorem 15 , the wage rate has to go up, and the increase in 
wage rate will exceed the increase in the price of N itself. 
8.3 Different Variants of Core Model 
In this section, we are interested in observing the different results from relaxing 
some of the assumptions of the basic model. 
8.3.1 Decomposition of Tradable Sector 
Many economists, such as Snape (1977), Corden and Neaty (1982), Cassing et al. 
(1987) and others, have studied the impact of Dutch disease when decomposition 
of the tradable sector (T) is assumed. Instead of being one sector, they assumed 
that if the tradable sector was decomposed into many sectors. If more than one 
factor allowed to move, then it is quite possible that some sectors within the 
lagging sector will expand, in spite of the fact that the sector as a whole contracts. 
In the Corden and Neary (1982) model, capital and labour are mobile among the 
component industries of T. Before the boom, the tradable sector constitutes a 
minuscule H-0 economy. Then, when the boom occurs, T will release some of the 
globally mobile factor, labour, to other sectors, i. e., B and N. Notably, the capital 
in T is not globally mobile. It is only mobile among the component industries of 
T. 
"The Stopler- Samuelson theorem predicts that an increase in the price of a commodity 
will raise the return of the factor used more intensively in the production of this 
commodity and decrease the return of the factor used less intensively. 
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According to the Rybczynski 16 theorem, goods using labour more intensively will 
shrink, while those using it less intensively will expand. In other words, some of 
the components of T may expand, even though the aggregate T shrinks. 
8.3.2 Capital is Mobile Between Tradable and Non-Tradable Sectors 
Now consider that labour is mobile among all three sectors of our model, and 
capital is mobile only between T and N sectors which employ labour and capital 
in varying proportions. As in the previous situation, we have a small H-0 
economy. The boom causes the globally mobile factor, labour, to shift towards the 
booming sector. The reduction in the labour supply available to T will cause the 
sector using labour more intensively to shrink, while causing the other to expand. 
This result is induced by the resource movement effect which, in turn, is an 
application of the Rybczynski theorem. 
If the N happens to be labour-intensive, while the T is capital-intensive, a 
paradoxical result is expected. This is that N will shrink, while T will expand. 
Therefore, the net effects on the tradable sector T can be summarised as follows. 
If T is labour-intensive, while N is capital-intensive, the resource movement effect 
with the Rybczynski effect leads to an expansion in N and a contraction in T. In 
addition, it results in a real depreciation of the real exchange rate which might be 
offset by the spending effect. 
16 Rybczynski (1955) postulates that the growth of only one factor leads to an expansion 
in the output of the commodity using the growing factor more intensively and to a 
contraction in the output of the commodity using the growing factor less intensively, 
providing that the relative commodity prices are held constant. 
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8.3.3 Capital is Mobile Between Booming and Tradable Sectors 
In this situation, we assume that capital is mobile between B and T. We maintain 
our assumptions of a small country and that labour is globally mobile among all 
three sectors. Moreover, N employs a sector-specific factor in addition to the 
globally mobile factor, i. e., labour. Also, as in the previous models, we assume 
that there are no domestic distortions and that the economy is operating at full 
employment with expenditure equal to income. Long (1983) has come up with 
three 'paradoxical' results which rely on the Rybczynski effect that give rise to 
supply complementarily. 
T may be expanding even when its price falls relative to the price of N. 
(2) The expansion of T stated in (1) may be accompanied by a contraction of the 
output of B, relative to its pre-boom equilibrium output. 
(3) The possibility of real depreciation in the exchange rate resulting from a boom 
in an exporting sector. 
8.3.4 Intemational Capital Mobility 
This requires a dynamic model analysis of Dutch disease rather than a static 
model. Bruno and Sachs (1982) supposed that a rise in wealth would lead to 
capital accumulation in N and to decumulation in T. 
Corden and Neary (1982) extended their basic model, presented earlier, to allow 
for some degree of international capital mobility. They consider a simple case 
where each of the three sectors employs sector-specific capital which, in turn, is 
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internationally mobile. Such capital does not, however, move among the three 
domestic sectors. 
In order to induce international capital mobility, let us assume that the boom 
initially causes the rent of capital in T to decrease, while causing the rent in the 
other sectors to increase. Therefore, given the international capital mobility, the 
capital in T will flow out seeking a higher rate of return, while the capital specific 
to other sectors will flow from abroad to the home country. While this will 
reinforce the output effects, it will moderate the effects on the return to capital. 
'de- industrialisation' will be greater, but the adverse effect of the boom on the 
profitability of T will be reduced because of the capital outflow. In the case of N, 
capital mobility makes the supply schedule more elastic, which in turn leads to a 
further rise in output. Hence, the real appreciation required to restore equilibrium 
would be moderated. 
8.4 Limitations of Applying Dutch Disease Model to Developing Countries 
Some of the assumptions that were mentioned earlier in relation to Dutch disease 
model need to be relaxed when they are applied to LDCs. Therefore, the model 
has to be modified to fit the circumstances of the LDCs. 
1. Presence of Surplus Labour 
The full employment assumption should be relaxed when analysing the effects of 
the Dutch disease in LDCs. Contrary to the majority of developed countries, 
LDCs have substantial underemployed and unemployment. This is due to the fact 
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that either many of them are engaged in low productivity subsistence agriculture 
or there are many job-seekers. "The concept of surplus labour pool is itself 
suspect; virtually no one argues any longer that LDC's contain a large group of 
underemployed with marginal product close to zero" (Roemer, 1985, pp. 239- 
240). Accordingly, each sector of the economy can draw on this pool of surplus 
labour without bidding away resources from other sectors. Hence, neither the 
resource movement nor the spending effects need occur. 
However, Dutch disease was experienced in some labour-surplus developing 
countries such as Nigeria and Indonesia. Roemer (1985) suggested that this was 
due to the lack of necessary skill level required by the booming sector. Therefore, 
Dutch disease may occur in oil exporting LDCs, though they possess surplus 
labour. 
2. Migrant Labour and Booming Sector 
In contrast with Nigeria and Indonesia, other oil exporters and several Middle 
Eastern countries have welcomed large numbers of migrant labour. For instance, 
the migrant labour force percentage in Saudi Arabia was 60.8% of the total labour 
force in 1994. This situation would modify the effects of Dutch disease in two 
ways. Firstly, the availability of migrant labour increases the supply for all sectors 
of the economy, which in turn mitigates the resource movement effect. Secondly, 
the amount of income that migrant workers remit home or consume on imported 
goods or services that, by implication, take on the characteristics of traded goods, 
would mitigate the spending effect. As a result, the spending effect would be 
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moderated and the real exchange rate appreciation would reduce. For example, the 
outflow remittances of migrant labour were SR 57.3 billion in 1995, which 
accounts for 20% of Saudi Arabian oil revenues in the same year 
(Alhayat/Business, 2000). 
However, as dependence on migrant labour grows, more non-tradable industries 
can be treated like other traded industries. Roemer (1985) asserted that the three- 
sector model collapses eventually into a traditional two-sector model with an 
expanding PPF due to the extra supply of labour. If B is capital-intensive while 
the other sector is labour-intensive, the Rybczynski theorem implies an expansion 
of the other traded goods sector rather than de-industri all s ation. In conclusion, the 
spending effect is expected to be lower in migrant labour-importing LDCs relative 
to the developed countries. 
3. Identifying Relative Factor Intensities 
As stated earlier, long run effects of Dutch disease on the economy depend on the 
factor intensity of both T and N. However, the condition is different in the 
developing countries, due to the difficulty in identifying whether T or N is more 
cap ital- intensive. We cannot generalise about long-run effects because each sector 
is composed of sub-sectors with very different production characteristics. For 
instance, the tradable sector (T) includes sub-sectors which could be characterised 
as labour-intensive, such as agricultural exports and food production. In the mean 
time, T includes other sub-sectors such as manufacturing, which is probably 
capital-intensive. Similarly, the non-tradable sector includes capital-intensive sub- 
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sectors such as transport services, as well as other labour-intensive sub-sectors 
such as household and personal services. 
4. Identifying Tradable and Non-tradable Goods 
Most LDCs impose tariffs and other barriers to protect domestic infant industries. 
Therefore, the prices of these goods become no longer related to world prices. 
Hence, both tradable and non-tradable goods prices are domestically detennined. 
In other words, government intervention eliminates foreign competition and 
transforms T into N. As a result, the tradable sector might expand, at least in the 
short run, regardless of the appreciation in the real exchange rate. 
5. Imperfect Substitutions 
Another reason for the difference in effects of the booming sector between 
developed and developing countries is the imperfect substitutions with foreign 
goods. Benjamin et al. (1989) analysed the impact of the oil boom on the 
economy of Cameroon, as a developing country. They found that some 
domestically produced manufactured goods were imperfectly substituted in world 
markets. Therefore, consumer demand did not shift entirely into foreign goods as 
the domestic price rises. As a result, the spending and movement effects resulting 
from the oil boom were moderated. This is because the prices of the imperfect 
substitutes were not pegged to world prices, thereby the spending effect resulting 
from an oil boom induced higher demand on these goods, which in turn raised 
their prices as well as their supply. Therefore, though T as a whole contracted, 
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some of the tradables sector actually expanded, due to their imperfect 
substitutability with foreign goods. 
8.5 Dutch Disease in Saudi Arabia: Some Indicators 
The purpose of this section is to study the empirical incidence of Dutch disease in 
Saudi Arabia. The model is based on Corden (1984) as explained earlier. In order 
to trace the impacts of the oil prices, an attempt is made to divide the Saudi 
economy into three conventional sectors, namely the booming sector (B), the 
tradable or lagging sector (T), and the non-tradable sector (N). The effects of the 
oil boom on relative price, structural change and exchange rate will be explored to 
see whether the predictions of Dutch disease hold in the case of a large oil 
producer, i. e., Saudi Arabia. 
1. Booming Sector (B) 
The booming sector in Saudi Arabia is, clearly, the oil sector. Despite the fall in 
the price of oil in recent years, the paramount position of oil in the Saudi Arabian 
economy remains unchallenged. Oil has been a significant factor in the 
development of the economy since 1970 till today, and possibly in the future. For 
example, between 1970 and 1995 the share of the oil sector in total real 
government revenues was 86%, and more than 90% of total real exports, on 
average. However, oil is an enclave sector with few important backward and 
forward linkages with other sectors of the economy, and is charactensed as a 
cap i tal- intensive industry. 
2. Non-tradables Sector (N) 
190 
Non-tradables, broadly defined, as those goods and services that are produced 
and consumed domestically. In other words, non-tradable activities could be 
defined as those sectors which do not export or import at all, or have a negligible 
contribution in both total exports and imports. Looking at the components of the 
Saudi Arabian real GDP, one finds it difficult to separate the tradables from the 
non-tradables sectors. Given the above definition, services, construction and 
utility (electricity, gas and water) might be labelled as the non-tradables sector. 
Non-tradables represent on average 59% of real non-oil GDP between 1970 and 
1995. 
3. Tradables Sector (T) 
By definition, tradables include those goods which are actually traded, as well as 
those which are potentially traded. Tradables are derived residually, i. e., the 
remaining sectors after excluding booming sector and non-tradables. Therefore, 
agriculture, manufacturing and non-oil minerals are labelled as the tradables 
sector. Tradables' contribution to real non-oil GDP over the period 1970-1995 
was 41 % on average. 
Table 8.1: Booming, Tradables and Non-tradables in Saudi Arabian Econom 
(1970-1995) 
(Yearly Average, constant SR) 
Booming Sector (B) Oil Output Tradables Output Non- Output 
% in Sector (T) % in Tradables % in 
(B) (T) Sector (N) (N) 
-Mining of Crude oil and Agriculture 55.7 Services 70.6 
Natural Gas 91.7 Manufacturing 40.8 Construction 21.2 
-Petroleum Refining 7.1 Non-oil Electricity, 
-Construction Associated Minerals 3.5 Gas and Water 5.2 
with Oil Sector 1.2 1 1 1 
Source: Author's classification. 
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8.5.1 Relative Prices of Non-tradables to Tradables EL 
Pt 
Saudi Arabia is deemed to be a small, open economy, and that as such it is a price 
taker in international markets. The domestic price level is determined according to 
the supply and the demand conditions. The oil boom has resulted in an increase in 
the price of non-tradables at a higher rate relative to the price of tradables. 
Because good data are not available on a relative price, proxies should be used. 
Thus, the analysis used here in order to calculate the relative prices was as 
follows. First, for each year between 1970 and 1995, the price index of tradables 
Pt was estimated by dividing the sum of GDP deflators of all the components of 
the tradables sector, given in Table 8.1, by the sum of the implicit non-oil GDP 
deflator of the same components. Second, using the components of the non- 
tradables sector, the price index of non-tradables P, was estimated in the same 
way. Finally, the relative price index of non-tradables to tradables was calculated 
by dividing the estimated price index of non-tradables by the estimated price 
index of tradables and multiplying the result by 100. Table 8.2 gives the index of 
relative prices of non-tradables to tradables. 
The prediction of Dutch disease is that the oil boom would have a great effect on 
relative prices. Table 8.2 reveals that the price index for the non-tradables 
continuously increased throughout the 1970-1978 period. Since 1979, it has been 
decreasing. Moreover, the average inflation rate in the non-tradables sector was 
higher than the average inflation rate in the tradables sector throughout the 1971- 
1976 period. Afterwards, it stabilised. The movements in the relative prices did 
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not change noticeably 1970-1973. The ratio increased from 123.8 in 1973 to 148.0 
in 1974, which represents a percentage change of 19.6%. 
Table 8.2: Tradables and Non-tradables Deflators for Saudi Arabia (1970-1995 
Year Tradables 
(P) 
Inflation in 
(P) 
Non- 
tradables 
(PI) 
Inflation 
in (P, ) 
p 
, *100 
pt 
Real 
Exchange 
Rate 
change 
1970 99.94 102.78 102.84 
1971 100.79 0.9 105.02 2.2 104.20 1.32 
1972 104.59 3.8 118.78 13.1 113.57 8.99 
1973 112.00 07.1 1 ý-8.62 16.7 123.76 8.97 
1974 164.73 47.1 243.85 75.9 148.03 19.61 
1975 200.51 21.7 348.28 42.8 173.70 17.34 
1976 242.50 20.9 425.52 22.2 175.47 1.02 
1977 329.31 35.8 461.68 8.5 140.20 -20.10 1978 355.44 7.9 487.19 5.5 137.07 -2.23 1979 384.47 8.2 522.45 7.2 135.89 -0.86 1980 416.48 8.3 540.36 3.4 129.74 -4.52 1981 442.18 6.2 560.58 3.7 126.78 -2.29 1982 469.77 6.2 556.72 -0.7 118.51 -6.52 1983 466.06 -0.8 546.92 -1.8 117.35 -0.98 1984 466.27 0.0 558.93 2.2 119.87 2.15 
1985 463.85 -0.5 549.57 -1.7 118.48 -1.16 
1986 460.09 -0.8 538.51 -2.0 117.04 -1.21 
1987 457.83 -0.5 531.56 -1.3 116.10 -0.81 
1988 469.49 2.5 533.28 0.3 113.59 -2.17 
1989 477.58 1.7 536.89 0.7 112.42 -1.03 
1990 494.53 3.5 552.79 3.0 111.78 -0.56 
1991 543.40 9.9 583.05 05.5 107.30 -4.01 
1992 571.47 5.2 604.38 3.7 105.76 -1.43 
1993 596.44 4.4 622.33 3.0 104.34 -1.34 
1994 619.83 3.9 636.64 2.3 102.71 -1.56 
1995 640.93 3.4 642.38 0.9 100.23 -2.42 
Source: Author's calculation based on SAMA (1998). 
The index of relative prices peaked in 1976 at 175.5. The appreciation of the 
relative price (real exchange rate) was experienced throughout the period 1970 to 
1976. However, after 1976, the real exchange rate levelled off and started to 
decrease, i. e., depreciation of the real exchange rate. This resulted in a rapid 
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growth rate of tradable goods, particularly in 1976, when the rate exceeded 21% 
in nominal terms. This could be attributed to the fact that the continuous rigidity 
of the relative prices led the government to respond mainly by subsidising the 
tradables. 
8.5.2 Exchange Rate 
Explaining how export booms affect a country's real exchange rate, and how the 
real exchange rate, in turn, affects other industries are important and integral 
points in understanding the Dutch disease phenomenon. Consider that an export 
boom leads to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and hence, cetens 
paribus, an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Let the real exchange rate 
(RER) be defined here as the foreign currency price of a unit of domestic currency 
(that is nominal exchange rate) multiplied by the ratio of the domestic to the 
foreign price level. 
RER 0 
P" 
Pd 
where: 
RO is an index of the nominal exchange rate defined as number of units of local 
currency per unit of foreign currency; 
P., is an index of tradables' prices detennined by the world's price in the case of a 
small, open economy like Saudi Arabia, i. e., Saudi Arabia price level; 
Pd is an index of domestic price, e. g., wholesale or consumer price index (CPI), 
i. e., foreign price level. 
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The domestic price of tradable goods is given by Pd. Now, changes in Pd will 
reflect changes in the domestic price of non-tradable goods. Pd acts as a proxy for 
domestic inflation. An increase in Pd, holding P,, and RO constant, leads to a 
decline in the RER. This decline called an appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
Similarly, for fixed P,, and Pd, a decline in RO leads to an initial appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. The final change in the RER is a function of how Pd Will 
respond to the change in Ro. 
The real exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) adversely affects the 
competitive position of an individual exporting (import-competing) firm in a 
country, assuming that the world demand for oil is relatively inelastic. For other 
commodities whose world markets are perfectly competitive, unlike OPEC, an 
appreciation of the RER leads to increase in the relative price of exportables. This 
provokes a decrease in the relative price of importables, and thus causes a fall in 
exports and an increase in imports. It is this loss of export competitiveness which 
drives the phenomenon of Dutch disease. 
Before 1975, the exchange rate of the Saudi Arabian nyal was linked with the US 
dollar. Throughout the entire decade of the 1960s, the value of the riyal remained 
stable in relation to the US dollar. However, when the dollar weakened in the 
early 1970s, the riyal tended to appreciate against the dollar, with its exchange 
rate rising by a total of 27%. The strong foreign exchange position of Saudi 
Arabia appreciated the riyal from SR 4.50 to SR 3.55 per dollar over a period of 
less than 2 years, that is from December 1971 to August 1973. The continuing 
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depreciation of the dollar led the Saudi Arabian government to sever the link of 
the riyal with the dollar in 1975. In order to stabilise the riyal, Saudi govemment 
pegged the riyal. to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) in 1975. The stabilisation 
arrangement was based on pegging to SDR at SR 4.28255 = SDR 1, with margins 
of 7.25% on either side of the parity. This policy, was justified by the Saudi 
Arabian government, on the basis that pegging the riyal to one currency was not 
desirable, and pegging to a basket of currencies was perferable. The Saudi 
government desired to prevent the riyal from being adversely affected by erratic 
movements in the exchange rates of major currencies due to international 
speculative forces having no relationship with the domestic economy. The 
utilisation of wider margins was also advocated on the basis that it would help to 
insulate the riyal from excessive and undesirable movements in the SDR itself due 
to unhealthy speculative forces conflicting with the welfare and growth-oriented 
strategies of the Saudi Arabian government. The consequence of such pegging 
was expected to be less variation in the exchange rate and the prices of import, 
and hence, less variation in inflation (SAMA, 1998). 
This policy did not last for long, as the Saudi Arabian goverranent decided to 
ý'k abandon linking the riyal to the SDR and return to linking it to the dollar in 1981. 
The officially announced reason was the substantial exchange rate appreciation of 
the riyal against SDR, as a consequence of which the margins with SDR were 
suspended. In fact, the US dollar remained the interveAtion currency, and the 
riyal/US dollar continued to serve as the basis for other exchange quotations in the 
market in the period 1975-1981. There were several reasons for this policy of 
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pegging the riyal to the US dollar. Firstly, the oil revenues which accrued to the 
government were denominated in US dollars, Therefore, these revenues would be 
exchanged for riyals, which would make it easier for the government in planning 
the annual budget. Secondly, Saudi Arabia is an open economy, and imports 
played a major role in the trade sector. A stable relationship between the riyal and 
dollar would lead to stable prices of imports from the major countries which 
traded with Saudi Arabia, such as the US and other developed countries. Finally, a 
large proportion of Saudi investment was either inside the United States or in 
assets dominated by US dollars. 
Although the nominal exchange rate was not altered, it changed from one period 
to another to reflect the change in the inflation rate. For instance the nominal 
exchange rate in the period 1970-1980 appreciated, reaching its peak in 1980. 
After 1980, however, the nominal exchange rate of the riyal showed continuous 
depression, probably induced by the decline of oil prices. From 1987 onwards, the 
nominal exchange rate was fixed against the dollar, due to the new government 
arrangement which maintained the Parity at SR 3.745 per US dollar. 
8.5.3 Structural Change 
Compared to relative prices and the exchange rate, the oil boom has a clearer 
impact when it comes to structural change. The relative price and the attraction of 
the booming sector to mobile factors together play a major role when a small 
economy increases absorption in response to windfall gains. Holding the 
assumption of full employment equilibrium, the mechanism of relative prices' 
operation in an economy could be explained as follows. Since the price of 
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tradables has not changed, their excess demands can easily be satisfied through 
additional imports. On the other hand, the excess demand on non-tradables, 
together with the rise in the cost of production and income effects, will cause 
domestic inflation. As domestic inflation soars, the non-tradables expand at the 
expense of tradables outputs. This effect is the key source of the decline in non- 
oil tradables production and export. 
Table 8.3: Sectoral Composition of Output: Percentage of Tradables and Non- 
Tradables Sectors Real GDP 
(Constant 1970 Prices) 
Boom Period (1970-1982) Post-Boom Period (1983-1995) 
Sector 1970 1982 % 
Change 
Annua 
Growth 
Rate 
1983 1995 % 
Change 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
Tradables 42.67 39.19 -3.48 9.3 39.23 41.57 2.34 0.02 
Agriculture 65.64 44.84 -20.8 5.9 45.08 59.46 14.38 0.03 
Manufacturing 31.21 50.93 19.72 13.9 51.25 38.52 -12.73 0.03 
Non-oil 
Minerals 
3.16 4.23 1.07 13.7 3.67 2.02 -1.65 0.55 
Non-tradables 57.33 60.81 3.48 10.7 60.77 58.43 -2.43 0.01 
Source: Author's calculations based on SAMA (1998). 
If we look at the sectoral growth rates given in Table 8.3, and Figures 8.1 and 8.2, 
we can see that during the boom period, at the aggregate level, the non-tradables 
sector in Saudi Arabia was growing faster than tradables. In the fonner case, the 
annual growth rate was 10.7%, whereas for the latter it was only 9.3%. According 
to the above analysis, and based on the assumption that the increase in relative 
prices of non-tradables to tradables had actually led to an increase in the 
profitability of the fonner relative to the latter, it can be argued that more 
investment was attracted to non-tradables, a fact that explains its higher growth. 
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Figure 8.3: Real Rates of Growth of Economic Sectors 
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During the boom period, on an aggregate basis, the tradables sector was declining 
in terms of its share in non-oil GDP. However, within traclables themselves, at a 
more disaggregated level, matters were not the same. Indeed, the manufacturing 
199 
sector was not declining; rather, its share in Teal non-oil GDP increased from 
31.2% in 1970 to 50.9% in 1982, and over the same period it recorded remarkable 
annual growth rate of 19.7% in real terms. Similarly, the non-oil minerals sector 
experienced a slight increase in its share of real non-oil GDP, from 3.2% in 1970 
to 4.2%, and over the same period it recorded annual growth of 1.1% in real 
tenlis. 
On the other hand, the annual growth rate of the agriculture sector was lower than 
that of manufacturing and non-oil minerals, and in ten-ns of its contribution to real 
non-oil GDP, the sector recorded a percentage decrease of 20.8%; that is, from 
65.6% in 1970 to 44.8% in 1982. Therefore, during the boom penod, Saudi 
Arabia experienced de-agriculturalisation rather than de-industri all sation. This 
stems in part from the fact that Saudi Arabia had negligible industrial output 
before the 1973-74 oil boom, and was not an exporter of industrial products. 
Another reason for the slower growth in agriculture compared to manufacturing 
was due to the government policy of investing heavily in manufacturing at the 
expense of agriculture. Although the share of the agriculture sector declined in the 
booming period, its annual growth rate was increasing over the same period. The 
average annual growth rate of agriculture was about 6%. This growth can be 
attributed to the role of goveniment subsidy, and the direct agricultural price 
support. 
Indeed, Table 8.4, which gives the composition of both public and private 
investment by sector, clearly indicates that during the boom period, investment 
was concentrated in manufacturing and non-tradables, at the expense of 
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agriculture and non-oil minerals. During the same period, the annual growth rate 
of non-tradables was higher than that of tradables; that is, 10.7% compared to 
9.3%. In terms of contribution to real non-oil GDP, non-tradables increased their 
share from 57.3% in 1970 to 60.8% in 1982. This increase is due to the high 
percentage of investment in the non-tradable sector, especially in social 
infrastructure. 
Table 8.4: Composition of Lending by Sector 
Booming Period Loan Post-boom Period Loan 
Sector (1970-1982) (1983-1995) 
Government Commercial Government Commercia 
Institutions Banks Institutions Banks 
Agriculture 4.00 1.68 7.69 4.51 
(Tradable) 
Manufacturing 42.81 23.02 38.35 20.89 
(Tradable) 
Non-oil Minerals 5.41 3.34 2.99 1.45 
(Tradable) 
Non-tradable 47.77 71.96 50.96 74.15 
Source: Ministry of P lannmg (1999). 
During the post-boom period, the share of investment in non-tradables increased, 
in spite of the fact that relative prices of non-tradables to tradables declined. This 
is an indication that price changes are not necessarily important in determining the 
direction of government investment. Indeed, the direction and amount of Saudi 
Arabian government investment appropriated to the different economic sectors 
depended to a large extent on the government's development policy. The 
government's desire was to satisfy the social needs of its people and to implement 
its long-run goal of creating an alternative source of foreign exchange. 
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If this was a reasonable justification for the public to increase their investment, 
regardless of factors such as sales and profits which affect investment and its 
direction, how can we justify this for the commercial banks? Before trying to 
answer this question, it is necessary to explain the role of the commercial banks in 
financing economic development in Saudi Arabia. During the boom period, their 
role were negligible. According to A]-Ali (1992), there were two reasons for this: 
First, the huge increase in the level of government expenditure led to an increase 
in private sector income, hence the increase in private sector liquidity. As a result, 
the private sector businesses were able to self-finance their investments without 
the need for bank loans. Secondly, the availability of low-cost loans from the 
public specialised funding institutions. During the post-boom, however, the above 
situation was reversed, and the demand for loans increased. Notably, most of the 
commercial loans were to finance foreign trade transactions of the private sector. 
Table 8.5: Composition of Public Subsidies by Sector (%) 
Sector Booming Period Subsidies Post-boom Period Subsidies 
(1970-1982) (1983-1995) 
Agriculture 132.5 1.84 
(Tradable) 
Manufacturing - - 
(Tradable) 
Non-oil Minerals - - 
(Tradable) 
Non-tradable 139.33 -1.54 
Source: Ministry ot- Planning (1999). 
Table 8.5 shows that during the same period, the share of non-tradables as a whole 
in non-oil GDP declined, in spite of the fact that the share of investment in non- 
tradables increased. As far as the tradable sector is concerned, even though as a 
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whole it expanded its share in real non-oil GDP, the non-oil minerals and 
manufacturing sectors declined both in tenns of their share in non-oil GDP and 
their annual growth rate. On the other hand, the agriculture sector increased its 
share in non-oil GDP with slower annual growth rate of only 0.03%. The 
relatively slow contraction of agriculture compared to manufacturing and non-oil 
minerals is largely due to the government policy on subsidies, with a lower 
percentage during the post-boom period. 
According to the Dutch disease model, a resource boom will lead to an increase in 
relative prices of non-tradables to tradables (positive relationship), which in turn 
will lead to a decrease in the tradables sector (negative relationship). In order to 
test empirically whether these relationships or associations hold in the case of 
Saudi Arabia, we estimated the correlation matrices of variables given below. 
Each correlation matrix of variables contains the correlation coefficients between 
the oil price (OP) and relative prices of non-tradables to tradables (RP) on the one 
hand, and the shares in non-oil sector real GDP of non-tradables (%N), tradables 
(%T), agriculture (%AG), manufacturing (M), and non-oil minerals (NM), on the 
other. The correlation matrices were estimated for the boom period (1970-1982), 
the post-boom period (1983-1995), and the sample period as a whole (1970- 
1995). According to the above analysis, the expected signs are as follows. 
%N %T %A %M %NM OP RP 
OP +++ 
RP +?? ++ 
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As the results of the estimation show, all the signs are as expected dunng all three 
periods, even though the correlation coefficient is low in some cases. Therefore, it 
has been shown once more that, on an aggregate basis, the case of Saudi Arabia is 
in close confonnity with the predictions of Dutch disease theory. 
Figure 8.5: Estimated Correlation Matrix of Variables (1970-1982) 
%N %T %A %M %NM OP RP 
OP 0.97 -0.97 -0.97 0.98 0.17 1 0.34 
RP 0.33 -0.33 -0.33 0.31 0.67 11 
Figure 8.6: Estimated Correlation Matrix of Variables (1983-1995) 
O/oN %T %A %M %NM OP RP 
OP 0.79 -0.79 -0.79 0.78 0.81 1 0.49 
RP 0.73 -0.73 -0.73 0.73 0.74 0.49 1 
Figure 8.7: Estimated Correlation Matrix of Variables (1970-1995) 
%N %T %A %M %NM OP RP 
OP 0.62 -0.62 -0.62 0.78 -0.23 1 0.07 
RP 0.65 -0.65 -0.65 0.36 0.83 0.07 
1 
8.6 Policy Response 
The impact of the resource boom could have been more harmful to the economy, 
if the Saudi Arabian government had not intervened to moderate its full effects. 
The govemment adopted some short-term policies to mitigate the structural 
effects caused by the disease. However, some of these policies had side effects on 
the economy. In the next section, we are interested in introducing and analysing 
these policies in order to establish a long-term policy to protect the Saudi Arabian 
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economy and specifically, the growth in non-oil minerals, from the symptoms of 
Dutch disease. 
Firstly, the Saudi government used a substantial proportion of the oil revenue to 
subsidise the production of the tradables sector, especially agriculture and 
manufacturing industries. Nevertheless, such a policy reduced the boom resource, 
not without excess burdens to the society, because these goods were valued less 
than the marginal social costs of production. Secondly, it imposed tariffs and 
barriers on some import-competing tradables industries. Regardless of the limited 
advantage which may be gained by the domestic producers, such a policy makes 
the society as a whole worse off, because the insufficient producers over-produce 
and consumers under-consume. Thirdly, in order to reduce the growth constraint 
of the tradables sector, Saudi Arabia imported a large amount of capital, such as 
machines and equipment. The increase in the supply of capital moderated the 
resource movement effect and, on the other hand, the payments for the purchases 
of these machines reduced the spending effect. Therefore, the real exchange rate 
appreciation and the structural effects were both mitigated. 
Although the Saudi govemment exerted efforts to mitigate the problem of Dutch 
disease, it still exists. This is because its interventions to stabilise the effects of 
the resource boom (through government expenditure) were intended for the 
symptoms rather than the causes. As regards the non-oil minerals sector, wIth 
which we are primarily concerned, the government will need to protect the sector 
from the adverse effects of the oil boom. Furthermore, they need to ensure that the 
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rest of the economy is insulated as much as possible fTom the harmful economic 
impacts of a resource boom. 
There are several measures that can be taken to protect the tradables sector. They 
include devaluation, anti-absorption, and capital accumulation policies, The 
objective of a devaluation policy is to improve the balance of payments. As a 
result, the income effects of the devaluing country will have two important roles. 
Firstly, this income effect is associated with the rise in export earnings which will 
improve domestic demand operating through the multiplier effects. Secondly, the 
income effect has an impact on the terms of trade. As a consequence of 
devaluation, it is expected that the export price will fall relative to import price. 
However, one should be careful in prescribing a devaluation policy, because of 
the future problems that accompany it, such as inflation. 
An alternative policy could be the anti-absorption method. This method involves 
tightening credit for consumption and investment, in other words, slower 
depletion of oil resources and more investment abroad in order to stabilise the 
exchange rate. However, this issue has received a controversial response in most 
of the Saudi Arabian economics literature. Such a policy was in fact used by the 
Saudi Arabian government when it decided to invest part of the Saudi Arabian oil 
revenues abroad. The officially announced reason was to provide income when oil 
exports decline, and prevent excessive appreciation of the Saudi Arabian 
currency. Opponents argue that while this kind of policy mitigates the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, the rate of return on such investment has 
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been far less than would have been achieved by leaving the oil in the ground. On 
the other hand, the supporters are arguing from a long-terrn point of view. They 
believe that transforming the oil into overseas assets was better than transforming 
it into imports which could not have been sustained, and hence would have 
generated future inflation and unemployment. Finally, it should be bome in mind 
that an anti-absorption policy may not, in any case, be applicable in the case of 
Saudi Arabia, as Alexander (1952) argues that this policy is preferable only as full 
employment is approached. 
The other available policy alternative is the positive use of the accumulated assets 
to promote non-oil mineral development. This could be achieved through the use 
of assets to import capital equipment which would strengthen the industrial base 
and sustain the economic development, particularly when the resource runs out. 
8.7 Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter that according to Dutch disease theory, a boom in 
one of the sectors of the economy is not only a blessing, and may lead to de- 
industrialisation or/and de-agriculturalisation. This phenomenon is called Dutch 
disease, after it was observed in the Netherlands in the 1970s when the flow of 
North Sea gas increased sharply. There are two basic mechanisms that bring about 
such negative effects, the spending effect and the resource movement effect. 
Contrary to the Dutch disease symptoms (in the form of a contraction in the 
tradables sector) observed in the Netherlands and other developed countries, the 
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manufacturing sector actually expanded at the expense of agriculture in most oil- 
exporting developing countries, including Saudi Arabia, following the oil boom of 
the 1970s. In the non-oil minerals sector, the same observation, though with less 
degree of expansion, was obtained. We have seen that there is no unanimous 
agreement among economists as to why the manufacturing sector expanded in 
these countries. With regard to the Saudi Arabian case, our empirical study 
suggests that aspects of Dutch disease syndrome are observed. Using correlation 
analysis, we have seen that the massive oil export price increase in the boom 
period led to an increase in relative prices of non-tradables to tradables, an 
expansion in the share of non-tradables in non-oil GDP, and a contraction in the 
share of tradables. Within the tradables themselves, it was the agriculture sector 
which suffered most, unlike manufacturing and non-oil minerals, whose shares 
actually expanded dunng the boom period. This could be explained by the fact 
that Saudi Arabia had negligible industrial output before the 1973-74 oil boom, 
and was not an exporter of industrial products. 
However, the equilibrating role of relative price changes in the economy structure 
does not necessarily operate in the case of Saudi Arabia, due to the fact that price 
levels are not an important mechanism for clearing markets. This is because of the 
dominance of government investment, which was influenced more by the 
government development strategy than by relative price and profitability changes. 
During the post-boom, when the Saudi Arabian oil price witnessed a massive 
decrease, the Dutch disease syndrome reversed itself in Saudi Arabia, leading to 
results opposite to those observed during the boom period. The oil decline is 
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expected to cause an expansion in the tradables sector and a relative contraction in 
the non-tradables sector. However, the adjustment Process may take time, due to 
the higher cost of the re-entry into tradables industries. 
Some economists do not consider Dutch disease a problem unless it accompanies 
any kind of economic distortions or externalities. They believe that in the 
presence of any kind of economic externalities, an export boom could induce 
adverse welfare effects. For instance, since a temporary resource boom crowds out 
the tradables sector, it delays the learning-by-doing experience that improves the 
comparative advantage in the production of tradable goods. Therefore, the non-oil 
GDP has to grow by itself and independent of oil revenues in order to diversify 
the country's economy, and sustain and accelerate its growth rate. 
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Chapter 9: Summary and Conclusions 
The oil sector is the major pillar of the Saudi Arabian economy. Since the 
beginning of first Five-Year Development Plan in 1970, the Saudi Arabian 
economy has relied heavily on oil. The Saudi Arabian economy is dependent on 
oil exports, such that a slight decline in oil exports has a heavy impact on the 
macroeconomy of the country. As a result, the Saudi Arabian government realised 
that it would be beneficial for the economy to utilise its oil income by investing in 
other productive sectors, such as manufacturing, agriculture and, more recently, 
the non-oil minerals sector, in order to diversify its economic base before oil is 
depleted. 
The aim of this study has been to evaluate the contribution of the non-oil minerals 
sector to the economic growth of Saudi Arabia during the period 1970-1995, as 
well as to investigate the new Saudi Arabian policy of promoting the non-oil 
minerals sector as a means to diversify the economy away from oil. 
9.1 Conclusions 
We have shown in Chapter Two of this study that, before the discovery of oil in 
the 1950s, the Saudi Arabian economy relied mainly on agriculture and the 
revenue from pilgrims in the two holy cities, Makkah and Madinah. The Saudi 
Arabian development strategy in its first phase (1970-1985) was to consolidate the 
massive inflow of oil revenues to build the infrastructure and raise the 
living 
standard of the Saudi citizens. This phase, known as the oil boom period, 
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experienced an expansion in the industrial sector, construction, infrastructure and 
transport, and several pipeline projects grew rapidly to facilitate the sale of oil. 
The huge government expenditure and the pace of development led to high 
inflation and increased the number of foreign workers. The government managed 
to reduce the rate of inflation by adopting some fiscal and monetary controls, such 
as cutting expenditures and controlling the money supply. Moreover, the 
government had to act on the problems of a shortage in local manpower and the 
increased numbers of foreign skilled and unskilled labour. Foreign labour was 
needed to run many economic activities and was seen as a partial solution to the 
lack of local workers. The second solution was, however, to increase the number 
of educational and vocational institutions for Saudi citizens to increase their 
n, k ability to carry out the development process in the country. This policy succeed in 
replacing foreign white collar workers with local ones, but it failed in terms of the 
replacement of blue collar workers. 
The second phase was shaped by the oil price crash in 1986. The major source of 
income for the Saudi Arabian economy was affected badly by the drastic decline 
in oil prices. The government responded by cutting spending, delaying projects, 
ending subsidies, and depleting its foreign assets. As a result, economic growth 
slowed down, many companies were bankrupted, and the commercial banks 
experienced an increase in debt. The non-oil sector was unable to offset the 
decline in the role of oil and stimulate economic growth. The Saudi planners 
adopted two policies to boost the non-oil sector in order to diversify the economy 
away from oil as the main source of foreign exchange. Firstly they encouraged the 
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commercial banks to replace the government as the main source of funds to the 
private sector. Secondly, they imposed tariffs and imports restrictions to protect 
local industries. The oil sector, meanwhile, experienced an expansion in 
production capacity, as well as in both downstream and upstream projects. By the 
end of the second phase in 1989, the above policies coupled with an increase in 
the oil prices had fostered Saudi economic growth. 
The Gulf War marked the beginning of the third phase the third phase and halted 
that economic growth. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 led to a huge money 
outflow from the Saudi commercial banks. SAMA played a major role in 
restoring the confidence of both foreign and domestic creditors. Saudi Arabia 
increased oil production to offset the loss in the market caused by the UN 
embargo on both Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil exports. The cost of the Gulf War led to a 
record budget deficit in absolute tenns in 1990/1991. As a result, the goverment 
responded by drawing down further external assets, increasing its bond sales, and 
for the first time, external borrowing. In contrast, the private sector benefited from 
the government's massive spending on the allied troops, as well as the cutting of 
some utilities' prices. 
Chapter Three was devoted to examining the Saudi Arabian industrialisation 
strategy. Industrialisation was perceived by Saudi Arabian planners as a means of 
diversifying the economy away from crude oil as a major source of income and 
foreign exchange earnings. Moreover, industrialisation was seen as a long-term 
structural change in the non-oil sector production in order to reduce dependency 
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on crude oil and imported goods, to create income stability and, more important, 
to create integration among local industries. The Saudi planners recognised the 
limitations of oil as an enclave sector, with exhaustible resources, and volatile 
prices. Given the shortage of local labour, and limitations of domestic market, the 
new industries were selected to be capital-intensive as well as export-oriented. 
Hydrocarbons industries, such as oil refineries and petrochemicals, would ensure 
that Saudi Arabia was competitive in world markets by using crude oil and natural 
gas as cheap feedstock. The goveniment, by means of subsidies and tanffs 
protection, encouraged the private sector to invest in import substitution 
industries. Despite the country's and enviromnent, the Saudi agriculture sector 
had grown rapidly. However, the government incentive programmes and 
protectionist trade policies were costly and unjustified. Therefore, the extreme 
environment as well as the cutting of government subsidies put an end to any 
further growth in the agriculture sector. After two decades of development, the 
role of the non-oil sector in Saudi Arabian economic growth remained relatively 
weak. 
Chapter Four of this study served as a general background to the Saudi Arabian 
non-oil minerals sector. The production, potential, and structure of the industries 
in this sector were presented. It was shown that the non-oil sector had so far made 
a poor contribution to the Saudi economy. Despite the presence of large non-oil 
mineral commodities, the sector had done very little impact in terms of 
macroeconomic measures. This was due to many reasons, among them, the 
relatively low investment (government and private) and poor infrastructure, which 
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were inadequate to reduce the exploitation cost and the negative effect of the oil 
sector on the whole non-oil sector. In its commitment to diversify the economy, 
Saudi Arabia has recently, launched an ambitious plan to develop the non-oil 
minerals sector. Supported by the discovery of huge reserves of several non-oil 
mineral commodities, the Saudi planners believed that the sector could play a 
major role in the diversification of the economy. Non-oil mineral goods (as well 
as the rest of non-oil goods) were expected to reduce the Saudi Arabian export 
instability. Moreover, the sector could integrate with other sectors inside the 
domestic economy by developing more backward and forward industries, Four 
significant steps initiated by the government (within less than three years), 
reflecting the strong commitment to promote the non-oil sector. The first step was 
the announcement of the formation of the Supreme Petroleum and Mineral Affairs 
Council (SPMAC), headed by the Saudi Crown Prince. The second was the 
establishment of the state-owned Ma'aden, which will consolidate all mining 
projects in which the government is involved, with an initial capital of more than 
SR 3.7 billion. The third move was the revision of the country's mining 
investment laws to attract more local and foreign investors. And last, but not least, 
was the establishment of the Saudi Geological Survey (SGS) as an independent 
organisation to provide accurate information in the non-oil minerals' field. The 
impacts of such incentives for the sector were significant. Ma'aden initiated new 
mining projects and expanded the already existing mines. However, the full 
impacts on the sector, as well as on the Saudi economy as a whole, will take some 
times to be manifested. 
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A portfolio model was employed in Chapter Five to address the problem of Saud' 
Arabian export instability. The chapter discussed how uncertainty would influence 
economic behaviour adversely. Therefore, diversification in international trade 
has become a goal for Saudi planners in the past two decades. The objectives of 
this chapter were to investigate the relationship between the Saudi Arabian 
increased diversity and export performance, and to examine marginal changes in 
the Saudi export portfolio. Aiming to provide guidance to the Saudi planners, the 
most non-oil export commodities were used in the portfolio model for two distinct 
periods, 1984-1990 and 1991-2000. It was found that there is a tenuous 
relationship between the Saudi increased export diversity and export earnings, 
which is consistent with a number of other studies (MacBean and Nguyen, 1980; 
Love, 1983; Alwang and Siegel, 1991). Evidence was presented that, during both 
periods, machinery and transport equipment ranked best in terms of international 
price trends and the impact of their exports on earning stability. It was also found 
that there is inconsistency in the impacts of changes in commodity volume on 
stability and earnings' growth from period to period. Commodities' impacts on 
instability or earnings changed dramatically from one period to the next. Thus, the 
design of 'optimal' adjustments in the export portfolio is complicated. If it may be 
assumed that price trends can be forecasted more accurately than variability in 
earnings, then it is wiser to choose changes in the export portfolio based on 
expected eamings. 
Chapter Six of the thesis was devoted to an application of the input-output model 
in order to estimate and evaluate, first, the inter-industry linkages of the non-oil 
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minerals sector with the rest of the sectors, and second, the economic multipliers 
(output, foreign exchange earnings, imports, income and employment) generated 
by the non-oil sector and the other sectors of the economy. Using the 1994 Saudi 
Arabian input-output table, the results of the estimation show that the non-oil 
minerals sector possesses relatively low backward and forward linkages. 
Moreover, these linkages are developed only within the sector itself and with a 
few other sectors, as indicated by the high coefficients of variation of those 
linkages. In addition, the estimation of the economic multipliers has shown that, 
apart from the exports' multiplier, the sector had insignificant impacts on the 
economy. However, when induced impact is included, the sector reveals relatively 
high income and employment multipliers. This indicates that the non-oil minerals 
sector can be stimulated by an increase in final demand, and generate more 
income and employees than other sectors of the economy. Therefore, it is 
expected that the impact of expansion and/or an introduction of a new industry 
within the non-oil minerals sector would have significant effects on the Saudi 
Arabian economy. It has also been shown empirically that the oil sector did not 
constitute a key sector. The sector loses its key sector status when the coefficients 
of variation of its linkages are taken into account. The sector which we identified 
as the key sector in the Saudi Arabian economy in 1994 was the manufacturing 
sector, which seemed to offer maximum effects on all the policy objectives under 
consideration. 
Chapter Seven was rather an extension and complement of the estimation in the 
previous chapter. The high income and employment multipliers in the non-oil 
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minerals sector in 1994 had suggested that an increase in final demand would 
stimulate the sector. Therefore, we were interested, in this chapter, to examine the 
effects of an expansion within the non-oil minerals sector resulting from changes 
in the final demand for that sector products. Specifically, this involved an 
empirical application of an input-output approach to the analysis of the economic 
impacts of the introduction of three new industries. These were aluminium, 
phosphate, and iron. Quantitative results were presented, in tenns of projected 
industry output, household income and employment effects. The chapter drew out 
the economic impacts of each of these major extensions in the sector, individually 
and collectively. In the construction phase, it was found that the new mining 
industries have relatively high output and employment multipliers. The railway 
network, as well as the smelters and refineries, were possibly the main reason. In 
contrast, income multipliers were relatively low, due to the leakages caused by 
foreign workers in this phase. In the operation phase, however, it was found that 
the new industries have strong linkages both entirely and between each other. On 
the other hand, the new industries have relatively small linkages with other sectors 
of the Saudi Arabian economy. This could be mainly due to the imported 
machines and other import inputs. The high income multipliers reflect the high 
linkages of these new industries with other sectors in the economy. The new 
industries have created low employment, reflecting the capital-intensivity of the 
mining industries. 
Chapter Eight was an exploration of the Dutch disease model as proposed by 
Corden (1984), and an attempt to relate this model to Saudi Arabia, in order to test 
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whether the case of this country confon-ns with the predictions of the Dutch 
disease theory. This theory says that a boom in one sector of the economy does 
not have only beneficial effects, and may lead to an increase in relative prices of 
non-tradables, which in turn may lead to de-industrialisation or/and de- 
agriculturalisation. 
Contrary to the Dutch disease symptoms (in the form of a contraction in the 
tradables sector) observed in the Netherlands and other developed countries, the 
manufacturing sector actually expanded at the expense of agriculture in most oil- 
exporting developing countries, including Saudi Arabia, following the oil boom of 
the 1970s. For the non-oil minerals sector, with which we are especially 
concerned, the same observation, though with a slower rate of expansion, was 
obtained. We have seen that there is no unanimous agreement among economists 
as to why the manufacturing sector expanded in these countries. With regard to 
the Saudi Arabian case, our empirical study suggests that aspects of Dutch disease 
syndrome are observed. Using correlation analysis, we have seen that the massive 
oil export price increase in the boom period led to an increase in relative prices of 
non-tradables to traclables, an expansion in the non-tradables' share in non-oil 
GDPý and a contraction in the tradables' share. Within the tradables themselves, it 
was the agriculture sector which suffered most, unlike manufacturing and non-oil 
minerals, which actually expanded their shares during the boom period. 
However, the equilibrating role of relative price changes in the economy structure 
does not necessarily operate in the case of Saudi Arabia, due to the fact that price 
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levels are not an important mechanism for clearing markets. This is because of the 
dominance of government investment, which was influenced more by the 
government's development strategy than by relative price and profitability 
changes. During the post-boom, when the Saudi Arabian oil price witnessed a 
massive decrease, the Dutch disease syndrome reversed itself in Saudi Arabia, 
leading to results opposite to those observed during the boom period. The oil 
decline is expected to cause an expansion in the tradables sector and a relative 
contraction in the non-tradables sector. However, the adjustment process may take 
time, due to the higher cost of re-entry into tradables industries. Finally, some 
policies and recommendations were suggested to the Saudi Arabian government 
to mitigate the effects of the disease. 
9.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
The present study can be viewed as preliminary step towards the building of much 
more detailed and sophisticated model of the contribution of the non-oil minerals 
sector to the economic growth of Saudi Arabia in future. There are many 
possibilities of extending the model: 
The input-output model applied in this study measures only the static effects of 
a unit increase in the final demand or the impacts of an expansion on the sector. 
Further extension, would be to try a dynamic model that can capture the dynamic 
changes associated with capital accumulation and population growth. Given that 
the future researchers have access to new table and ample data, a dynamic 
analysis can show fully all of the costs and benefits of these adjustments 
(changes). 
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2. Regional input-output can be carried out by the future researchers to estimate 
the impacts of individual mining projects on the corresponding region's economy. 
The impacts of a mining project tend to affect a specific areas to a greater or lesser 
extent rather than to be spread evenly over a country. Thus a minor change at the 
country level may be a major one for a specific region. As a result, the micro- 
impacts would complement our macro-impacts by identifying clearly the actual 
communities affected. 
3-Cost-benefit analysis could be applied to weight the actual and potential costs 
(both private and social) on various proposed mining projects against the actual 
and potential private and social benefits. This method could help the planners to 
select between the most desirable (profitable) mining projects in terms of yielding 
the highest benefits-cost ratio. 
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Appendix A: Non-Oil Minerals and Geology of Saudi Arabia 
Table A. 1: Summary of Known Non-Oil Mineral Resources in Saudi Arabia 
Ore 
Principal reserve Mine life 
deposits (mt) I Commodity Annual production (year) Workers 
Wadi Sawawin 974.00 Iron 2.2 mt 25 839 
Wadi Fatima 12.50 Iron - 
Jaballdsas 106.00 Iron - 
Al Aflaj - Iron - 
Hadbah - Iron - 
Wadi Wassat 180.00 Iron - 
Bauxite, 
Kaolinitic 
clay, and 
Aluminium 
Az Zabirah 372.00 Dioxide 2.5 mt 20 199 
Copper, 76,000tonnes Cu 340 
Jabal Sayid 60.00 (zinc) (29%) 
Jabal-Ash Copper, - 
Shizin 1.60 (zinc) 
Umm-Ad Copper, 
Damar 1.00 (zinc) 
Copper, 
Kutam 1.63 (zinc) 
Zinc, 34,000tonnes Cu 
(copper, (25%), 58,000tonnes 
Al Masane 7.03 gold, silver) Zn (53%) 10 200- 
Zinc, (copper, - 
Nuqrah 466.30 gold, silver) 
Zinc, 638,200 tonnes Zn 176 
Khnaiguiyah 30.4 (copper) 11,400 tonnes Cu. 13 
Sukhaybarat 6.40 Gold 
Al-Amar 2.20 Gold - 
350,000 tonnes (7,200 214 
tonnes Cu; 
Gold, (silver, 16,800tonnes Zn, 720 
Al -Amar 6.70 copper, zinc) kg Au; 1320 
kg Ag) 10 
Mahd Ad Gold, (silver, 
Dhahab 1.14 copper, zinc) - 400,000-500,000 t (1.7 127 
t 
Al-Hajar 176.64 Gold, silver grams/tonnes Au) 10 
300,000 tonnes (2.89 30 
Hamdah 4.28 Gold gram/tonnes) 8 
3 mt (1700 grain gold 159 
Bulghah 61.68 Gold bar) 10 
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Summary of Known Non-Oil Mineral Resources in Saudi Arabia (continued) 
Principal 
deposits 
Ore 
reserve 
(mt)l Commodity 
- 
Annual production 
Mine life 
(year) Workers 
Dowaihi 0.01 GýI d 
Bil'iwy 0.54 Gold 
Umm Matirah 1.03 Gold 
Ash Shakhtaliya 
_ 
Gold 
Al Jalamid 1413 
II mt (4.5 mt 
phosphatus condensed 
by 32% of pento 
phosphates oxides 40 
800 
Yanbu 16.00 Gyp sum 
Al Butayn 660.00 Silica 
Yanbu 30.00 Clay 
Zarghat 3.20 Magnesite 65,000 tonnes 24 24 
Al Shahba 2.00 
Carbonated 
rocks Unavailable 
- 
Farasan 5.00 
Carbonated 
rocks Unavailable 
- 
Raniah 12.00 
Carbonated 
rocks Unavailable 
- 
Urn Wu'al 250.00 Phosphate 
Tabuk region Granite Unavailable - 
Hail Region Granite Unavailable - 
'Million tonnes. 
Diammonium Phosphate. 
Source: DMMR (1996) and (1998a). 
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Figure A. 2: Saudi Arabian Non-Oil Minerals e osits and Main Related Industnes 
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